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Abstract

This dissertation takes a fresh look at the forgotten generation of servicemen and women
who served in theater during the Korean War. Beginning with their shared childhood, growing
up during the Great Depression and World War II, this narrative account follows the story of
American men and women as they enlisted in or were drafted into the Armed Forces, took basic
training, shipped out to the Korean Peninsula or Japan, lived in the war zone, and returned home
to a country that seemed not to have noticed their absence. Special attention is paid throughout
to the complex interplay between service members and the home front and to the changes which
occurred in both the lives of individual Americans and in American life as a result of wartime
experiences. Though not a treatise on civil rights, the dissertation examines how integration in
training and in foxholes helped break down racial barriers.
Research for this project comes from the Library of Congress’s Robert A. Taft Papers
and Veterans History Project Collection, the Eisenhower Papers, various collections at the
National Archives and the Center for the Study of the Korean War, veteran surveys at Carlisle
Barracks, oral history collections, published and unpublished memoirs, collections of veteran
poetry, and contemporary newspaper and magazine stories.
This work adds greatly to the historiography of the American soldier, connecting military
and social history and examining both the personal and collective consequences of waging war
the American way.
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PREFACE
“We came back in dribs and drabs. By and large the public was tired of war and ignored Korea unless it
directly affected them.”—Norman Weibel, Korean War veteran.1
“I was surprised by the lack of interest back home….People usually said, ‘Where have you been, on
vacation?’”—Bob Chester, Korean War veteran.2
“We did what our country called us to do. Is it too much to ask that we be recognized for what we did?”—
Harold L. Mulhausen, Korean War veteran.3

During the Korean Conflict, America shipped the bodies of those killed in action home
for burial for the first time. With little by way of ceremony or pomp, the remains of soldiers who
had died in Korea were interred in simple graves that merely identified the person’s name, rank,
and date of birth. Only later did Americans think to add “Korea” to the stones, ascribing a time
and place, if not a meaning to their deaths. Some 33,700 American soldiers ended their wartime
tour of duty in Korea this way while another 1.8 million returned home alive but alone and
shrouded in the same anonymity, the forgotten soldiers of a forgotten war.4
Unlike their older brothers and cousins who served in World War II and returned to
tickertape parades and the boisterous tunes of welcoming bands, Korean War veterans returned
quietly to a country that had scarcely missed them. Though Americans had initially rallied to the
war drum when President Harry S Truman called on the nation to defend South Korea from

1

Norman Weibel, Korean War Veteran Survey, 8, Center for the Study of the Korean War, Graceland University,
Independence, Missouri (hereafter CFSOKW).
2
R. W. Chester, Korean War Veteran Survey, 7, CFSOKW.
3
Harold L. Mulhausen and James Edwin Alexander, Korea: Memories of a U. S. Marine (Oklahoma City, OK:
Macedon Publishing Company, 1995), i.
4
There are 6.8 million Korean War era veterans, but only 1,789,000 of those served in theater. See Tom Heuertz,
“The Korean War + 50: No Longer Forgotten, Teaching Resources,” Box FF “A.0957-A.0986,” Folder A. 0974,
CFSOKW and “Section XI: Mortality and Combat Service,” “Section 11,” 1, U.S. President’s Commission on
Veterans Pensions (Bradley Commission): Records, 1954-58, A 69-22 and 79-6, Box 61, Dwight David Eisenhower
Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter Bradley Commission and DDE Library). Because of the rotation system, these
veterans of the Korean War returned individually rather than with their platoons or units. As a result, quite often the
trickling home of soldiers went unnoticed and unmarked by communities around the United States. See Chapter 4
for more on the rotation system.
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communist aggression, the lack of home front participation in the form of rationing or other
personal sacrifice soon made Korea only a minor distraction for many Americans.5 As soldiers
still green to battle clung to the Pusan Perimeter, as Marines fought their way out of a place
called Chosin Reservoir with frozen feet and staggering casualties, and as dogfaces tried to hold
the line in a bloody stalemate half a world away, Americans at home went on with business as
usual, concentrating on making the most of the prosperous post-World War II economy. Fearing
wartime shortages, they snapped up furniture and televisions, refrigerators and cars.6 In Fords
and Lincolns and Chevrolets, the war drove right out of the minds of many Americans and into
the middle and back pages of newspapers. Returning veterans could only wonder at the world
that had seemingly forgotten them in their absence, surprised that “there was no evidence that the
civilian population of the USA even knew (or cared) that those of us getting off the ship had seen
desperate combat.”7
And if average Americans found themselves too busy with life to pay attention to the
conflict raging thousands of miles away in Korea or to the soldiers trickling home, moviemakers, novelists, and even historians proved no better at acknowledging the sacrifices made by
those American servicemen and women. Throughout the war and in the years following,
Hollywood produced a number of war movies, but most of them looked back to the “good war,”
World War II, for inspiration. The silver screen showed John Wayne, Henry Fonda, Humphrey
Bogart, Robert Mitchum, Randolph Scott, and a host of other stars heroically battling Nazis and

5

An August 20-25, 1950 Gallup poll showed that 65% of Americans believed that the United States had NOT made
a mistake in deciding to defend Korea. By January 1-5, 1951, that percentage had fallen to 38%, and throughout the
war popular support for military intervention in Korea continued to decline. Also, as it became clear that the war
would have little effect on the home front, interest in the conflict waned. See George Gallup, Jr., “Korean War,” in
The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 2000 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2000), 194.
6
See John E. Wiltze, “The Korean War and American Society,” Wilson Quarterly 2 (Summer 1978): 131.
7
Robert Henderson, Korean War Veteran Survey, 9, CFSOKW.
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“Nips” in such classics as Flying Leathernecks (1951), Battle Cry (1955), and Bridge on the
River Kwai (1957). To be sure, Korea did provide backdrop for a number of films, but with few
exceptions these failed to catch hold of the popular imagination and seemed simply to reuse
themes and storylines from World War II.8 The one exception to this might be M*A*S*H (1970)
which set out to portray the lives of doctors and nurses in a mobile army surgical hospital during
the Korean War, but in the end the film seemed more adept at reflecting the values and issues
belonging to the Vietnam era than at depicting life in Korea. Some fifty years later, the trend
remains the same—movie studios churn out new World War II classics like Saving Private Ryan
(1998), Pearl Harbor (2001), and Flags of Our Fathers (2006), but largely ignore the Korean
War and the men and women who served in it. When Paramount Pictures remade Manchurian
Candidate in 2004, originally a movie centering on a prisoner-of-war brainwashed by the
Chinese, they stripped the story of its original Korean War setting, placing it instead in the Gulf
War.
With its dependency upon public interest for earnings, one can readily understand why
Hollywood paid such short shrift to the Korean Conflict and its veterans, but academics and
scholars have also shown great reluctance in tackling the first hot war of the Cold War. While
they have written hundreds, perhaps thousands of books on Vietnam, the second major flare-up
of the Cold War, historians have produced only a handful of volumes dedicated to the Korean

8

Two books in particular make clear the discrepancy in number and quality between movies about World War II
and the Korean Conflict. Larry Langman and Ed Borg’s Encyclopedia of American War Films, an exhaustive
compilation of films produced from the 1940s through the late 1980s, devotes ten times as much space to World
War II films as it does to Korean War films. In the book, even movies about World War I, the Civil War, and
Vietnam individually fill more lines than those about Korea. Lawrence Suid’s Guts and Glory provides a more
analytical approach, explaining that the nature of the Korean Conflict simply made it less suitable as a topic for
filmmakers than World War II. See Langman and Borg, Encyclopedia of American War Films (New York: Garland
Publishing, 1989) and Suid, Guts and Glory: the Making of the American Military Image in Film, revised and
expanded edition (United States: University Press of Kentucky, 2002).
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War experience. The majority of these concentrate on the military campaign itself or on the
foreign policy that failed to prevent hostilities. Some look at the American home front during
the Cold War, but with a few exceptions, these focus so narrowly as to preclude any real analysis
of the impact of the Korean War on domestic life.9 In some cases, the home front studies even
fail to mention the Korean War at all. Elaine Tyler May’s landmark study on the Cold War
family, Homeward Bound, talks at length about the structure of the American family in the 1950s
but never addresses the millions of families who sent husbands, sons, and fathers overseas to
fight and sometimes die in Korea.10 Not surprisingly, with so little attention paid in general to
the conflict, Korean War veterans are all but excluded from the scholarly literature. Only a few
works, like Rudy Tomedi’s No Bugles, No Drums, Linda Granfield’s I Remember Korea, and
Donald Knox’s two volume oral history of the Korean War take a close look at those who laid
their lives on the line at the 38th Parallel.11 And, while these books do a good job of allowing
veterans to tell their stories, they provide little analysis, focusing primarily on wartime
experiences and leaving the Korean War soldier turned veteran a mystery.
With the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War now past, the time has come for a fresh
and more comprehensive look at the men and women who marched to the “land of the morning
calm” from June 1950 to July 1953. Of the 6.8 million survivors of the Korean War era, only 3.9
million remained in 2000 and the U. S. Department of Veterans Affairs estimates that by 2010
9

There are some noteworthy exceptions to this. Lisle Rose’s Cold War Comes to Main Street spends a good deal of
time investigating the impact of the Korean War on domestic attitudes and life and David Halberstam’s The Fifties
makes frequent references to both the war and the return of those who served overseas. See Lisle Rose, The Cold
War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999) and David Halberstam,
The Fifties (New York: Villard Books, 1993).
10
Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
11
Rudy Tomedi, No Bugles, No Drums: An Oral History of the Korean War (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1993). Donald Knox, The Korean War: Pusan to Chosin: An Oral History (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich, 1985). Donald Knox, with additional text by Alfred Coppel, The Korean War: Uncertain Victory, the
Concluding Volume of an Oral History (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1988). Linda Granfield, I
Remember Korea: Veterans Tell Their Stories of the Korean War, 1950-1953 (New York: Clarion Books, 2003).
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only 2.5 million will still be alive, none under the age of 70.12 The generation is passing and
with it the opportunity to give a face to those who served and to understand the impact that this
war had on veterans and on the world to which they returned.
This study focuses on the veterans of the Korean War, their backgrounds, training and
wartime experiences, attitudes, and post-Korea lives. Raised during the Great Depression and
the Second World War, the men and women who served in Korea learned firsthand the sacrifices
that Americans might be called upon to make in the name of country. After the defeat of the
Nazis and Japanese, however, few could have expected that one day Uncle Sam would ask them
to participate in a ground war of their own. Situated between World War II and the Vietnam
War, did this generation patriotically heed the call to colors as they saw fathers and brothers do
in the 1940s or did they seek to avoid the draft and shun volunteering as their sons and daughters
in the 1960s and 1970s? Did they protest military service? If not, what led them to quietly bear
the responsibility of a war half a world away? And, was that burden shared equally by all
Americans or did people perceive, as they did during the Vietnam War, that factors like race and
social class created inequities in the system and in the nation’s defense of liberty?
Most of the soldiers and Marines who fought on the Korean Peninsula as well as the
nurses and doctors who tended them ended up in the war zone by either enlisting or accepting
induction through the Selective Service system. But, relying on atomic deterrence and air power,
President Truman all but ended the draft and pared down the military in the 1940s, making it
necessary to call up men from the National Guard and Reserves when hostilities erupted along
the 38th Parallel in the summer of 1950. Armed with the American “can do” spirit, a small core
12

U. S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Analysis, Office of Program and Data
Analyses, Data on Veterans of the Korean War, June 2000. (online publication at
www.va.gov/vetdata/demographics/KW2000.doc).
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of regular military men and women supplemented by reservists and newly trained inductees set
out to make a good showing in Korea. But, as they reached the dirty, bloody war being fought in
Korea’s hills, did infantrymen and support personnel think the land and people on whose behalf
they had been summoned worth the price? As the war dragged on and it became clearer to those
fulfilling their obligations overseas that the American public had little interest in the struggle
over real estate in Korea, what motivated them to keep fighting and at what personal cost did
they do so? Had America adequately trained these sons and daughters for the challenges they
now faced?
In contrast to previous wars, servicemen and women returned home from Korea
individually, rotating out after completing a set number of months in country. Some did arrive to
parades or welcoming bands, but most experienced a quieter homecoming. Rather than
celebrating the end of the war as they had in 1945, Americans seemed anxious to simply put
Korea behind them as soon as possible and forget it ever happened. Of course, Congress did
pass a Korean G.I. Bill in 1952, but it was less generous than that of World War II in its
readjustment benefits, further acknowledgement of the country’s tepid gratitude. So rewarded
for doing their duty, did the veterans of Korea use the G.I. Bill as readily as their predecessors or,
like other Americans, did they try to forget their service and pick up their lives just where they
had left off? After their war, did Korean veterans suffer lasting effects from their wartime
experiences? How did the war change them? Known as the “silent generation,” did Korean War
veterans ever recover their identity as war veterans?
While Truman had issued Executive Order 9981 in 1948 in hopes of desegregating the
Armed Forces, little had been done to accomplish that end before the Korean War began.
Manpower pressures on the peninsula, however, forced commanders in the field to integrate
xii

units there and by the end of the war blacks and whites regularly served in the same units at both
training and duty stations. In what ways did these experiences serve to change the attitudes of
individual service members toward race? When they returned to their hometowns, did men and
women see local customs differently in light of their exposure to different types of people while
in the military or in the war theater? Did Korean War veterans become activists as Vietnam
Veterans did later?
With so little scholarly research available on Korean War veterans, these are difficult
questions to answer. However, given the current war in Iraq and the cyclical return of veterans
to American society, the endeavor to identify both the impact of war on participants and of
veterans on American culture remains worthy. And, approaching the sixtieth anniversary of the
beginning of their war, it is time to recognize the veterans of Korea. Relying upon such diverse
sources as statistical data from the Bradley Commission Report, Korean War Veteran Surveys,
personal memoirs, oral histories, archival records, public opinion polls, Project Clear reports,
contemporary newspaper and magazine articles, and studies on the draft, this work seeks to give
a voice to those who served in the Korean War and to place them in the larger context of
American history.
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CHAPTER 1: TIMING IS EVERYTHING
“It was our generation’s turn to answer the country’s call.”—Lawrence Cole, Korean War veteran.1
“I was brought up in poverty during the Great Depression. I remember World War II very vividly….It was
a disgrace not to serve our country in one way or another. It really was ‘our country right or wrong.’”—
Ralph Cutro, Korean War veteran.2
“And when I was told to go and do something, all I thought of was just go and do it. I never thought, I never
gave it a second thought.”—Joseph W. Jimenez, Korean War veteran.3
“My generation never questioned authority, we merely complied.”—Bernie Ruchin, Korean War veteran.4

William Dannenmaier missed serving in World War II by just about a year because of his
age. But as a young man, he did not fret over skipping such an important generational
experience. In fact, when he had registered for the draft as required by law, Dannenmaier never
expected to go anywhere, except maybe to graduate school.5 He reflected to himself on his luck,
that the war was over and despite the requirement to register for the Selective Service, “young
men’s lives were no longer forfeit. We could plan our futures—and have them.”6
Though they did not say so, Robert Baken, Lynn Hahn, Rudolph Stephens, Howard
Matthias, and Bill Anderson probably all felt the same optimism and self-determination as
Dannenmaier. Born in 1930, Baken also bypassed the Second World War and by the early 1950s
had settled comfortably into the study of electrical engineering at the Illinois Institute of

1

Lawrence Cole, Korean War Veteran Survey, 4, Center for the Study of the Korean War, Graceland University,
Independence, Missouri (hereafter CFSOKW).
2
Ralph Cutro, Korean War Veteran Survey, 13, CFSOKW.
3
Joseph W. Jimenez (AFC 2001/001/7979), Folder 3, Interview by Colleen Fulco of Joseph W. Jimenez, 29 May
2003, 13, Veterans History Project Collection, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress (hereafter VHPC,
AFC, LOC).
4
Bernie Ruchin, email to Melinda Pash, 3 July 2004, in author’s possession.
5
Despite the end of World War II, Selective Service laws remained in place almost continuously until the Korean
War. Refer to George Q. Flynn, The Draft, 1940-1973 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 2 and 116.
6
William D. Dannenmaier, We Were Innocents: An Infantryman in Korea (Chicago: University of Illinois Press,
1999), 10.

1

Technology.7 He planned to graduate and saw no reason why he should not. Lynn Hahn and
Rudolph Stephens had settled into something a bit cozier. Hahn, walking down an Alma,
Michigan street in the fall of 1950, met Beatrice Ruth Allen and after a brief courtship they
became engaged.8 Similarly, Stephens, only eleven when World War II started, had decided by
1951 that he wanted to marry his girlfriend.9 Nothing in the seemingly placid and prosperous
years after 1945 had prepared Hahn and Stephens for the possibility that they would not soon
follow up their betrothals with honeymoons and dinner parties, and maybe even a baby or two.
As for Howard Matthias and Bill Anderson, they chose very different directions than their peers.
Matthias, graduating college and concerned about the draft looming over him, enlisted in the
Marines, despite his own imminent engagement.10 In April 1950, at the ripe old age of 17, with
his parents’ consent, Anderson enlisted in what he believed to be the United States’ peacetime
Army Air Force.11 No doubt he foresaw an uneventful military career with decent pay and a
nice, dependable retirement at the end.
It is hard to say if Virginia Jennings Watson was also thinking about retirement when she
enlisted in the Navy. After all, every branch of the service mustered married women out pretty
quickly, so a permanent career in the Navy would have doomed her to a lifetime spent as an old
maid. But, her father had been an aviator in World War II and her mother, a proudly naturalized
American citizen, had been a Navy yeoman in Estonia during World War I, so military service

7

Robert E. Baken (AFC 2001/001/1443), Folder 2, Interview by Matthew Baken, 23 November 2001, 2, VHC,
AFC, LOC.
8
Lynn Harold Hahn, Memoir (Korean War Educator website at http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/), 2.
9
Rudolph W. Stephens, Old Ugly Hill: A G.I.’s Fourteen Months in the Korean Trenches, 1952-1953 (Jefferson,
NC: McFarland and Company, 1995), 14.
10
Howard Matthias, The Korean War—Reflections of a Young Combat Platoon Leader, revised edition
(Tallahassee, FL: Father & Son Publishing, 1995), 1-2.
11
William E. Anderson, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 2.
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came naturally. And, Virginia’s father seemed thrilled when she decided to join up.12 Betty Jo
Alexander’s father could not have reacted more differently. A serviceman in World War II, he
had come to think of military nurses as prostitutes and he and Betty Jo’s brother, also a World
War II veteran, definitely did not want Betty Jo to enlist in the Navy of all things!13 The
alternative of staying in Altus, Oklahoma and picking cotton, though, had little appeal and Betty
Jo did not let the weeds grow under her feet before marching down to the recruiter’s office.
While not subject to the draft like their male counterparts, Virginia and Betty Jo found the
promise of military service too alluring to resist.
Across the country the story was the same. In America’s big cities and small towns, in
the mountains and on the plains, along the coasts, in the countryside and on thousands of little
farms, the young men and women who belonged to the generation after the “greatest generation”
busily plotted the courses of their futures. But somewhere in between all the dreams,
engagements, weddings, births, college pins, careers, and carefully constructed plans, timing
intervened. On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea. To almost everyone’s
surprise, President Harry Truman set his jaw against this further expansion of communism and
wasted no time in committing American soldiers and sailors to a limited war in Korea. As a
result, many of those young men and some of the young women who had escaped the perils of
service in World War II, along with many who had served during that war, received a new
“invitation” from Uncle Sam to come and fight (or nurse those fighting) half a world away in
Korea.14 As Dannenmaier observed, “Now it was my turn.”15

12

Frances Omori, Quiet Heroes: Navy Nurses of the Korean War, 1950-1953, Far East Command (St. Paul, MN:
Smith House Press, 2000), 70.
13
Ibid., 69.
14
It should be noted that the Korean War was not fought solely by new draftees and recruits. Shortages of military
manpower at the beginning of the war due to the drastic dismantling of the World War II military made necessary

3

Whatever arrangements had been made, whatever prospects waited just on the horizon,
the Korean War and the draft were about to reconfigure the life blueprints of many young
draftees and enlisted men and women. Like hundreds of thousands of others, Dannenmaier,
Baken, Hahn, Stephens, Matthias, and Anderson all ended up in a war zone in Korea instead of
in Michigan or California building lives at home during the early 1950s. Dannenmaier enlisted
in order to avoid the draft, replacing graduate school with boot camp, at least for the time being.
But, he did have his undergraduate degree. Baken did not even get the chance to finish college
before mustering in. On summer break 1951, he received his draft notice and the draft board
denied his appeal to complete college before serving based on his non-enrollment that summer.
He mustered in September 1951.16 Stephens, believing that nothing could come of an
engagement interrupted by a long wartime separation, broke off his engagement. Years later he
still maintained that he never quite got over his fiancé.17 Hahn went ahead and married Beatrice,
spending his last three months before Korea as a married man. They recently celebrated their
50th wedding anniversary.18 Matthias also married his girl before shipping out and on the eve of
his departure learned she was pregnant. Whether good luck or bad, he received a Purple Heart
wound and was sent home in time to welcome the new arrival.19 Anderson, like many Korean
War era volunteers, experienced Korea as a grunt in ground combat. By the time Anderson
enlisted, the Air Force had separated from the Army, a little fact that the recruiter failed to

the call up of tens of thousands of reservists and national guardsmen, many of whom had already served in World
War II.
15
Dannenmaier, We Were Innocents, 2.
16
Robert E. Baken, Interview by Baken and Baken, 2, VHPC, AFC, LOC.
17
Stephens, Old Ugly Hill, 14.
18
Lynn Harold Hahn, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 1-2.
19
Matthias, The Korean War, 176.
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mention when he was signing up.20 Virginia Jennings Watson and Betty Jo Alexander received
orders to report overseas as Navy nurses. While some women sent to Japan or Korea felt great
trepidation, Watson looked forward to helping the war effort and doing “something
worthwhile.”21 Numberless and nameless others put their plans on hold or abandoned them
entirely and went to Korea, Japan, or Navy or hospital ships stationed in the Far East. They had
babies born while they stood in the foxholes, lost girlfriends and boyfriends and wives due to
their absence, gave up good jobs, turned into soldiers, earned their stripes, or simply changed
their plans and perhaps themselves as a result of their service.
Born during the Great Depression and sandwiched somewhere between the “Good War,”
World War II and the “bad war,” Vietnam, the men and women who served during the Korean
Conflict shared more than just the donning of military issue olive drab.22 They were a generation
of their own, influenced by a childhood made common by the uncommon events they shared—a
deep and nearly universal economic depression and then a war of unprecedented scale followed
by what many hoped would be an enduring peace. Little did they know it then, but this historical
backdrop served to uniquely prepare some of them to accept their roles in Harry Truman’s war
over a small, squalid, maybe even insignificant piece of Asia called Korea.
Though most of the men and women destined to serve in Korea and the Far East
Command would have been too young to remember October 24, 1929, they would certainly
recognize the effects of that day on their lives. “Black Thursday” as it was called marked the
end of the roaring twenties and the beginning of the decade long economic decline that started on
20
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Wall Street and rippled through the various Main Streets of America. Throughout the country,
banks closed, factories sat collecting dust, farmers threw in their rakes as their properties were
foreclosed, and average Americans wandered the streets or rode the rails in search of work. For
the children born in these years of widespread poverty, there were tangible and sometimes
terrible consequences. Poor diet and the inability to afford proper medical care led to
malnourishment, a rise in diseases like rickets and pellagra, and lifelong health issues. The high
rate of unemployment meant that many suffered eviction, hunger, discomfort, and parental
absence as fathers or mothers job-hunted. Not uncommonly, youngsters had to suspend their
schooling to either find employment themselves or help out at home or on the farm.
But the Great Depression served as an effective teacher to these kids, even if most of the
lessons were bitter to learn. If they were old enough, boys and girls learned to work and work
hard without complaining or questioning. They plowed fields, hawked newspapers, sold apples,
cared for younger siblings, and fed livestock. Like the adults around them, children of the
Depression sacrificed and pulled together with their loved ones, their communities, and their
country to survive hard times. And, they learned a new American lesson, too, that the
government could be their friend. President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, begun in 1933,
didn’t pull the United States out of depression, but it did ease the suffering of countless
Americans who benefited from its various programs aimed at relief, reform and recovery.
Children who had known only empty bellies and hardscrabble existences could see the difference
that government assistance made and they learned to trust and love their Uncle Sam.23 For many
it would be difficult to shake the image of a benevolent president wisely acting in the best
23
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interests of the country—even when shivering through Korean winters and ducking showers of
Chinese bullets.
As babies and young children of the Great Depression, most of the Korean War
generation sat on the sidelines during World War II, too young to be drafted or even to enlist.
But, the Second World War would nonetheless prove a milestone in their lives. Unaware of the
isolationism and malaise that had lingered after World War I, the men and women who would
later serve in Korea were ten and eleven year old kids when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor.
They saw how Americans joined together to back the war effort, even if that meant making grave
sacrifices. For their part, sixteen million American men, including the fathers and older brothers
of those who would later serve in Korea, stepped into military uniforms ready to do their duty
and lay down their lives in defense of the country. Those left behind on the home front did their
part, too. Whole towns turned out to say goodbye to their native sons being shipped off to war.
Ordinary Americans, even young ones, grew Victory Gardens, saved scrap metal and paper,
bought war stamps and war bonds, harvested the pod from milkweed for the making of
parachutes, and patriotically rallied behind their government.24 In the schools, club periods
became “victory periods” and junior ROTC units donated their time to pick up metal and other
materials and load them onto trains bound for national collection points.25 Many students quit
school altogether in order to enlist or go to work in defense plants.26 With fathers and older
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siblings gone in service of one type or another, younger children bucked up, taking on adult
responsibilities at home and within the community.27 When asked to conserve, Americans
accepted the severe rationing of such items as gasoline, meat, butter, sugar, and flour, and they
continued to support the war. For hundreds of thousands of kids, the message must have been
clear; in a time of war American citizens rally together, sharing the sacrifices and keeping the
trust with those whom they have called to serve.
In addition to burdens, World War II provided a great amount of excitement for those
growing up. Just the thought of war thrilled some of them. Jack Orth remembers sitting around
the dinner table when his family heard the news of Pearl Harbor. “Everyone was in a state of
shock. Can you imagine how exciting this was to a ten-year-old kid?”28 And if the real war
proved insufficient to keep the attention of youths, the “reel” World War II often did the trick.
Saturday matinees routinely featured John Wayne or Robert Mitchum in motion pictures
guaranteed to titillate audiences with true or manufactured wartime heroics. Even after the war
ended, Hollywood deluged young moviegoers with films glorifying the men who fought at the
Battle of the Bulge or Wake Island. For many, Sergeant Stryker, the cool-under-pressure bona
fide hard-ass Marine in The Sands of Iwo Jima (1949) served a far greater purpose than simple
entertainment. He and other characters like him became influential role models for the
generation of men that had missed out on World War II. As one Korean War veteran put it, “I
had been exposed to everything about warfare by Hollywood. These visions filled my head
when I joined up for the Korean War. My intentions were to kill a few North Koreans or
27
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Chinese, maybe get a small wound and be taken care of by a June Allyson or Doris Day type
nurse. Then I would return home to a hero’s welcome and have nice things said of me for the
rest of my life.”29 Others felt the same way and when the Korean War rolled around, they
determined to pay their debt to America and become heroes in their own right, heroes worthy of
depiction on the silver screen.30
If exposure to World War II influenced the young men of the Korean generation to enlist,
it sometimes had a different effect on young women. The movies occasionally depicted nurses,
WAVES, or WACS as American heroines, but many returning fathers, brothers and sweethearts
sang a different tune about female military service. Rather than touting feminine heroics and the
glamour of wartime nursing, protective fathers stressed the uncertainty of military life. Brothers
offered favorable appraisals in general of “women in uniform EXCEPT that they do not think it
is good for their sisters.”31 Boyfriends frequently went further, associating women in service
with immorality and poor reputation.32 All in all, “they would say bad things about the women
in the service.”33 No wonder then that by the time of the Korean War, female recruiters faced a
difficult task, to convince women to join the military despite negative feedback from their family
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or friends.34 Still, women were not immune to the patriotism engendered by the Second World
War and the Korean Conflict did claim its share of servicewomen. They did not always muster
in for the same reasons as their male counterparts, but women also remembered the patriotic
lessons of their youth.35 Margie Jacob and a multitude of others could claim “patriotic response”
as an important reason for their enlistment in the years after World War II.36
With the surrender of the Germans and then the Japanese, American patriotism soared to
new heights as did American gratitude toward those who had fought. Noisy parades, tickertape,
and a flurry of speeches and parties greeted returning G.I.s. In almost every town, bands played
songs commemorating World War II soldiers and organizations like the American Veterans of
World War II (AMVETS) sprouted to represent and pay homage to the new veterans. Unlike
their counterparts from earlier wars, World War II veterans also received very generous support
from the federal government. The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, or the G.I. Bill of
Rights as it was more commonly known, allotted federal money to help veterans buy homes and
businesses or go to school.37 Within a few years, some 8 million veterans had spent about $14
billion taking advantage of these educational benefits. So many ex-G.I.s entered college, in fact,
that many universities had to set up Quonset huts on campus to house all of them. The men and
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women entering college directly from high school could not help but be impressed with the older
veterans in their midst. In his memoir, Charles Cole notes, “[We] were continually reminded
both of sacrifice and patriotism. We seemed a humble minority in the flood of returning ex-G.I.s
who shared our classes.”38 Certainly, not all of those who served in World War II benefited from
it or could take advantage of the programs designed to help them ease back into civilian life, but
from the perspective of the generation just a step younger, veterans had become a special group
in society, revered, honored, and remunerated. The men and women who would muster in for
the Korean War would expect to do their duty, but they would also expect the same gratitude on
the part of the nation that sent them.
World War II caused some peculiar fallout for the Korean War generation. When it
ended, it left America at peace, but it also left in place the Selective Service system of 1940.
Though President Truman was dismantling the military at an almost alarming rate, males ages
21-36 still had to register for the draft and were liable for one year of active duty and ten years in
the reserves.39 After an aborted attempt to replace the Selective Service Act with a Universal
Military Training bill, Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1948 which lowered the
ages of eligibility for registration to 18-26, set the age of induction at 19-26, and increased the
tour of duty to 21 months.40 Boys maturing during and after World War II would find the draft
an ever-present force in their lives.
The changed landscape of the world in the postwar years, however, made military service
both less likely and more tolerable. The Second World War divided the globe into newly minted
38
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great powers, like the United States and the Soviet Union, and vanquished countries, a category
that included almost everyone else. And while the atomic bomb would eventually scare
Americans right out of their homes and into underground shelters, in 1945 the country’s sole
guardianship of atomic weaponry provided a certain “atomic security.”41 Russia might loom
threateningly on the horizon, but it would not take American ground troops to quell any
difficulties—nuclear weapons would do the trick. Even as late as 1949 when the Soviet Union
exploded their own A-Bomb, few Americans suspected that American boys might be called to
fight in another war with traditional weapons and tactics. Evidently, Harry Truman did not think
so either. By March 1949, the organized reserves had been pared down to 746,000 and by the
end of the year all branches of the military halted enlistments. The regular Army had strength of
only 591,000 by mid-1950, somewhat strange in light of the fact that only recently Russia had
exploded its own atomic bomb, Mao had seized mainland China for communism, containment
had made military assistance to Greece and Turkey necessary, and Europe had depended on the
Marshall Plan to shore them up against further decline and the potential siren song of
communism.42 Stranger still, young Americans continued to believe throughout what would
later be viewed as unsettling if not turbulent events that they could count on one thing—they
would not be required for the same kind of wartime service that veterans of World War II had
performed. Any war would be a worldwide affair and it would be fought with nuclear weapons
rather than conventional armies.43
Unfortunately, the men and women born a little too late to muster into America’s World
War II military machine would be just in time to discover that the atomic security they believed
41
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in was no security at all. Despite organized demands by citizens in Shawnee, Oklahoma and
elsewhere that the government drop atomic bombs on Korea and use nuclear weapons on the
battlefield, the “police action” in Korea from 1950 to 1953 would be fought like thousands of
wars before—by soldiers mucking around on the ground with guns.44 On the bright side,
probably no generation of American youth before or since was better prepared to deal with such
a reversal of fortune than that which grew up to fight in Korea. Despite ethnic, racial, religious,
political, and regional differences, they all listened to the same baseball games at night on the
radio, wore the same clothes, shopped at the local A&P, ate macaroni and cheese for dinner, and
most importantly absorbed those lessons of hard work, obedience, and duty to country from their
childhood experiences.45 So when the country called on them in June 1950 and in the months
and years after, those selected from among their Korean War cohorts heeded the call. No strong,
organized draft protest ever developed during the Korean Conflict as it had in earlier wars and as
would resurface with Vietnam and very few men attempted to dodge the draft. Out of the
roughly 2 million men involuntarily inducted from 1950 to 1953, only 20,080 ever faced
prosecution for violating the draft and of those only 9890 were convicted.46 Like Jimmie Clark
they understood that “It’s your privilege to disagree, but not disobey” and so “off we went to
unknown places to serve our country as our leaders suggested.”47
Still, not all soldiers marched willingly or happily to the Korean War, and it is
remarkable that so few resisted the draft or protested the war itself, simply resigning themselves
to their fates. Separated by only a little over a decade from their younger brothers and sisters of
44
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the Vietnam War, why did Korean soldiers not burn their draft cards and line the street in front
of the White House demanding an end to the conflict? The answer lies in part in their timing.
The late 1940s and early 1950s were years of conformity. The second Red Scare made
Americans look carefully at anyone who stepped outside the political or social bounds and the
consequences for such deviance could be devastating not only to individuals but to their families.
Homosexuals found themselves investigated as security risks, advocates of peace suffered
charges of communism, and outspoken critics of segregation had passports revoked. World War
II might have stirred up some resentment against the status quo and restlessness on the part of
African Americans, Hispanics, women, and others, but such disillusionment would not blossom
into full blown rights revolutions until the 1960s and for the time being consensus about
American life in general remained virtually unshaken. When men grew up, they became the man
in the gray flannel suit, married June Cleaver, and raised a family.48 And when asked to fight on
behalf of American conformity to the doctrine of containment, they marched to war.
Unknown to them at the time, these children of the Great Depression and Second World
War would be the last of their kind, a generation characterized by unquestioning obedience and
trust. Their war, the war for conformity, would turn out to be one of a series of pivotal events
spinning Americans in a thousand directions and creating more questions than answers. The
Cold War would harden and become ever more frightening, pushing Americans toward less
consensual and more precarious conformity at home. Communism would be exposed as
fractured and splintered rather than monolithic, leading many to question the necessity of
fighting it at all. Joseph McCarthy would reveal himself as a red-baiting, demagogic bully in the
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Army-McCarthy hearings, sickening those who watched it on television. Segregation would end
and the national Civil Rights Movement would gear up, dividing the country on questions of
race. Women, Native Americans, and Mexicans would challenge the status quo, redrawing
societal expectations. Government leaders would prove untrustworthy, paving the way for future
generations to question authority. Worldly and jaded G.I.s taking advantage of the World War II
and Korean G.I. Bills would transform education, generating new lessons that bred less
optimistic, more critical students. And Korea would become a reference point for those
summoned to fight in Vietnam, leaving many young men and women unable to find a successful
patriotic answer to whether or not the new war was worth it. Twenty years after the Korean War,
the country was the same but the people had changed—they were still all Americans but the old
homogeny and agreement born of the Great Depression and World War II was gone.
The men who fought in Korea and the women who served in theater were no braver than
the soldiers at Khe Sanh, Grenada, Panama, Mogadishu, or Iraq. In the history of American
soldiers and veterans, they can claim no monopoly on that active love of country sometimes
labeled patriotism. But, a different America had produced them and more than the draftees of
Vietnam or the all-volunteer force of recent years, they carried into battle and overseas duty the
certainty that where they led the country would follow. In 1950 or 1951, they were too young to
remember other American wars fought for lesser motives with less enthusiasm on the part of
citizens than World War II. Perhaps naively they imagined that they were marching to the beat
of the same drums that had carried their fathers, brothers, and older sisters to France or Germany
in the Second or even the First Great War. They could not yet hear that the tune was changing
and that those values embedded in them during a childhood of economic trouble and war were
becoming if not outdated at least less universal. When they returned, Korean War soldiers and
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CHAPTER 2: MUSTERING IN
“Lord I got my questionnaire, Uncle Sam’s gonna send me away from here/He said J. B. you know that I
need you, Lord I need you in South Korea.”—stanza of “Korea Blues.”1
“Greetings from the President of the United States.”—from Jimmie L. Clark’s draft letter.2
“He was like a million other guys. Whenever folly, blunder, wasted power, brought again the need for them,
they came.”—From Jackland Marmur, “The Bloodstained Beach.”3
“In the old country they say you gotta go in the army, you go. But here no one says you gotta go in these
Marines. Why you go? You don’t like your home, your family, whatsamatter?”—Joe DeMarco’s father
when he enlisted in 1948.4

“You’ll be soooorry!” The taunt from those who knew, who had already been there,
usually came just a little too late—like after raw recruits or inductees had already signed away a
year or two or five of their lives to the military.5 And by then, many of those being warned
already felt sorry. Mustering into the U. S. Armed Forces during the Korean War era, as in other
periods, sometimes amounted to nothing short of humiliation or hassle. For enlistees, the
process began with a trip to the nearest recruitment office, frequently located in the local Post
Office. Rural or small town residents might have had to travel to a larger community, but that in
itself presented little hardship, unless of course one were black. In that case, special
arrangements would have had to be made for travel, food, and lodging since de jure and de facto
segregation throughout much of the country, and especially in the South, limited one’s options.
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Once at the recruitment center, the potential enlistee gave background information—age,
race, educational level, marital status, number and ages of dependents, criminal record, etc.—to
“fast-typing sergeants” who quickly created a file for the applicant.6 Enlistees before the
outbreak of hostilities in Korea also had to supply three letters of recommendation written on
their behalf.7 Anita Bean, a foster child from the age of three when her mother passed away, had
to get her referrals from the state when she enlisted in 1950.8 If everything looked good—age
between 18 and 26 for males (or 17 with a parent’s signature) and 21 to 35 for females (or 18 to
35 with a parent’s consent), apparent good health, no evidence of an immoral character such as
would warrant an administrative disqualification, and in the case of women single with no
dependents under age 18—the candidate moved to the next level, the mental qualification exam.9
Men, women, enlistees, and draftees all took the AFQT (Armed Forces Qualification Test) or
6
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similar exams at either a recruitment center or an examining station.10 A hybrid aptitudeintelligence test consisting of 100 questions covering vocabulary, math, spatial relations, and
mechanical ability, the AFQT determined the fitness for service of the inductee or enlistee and
indicated where a passing candidate might fit in the military machinery, what MOS (military
occupational specialty) or job best suited them. With less access to quality classroom education,
minorities such as African Americans scored lower on the AFQT and had much higher rejection
rates than whites.11 A low score, though perhaps embarrassing, did not necessarily mean
rejection, however. High school graduates “were automatically declared acceptable even if they
failed to achieve the required score on the test.”12 And, prior to any disqualification, low-scoring
registrants with less than a high school degree met with personnel psychologists who conducted
personal interviews to establish whether or not they had the mental ability to serve.13 Also, as
manpower needs went up, the minimum acceptable score on the mental exams went down.14 In
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September 1949, one needed to score at least 49% to qualify for service, but by July 1951, 10%
would do the trick.15
Those found mentally acceptable had only one more obstacle to overcome before being
sworn into their chosen branch of the military, the often dreaded physical exam. While female
veterans rarely mention the physical at all in their writings and interviews, male veterans
frequently describe it as “a very dehumanizing experience.”16 Male enlistees and draftees lined
up either naked or in their skivvies as military medical staff walked along examining them one
by one, checking, among other things, private parts for signs of disease, rectums for
hemorrhoids, and feet for flatness.17 All that remained for physically fit recruits and inductees
was to take their oaths and then catch a train or bus to basic training. For most this proved pretty
uneventful after the drawn out processing-in, but for some it provided a measure of excitement.
Ralph David Fly, enlisting in the Navy, had his June 1951 swearing-in at a movie theater in
Seattle just before the premiere of what else but Gary Cooper’s “You’re in the Navy Now!”18
For their troubles, these new Marines, soldiers, and sailors received, after reaching their
destinations and waiting in yet another line, their new military issue clothing. Even many of
those who had not wanted to join the service to begin with could not help but admire and be
proud of their wonderful new uniforms. At the end of all the lines and red tape and after much
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anticipation or dread, entrants finally came to be officially mustered into the United States
Armed Forces.19
Such was the scenario played out millions of times during the Korean War as young men
and women had to be newly mustered or re-mustered into the Armed Forces of the United States
in order to fill out the ranks. After World War II ended, President Harry S Truman and his
military planners focused on preparing for worldwide atomic war.20 In the new era of
superpowers, no one expected conventional weapons or troops to play much of a role. As a
result, the various branches of the U. S. military had been pared down by 1950 to the point where
the government itself conceded that more money would have to be spent rebuilding the Armed
Forces if the country wanted to present a credible posture against communist aggression.21 With
the outbreak of war in Korea in late June 1950 and Truman’s determination to use American
troops to “police” the fray, the need for a bigger military became even more acute. Initially,
General Douglas MacArthur pulled troops on duty in Japan for the Korean operation, but quickly
realized that these would not suffice. Not only were the garrison forces there unprepared for
combat after months or even years of easy duty, they were understrength as well.22 Before long,
American soldiers in Korea found themselves cornered in the Pusan Perimeter. Replacements
19
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and more units would be needed immediately.23 The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, only
recently turning away enlistees, suddenly needed to fill uniforms and fast.
All branches of the service stepped up their attempts to attract voluntary recruits and to
keep the servicemen they had on hand by offering enticements for reenlistment or simply by
extending involuntarily enlistments that were due to expire. For its part, the Army made
especially good use of the Selective Service System, the draft, to fulfill its manpower needs.
But, new recruits, voluntary or otherwise, took time to train, time that MacArthur insisted U. S.
troops in Korea did not have. By July 9, 1950 Congress authorized the call up of Reserve
troops.24 Typically these would have been used to train new soldiers, but with the situation
critical, many found themselves promptly headed for the combat zone. The combination seemed
a winning one. MacArthur’s daring mid-September Inchon landing secured South Korea and by
early October American troops were pressing into North Korea. Draft calls, enlistment quotas
and the military’s manpower needs should have fallen to near prewar levels, but as luck would
have it a new and unexpected enemy entered the fight.25 Chinese “volunteers” crossed the Yalu
on October 16, 1950 and by November 26 the Chinese had trapped and destroyed much of the
United Nations force in North Korea, including about 20,000 Koreans and Americans at Chosin
Reservoir. The boys would not be home by Christmas. Instead, many more would be needed for
what was metamorphosing into a much longer conflict than anticipated. The whole process of
filling the ranks took on new life and another generation of young Americans found it their turn
23
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to heed the nation’s call to arms. Through enlistments, Reserve recalls, National Guard call-ups,
and the draft, over 6 million men and women mustered into the U. S. military during the Korean
War period.26 No doubt more than a few of them were very “soooorry!”

The Volunteers

The Korean War rekindled a dying Selective Service System that in fiscal years 1948 and
1950 had not even drafted anybody. Even after the U.S. entered the Korean War, inductees
rarely comprised more than 38% of those entering Uncle Sam’s military.27 Volunteers,
guardsmen, and reservists accounted for the majority of those who served.28 When the war
began in June 1950, career soldiers and leftover World War II volunteers or recruits from the
interwar period made up the backbone of the Armed Forces. For them, the military made signing
on for the Korean effort easy—the various branches simply extended expiring enlistments
involuntarily.29 But, in the three years that followed, a million and a half new enlistees joined
the old salts. Why did these choose to voluntarily enter into wartime military service? And why
had the older volunteers enlisted in the first place?
26
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For males, the draft provided the most obvious reason to enlist.30 Under the Selective
Service Act of 1948, men 18 to 26 had to register for the draft and those 19 to 26 were eligible
for a 21 month tour of duty.31 Even non-citizens found themselves draft vulnerable under the
1948 law unless they were willing to sacrifice the possibility of future naturalization.32 In the
pre-Korea years, the likelihood of being drafted remained low and few men received notices for
induction. But, if drafted, the chances of entering the Army were high since only the Army and
Marine Corps actually admitted draftees. The Air Force and Navy relied on all-volunteer forces.
After Truman began committing troops to Korea in June 1950, draft calls skyrocketed from their
previous levels and many more youths could expect their names to be chosen. Like Glen
Schroeder, many young men simply enlisted in order to have a choice about which branch they
served. Glen joined the Navy to “avoid being a grunt….I didn’t want to crawl around in the mud,
but go to sea instead.”33 Similarly, James Brady “rather liked the idea of being an officer, and
the Marines had an undeniable cachet.”34 Others simply did not want to wait around for the draft
to call them. Like Huston Wheelock they “wanted to get it over with and serve my time.”
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Wheelock did not even care which service he went into, selecting the Marines because that was
the first recruiter he ran into at the office!35 Ford Dixon wanted to finish his military obligations
before entering college, so at 17 he mustered in.36 Donald Bohlmann and others chose to enlist
in National Guard units even if they were due to be activated because if they had to serve they
wanted to “be amongst people I knew.” 37
Still more volunteered for the National Guard in an attempt to either beat the draft or
escape the war. Classified I-A (available for service), Frank Rowan discovered through a friend
that he could fulfill his military obligations by joining the California National Guard, serving 7
years and becoming exempt from being drafted into the Army. It did not work out quite as he
planned, though. Lured by the extra “rations and quarters” pay and the privilege of wearing the
uniform to work, Rowan went on duty as an “Active Duty National Guardsman,” then got
conscripted into the regular Army and shipped to Korea in the early months of the war.38 Bob
Carpenter, owner of the Philadelphia Phillies, encouraged two of his players, Charlie Bicknell
and Curt Simmons, to avoid conscription by joining the Guard in 1949. A year later, their
division, the 28th Infantry Division, got orders to activate and prepare for combat. Bicknell got
sold to the Braves, sent down to the minors on waivers, and played his last game on September
6, 1950, the same day he left for basic training.39 These cases were not unusual and many men
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who joined either the National Guard or Reserves found that these did not offer a safe haven
from service in Korea.
Others thought joining either the Navy or Air Force might keep them out of harm’s way.
Ralph Fly’s father pressured him to join the Navy because “he thought it would keep me out of
Korea.”40 For Franklin Manzar, the draft was imminent and so he “joined the Air Force with the
intention of not going to Korea.”41 Such plans might have worked out for some boys, but like
these, many ended up serving active duty in Korea. Navy and Air Force enlistees went in fewer
numbers to the war zone than dogfaces or Marines but they still went.
To be sure, male volunteers often hoped to get a better deal than the draft by enlisting,
but a shorter time in service was not one of the perks. Inductees served between 21 and 24
months active duty, but volunteers faced considerably longer periods of service. In the Army,
Selective Service registrants could enlist for the same period of time as draftees, but entering the
regular Army meant a term of between 3 and 6 years. The Navy offered only 4 or 6 year tours of
duty, regardless of Selective Service status and the Naval Reserve required 4 years.42 At the
beginning of the Korean War, the Marine Corps only had 4 and 6 year enlistments, but in August
1950 the Corps began offering 3 year terms as well. One could join the Marine Corps Reserve
for 3 or 4 years.43 The Air Force accepted volunteers for 3, 4, 5, or 6 years.44 Under the
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, anyone under 26 mustering into the
40
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military for the first time had an 8 year obligation to be served either on active duty or in the
reserves. Even if a volunteer banked on a short war, they could not count on serving a reduced
time in the military like their World War I or World War II counterparts whose terms of
enlistment held them no longer than six months beyond the period of the emergency.45 But for
some, choosing their branch of service or gambling that their reserve unit would not be needed
proved enough incentive to volunteer. All in all, draft pressure almost doubled the number of
male enlistments per month.46
While the draft provided a potent inducement to enlistment, men and women volunteered
during the Korean War era for other reasons as well. Left-over patriotism from the Second
World War along with a sense of nostalgia or duty compelled many to answer the call to colors.
Fred Smith remembers that after World War II, “patriotism…was an important part of our
lives…and we felt we needed to do something for our country.”47 Arthur Smith agreed “because
all the guys went through World War II to do their thing to save this country, and I thought that’s
what we were doing.”48 Warren Grossman wanted to offer “service to my country in time of
need.”49 Clyde Queen “felt a compelling obligation to serve my country…and to me that was the
most important thing in my life.”50 Even women, who often entered service for what might be
termed “practical” reasons, remark that volunteering “had a kind of patriotic sense about it in
45

“Section X: Duration of Service,” 8-12, (Bradley Commission): Records, 1954-58, A 69-22 and 79-6, Box 61,
DDE Library.
46
With the absence of the draft in 1947, only 9-14,000 men enlisted per month. After Truman requested a new draft
in March 1948, enlistments increased to 20,000 per month. 40% of enlistees who were polled admitted that they
enlisted in order to avoid the draft. For the Korean War years, as many as 60% of male enlistments are believed to
have been draft-motivated. See Flynn, The Draft, 118.
47
Commander Fred Ewing Smith in Frances Omori, Quiet Heroes: Navy Nurses of the Korean War, 1950-1953,
Far East Command (St. Paul, MN: Smith House Press, 2000), 84.
48
Arthur Smith, Memoir (Korean War Educator), 1.
49
Warren Grossman, Army Service (Korean War) Questionnaire, 1, 1st Cavalry Division, Surnames A-L, Carlisle
Barracks.
50
Clyde H. Queen, Sr., (AFC 2001/001/10115), Folder 2, Transcript (Written answers to interview questions), 1,
VHPC, AFC, LOC.

27

doing something for my country.”51 For the same reason, Native Americans also rallied to the
flag. In September 1950, Dr. Frank E. Becker, National Secretary of the Indian Association of
America, offered the government a plan to organize Native American military reserve units
specializing in communications in order to channel the energy of 6000 military age men on
reservations for service to the country.52 Gilbert Towner had heard that Indians, as wards of the
government, could be exempted from wartime service, but he thought it a “high honor to fight,
anytime, anywhere, to protect the country we love.”53
Those too young to have participated fully in World War II enlisted in the interwar and
Korean War eras because they could not shake the feeling that they had missed something
significant. During high school, John Nolan’s classmates disappeared as volunteers or inductees,
leaving him with “this hang-up feeling that it was an experience that I wanted to share.”54
Anthony Herbert, determined not to miss out, tried to enlist for World War II service at age 14,
but his high school principal ratted him out as underage. Three years later, he hurried to enlist
again because he knew “that there would be another war, and I would be in it.”55 Arden Grover
signed up because he was “not going to sit on the sidelines” if another war broke out.56 Jack
Orth, who had felt cheated when World War II ended, thought himself lucky when Korea came
along because: “Now I could go to war.” He later reflected that “I must have been nuts,” but at
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the time memories of what he had missed secured his enlistment.57 The son of Japanese
immigrants, Akira Chikami had served in World War II, but missed out on combat so he decided
to see what the Korean War could offer him.58 Seymour Harris, also a World War II veteran,
rejoined because “an irresistible urge drew me toward enlistment. I hadn’t done all that well
with the CBs and wanted another chance to prove myself.”59
Despite the boom years after World War II, financial need prompted many to muster into
military service. As John Kamperschroer recalls, “Patriotic? I don’t think so. There was a poor
future for farm boys.”60 In the same vein, Wadie Moore asserts “Patriotism never occurred to
me. I had one desire. That was to escape degradation and poverty. I mean clapboard, tworoom, chicken house kind of poverty.”61 For Gilbert Towner, the reservation had little to offer
and he believed he could “take better care of my mother with a steady pay coming from the
Marine Corps.”62 Joe Connors, a Chippewa Indian, George Hopkins, Joseph Morey, and Richard
Ballenger all needed work and so volunteered.63 On an internship at Philadelphia General
Hospital, Hank Litvin had work but no pay. When a Navy captain came around offering
ensign’s pay in return for 24 months service after completing his internship, Hank signed up.64
Douglas Anderson joined up when he ran out of funds for college and Charles Smith, a Native
57
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American, signed up in hopes of getting G. I. educational benefits. 65 Similarly, Shirley Brantley
“was looking for some way to continue my education and get to see something besides
Pittsburgh,” so she entered the Air Force.66 Robert Chappell, a black sharecropper, viewed
military service as his only ticket to getting any kind of education.67 Out of money at M.I.T.,
Richard Kohl joined the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers ROTC because it paid 2/3 of a person’s
way through school.68 J. F. Warnock enrolled in ROTC at Utah State University because it
promised $27 a month, a lot of cash for a poor college kid.69 For numerous volunteers, service
represented something very tangible—several pairs of shoes, nice clothes, a regular paycheck,
and the chance for a better life.70 Service “was a matter of necessity—the patriotism thing came
along a couple of years later.”71
In some instances, military service provided the only viable option for potential enlistees.
Unprepared for college and uncertain about his future, Elmer Payne saw military service as “an
escape.”72 Johnson Slivers, a 16 year old Navajo, turned to the Army because he “had nowhere
to go.”73 Melvin Rookstool, Elmer Bailey, and James Murphy had places to go alright, but if
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they wanted to see beyond the bars of juvenile hall or the jailhouse, they’d enlist. Sixteen year
old Rookstool had been “just knocking around,” getting “involved in some problems” when the
judge offered him a choice of either joining the Army or going to reform school. It wasn’t long
before Rookstool wished he’d chosen differently, but he’d already been mustered in!74 Bailey,
an African American, stood accused of dallying with a white man’s woman and it seemed his
options were suddenly narrowed to “getting strung up by a lynch mob, going to jail, or joining
the Army.”75 A judge made the choice simple for Murphy, “Either join or go to jail.”76 For
others, who had already been in trouble, joining up for the Korean War could provide the easiest
way to a second chance. President Truman issued Executive Order 3000 in December 1952
offering a full pardon to “all persons convicted of violation of any law of the United States” who
served in the Armed Forces for at least a year and separated from active service under honorable
conditions during the Korean Conflict.77
For those maturing during and after World War II, family military tradition frequently
pulled them toward the recruiter’s door. Like the character Conway in the Sands of Iwo Jima,
more than a few shipped in because they were expected to ship in: “Seems every time there’s a
war the men in my family join the Marines….I’m simply here for tradition.”78 For Louis Lyons,
whose ancestors fought in the Revolution and Civil War and whose 5 brothers all served in
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World War II, enlistment on his 17th birthday must have seemed very natural indeed.79 James
Boden, who lost an uncle in World War I, a cousin in World War II, and a friend at Chosin
Reservoir in Korea, heard the siren song of the service just as clearly and enlisted at age 18.
Joseph Brown’s father and uncle, both wartime veterans, helped him decide to join the Navy in
1949.80 Listening to the stories of his father, a World War I soldier, and Old Man Caldwell, a
slave turned Union soldier during the Civil War who later helped bring Geronimo back from
Mexico and fought at San Juan Hill, Charles Bussey “always wanted to be a soldier.”81 He was
“prepared to live for my country, fight for my country, and if necessary, to die for it.”82 With a
father who fought as a Marine in World War I even before he had citizenship and forefathers
who fought for the “homeland of the Ancient Ones,” Gilbert Towner asked “How could I be any
different?”83
Many of the women who enlisted also had some sort of family military heritage. The
Marines were a tradition for Mary Ann Bernard whose father and sister had both served in the
Corps.84 Jane Heins Escher’s father had been in the Navy and she followed in his footsteps
becoming a WAVE.85 Valeria Hilgart, who joined the Marine Corps, had a brother and sister
already in the Marines and her father had served in World War I.86 In 1952, Maria Matta, whose
brother had been killed in action in Korea, paid her own way from Puerto Rico to the United
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States to enlist in the Marines.87 Looking at the family histories of both men and women who
served in the Korean era, volunteer and draftee alike, a majority had relatives or loved ones who
served before them.88 Military tradition might not have been the main reason for enlisting, but
no doubt it accounted at least in part for the willingness of many to seek out enlistments of their
own.
Foreign residents volunteered for service in hopes of expediting the naturalization
process. After World War I and World War II, veterans with honorable discharges could be
naturalized as U.S. citizens as outlined in the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Initially, the
government made no such provisions for the aliens who donned U. S. uniforms during the
Korean War. However, in June 1953, Congress passed Public Law 597 which entitled foreigners
who had completed five or more years of military service to be deemed lawfully admitted to the
country for permanent residency if otherwise qualified for citizenship.89 This law expired of its
own terms on December 31, 1955, but new legislation followed to permanently amend the
Immigration and Naturalization Act to favor Korean veterans.90
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, a host of other things enticed youths to visit their local
post offices and hitch up for tours of duty. The military, especially in wartime, offered
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unparalleled adventure for kids who craved a view of something more than their hometowns.91
Enlisting in the Navy or Marines seemed a fine way to see the world while performing a service
that the country would appreciate.92 Those old enough and interested enough to fear
communism thought the war tendered a unique opportunity to “fight it in someone else’s country
… [and] stop the Communists there.”93 Others, who had been in service before, re-upped in
order to increase their rank,94 be with old buddies,95 or simply fill their time. Some, like Franklin
Hodge, were already planning for retirement. He calculated that by rejoining the military and
making a career of it he could retire at 39 with over $150 a month.96 Captain Helen Brooks
reentered the Navy as a nurse because “they desperately needed help in Korea.”97 Franklin
Hodge joined up to avenge his brother’s death and Joseph Timanaro signed up in order to seek
revenge for the North Korean atrocities he had read about in the newspaper.98 George Pakkala,
an American citizen raised in Finland, enlisted in order to learn English.99 Many women, if not
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enlisting in general for the uniform, at least chose their branch of service because the uniforms
looked sharp.100 As many reasons to enlist existed as there were volunteers.101
Interestingly, while women volunteered for many of the same reasons as their male
cohorts, they more often stressed practical reasons over patriotic ones. Very limited in career
choices, especially in occupations that paid well, many females desired a career in the Armed
Forces. As one enlistee later put it, “I decided to join the military because I perceived my only
options to be teacher, nurse, secretary, or the nunnery.”102 The passage of the Army-Navy Nurse
Act in April 1947 and the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act in June 1948 gave women a
real incentive to enlist in military service.103 While not abolishing restrictions on servicewomen,
such as unmarried without minor dependents, these acts did create a permanent place for women
in the military organization and did guarantee a pay scale similar if not equal to that of men
doing the same kinds of work.104 And, increasingly, military women could choose what work
they did. Before the end of the Korean War, women in the Air Force had achieved entrance into
many aviation specialties and women Marines had broken out of strictly administrative jobs and
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could gain posting to overseas duty stations denied them after World War II.105 Few other places
in American society promised these same benefits. By 1952, the Navy concluded that women
enlisted out of a desire to travel or have a career, gain education or self-improvement, receive job
training, take advantage of educational benefits, or wean themselves from family dependency.
The study failed to mention duty to country as a motivating factor at all. The Army decided that
patriotism did matter, but came after the desire for overseas service, self-improvement and
education, interesting work, and meeting new people and making new friends.106 As Katherine
Towle notes, one did “not join the services primarily for patriotic reasons.”107 By contrast,
studies conducted on male inducements for enlistment during the Korean War era placed
patriotism at the top of the list with draft motivation, choice of service, recruitment, and the
Korean G. I. Bill weighing heavily on the decision.108
Not surprisingly, African Americans sometimes found choosing military service more
difficult than their white comrades. They possessed the same love of country and personal and
financial reasons for wanting to enlist, but they also resented the idea of sacrificing again for a
country that could not be depended upon to show gratitude. Many remembered that black World
War II veterans returned not only to a climate of discrimination and segregation, but to outright
hostility. Isaac Woodward, still in his uniform, had been pulled off of a bus and beaten and
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blinded by a southern sheriff.109 In the first six weeks of 1946, Birmingham, Alabama city
policeman killed five African American veterans.110 All over the country, lynching increased
after the war.111 From the vantage point of some blacks, Korea looked no better. Numerous
articles in the Black Press decried the unfair treatment of black soldiers facing courts martial at
much higher rates than whites and other pieces documented that white troops in Korea were
flying the Confederate flag or that the white rapists of the wife of an African American soldier
fighting in Korea had been let off easy in North Carolina.112 No wonder that many began to
question black participation in the war and ask “Why should Negroes die for second-class
citizenship” or insist that “The United States should bring its troops home to fight for democracy
here in this country!”113 They did not want to be in the front lines in Korea but then return to the
back of the bus back home.
Still, African Americans found plenty of reasons to volunteer for or reenter the Armed
Forces in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1948, Harry Truman issued Executive Order 9981
which called for equal treatment and opportunity for all service members regardless of race,
color, religion, or national origin.114 The measure did not immediately desegregate the military
(that would come later, in part due to manpower needs in the Korean trenches), but it did
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represent a sure step up from the Jim Crow South or even the civilian North. Charles Bussey
happily left his job as policeman in California where he had been stationed in the black ghetto
despite finishing first in his class at the Police Academy for a return to active duty in August
1948.115 Similarly, James Allen, who had grown up sharecropping in Florida, decided after a trip
to New York that he did not want to go back to Ocala and Jim Crow and so enlisted at age 18.116
Beverly Scott saw the Army as an honorable profession. “There was no better institution in
American life … than the army for the black man in the forties and fifties. … You had more
leverage in the army. You always had somebody you could go and complain [to] about bad
treatment. A black man couldn’t do that in civilian life.”117 Hundreds of others felt the same
way and signed on, some for the rest of their careers. African Americans also volunteered
because they believed that their service would help to change the racial situation at home. As
Gerald Early notes, “They saw there was a connection, that you’d be able to make a stronger
argument when you came back: ‘We fought for this country, and we deserve to be treated as full
citizens.’”118 During the war, African Americans began to call for “unprecedented
consideration.” They wanted to do their duty, but in return, they expected “all of the rights
guaranteed … by the Constitution.”119 After 1950, when racial quotas limiting black enlistments
were lifted, blacks, like other Americans, would knock on the recruiter’s door.120

115

Bussey, Firefight at Yechon, 37-39.
James W. Allen (AFC 2001/001/13391), Folder 3, Interview by Judith Kent, 20 December 2002, 1, VHPC, AFC,
LOC.
117
Beverly Scott in Tomedi, No Bugles, No Drums, 182.
118
Quoted in Chuck Haga, “Legacy of the Korean War: Blending of Black and White,” Minneapolis Star Tribune, 7
July 2003, 1B.
119
“Unity, Duty and Rights,” editorial, Pittsburgh Courier, 20 January 1951, 6.
120
The quota system had some very strange effects on African American manpower before 1950. While some
qualified applicants were turned away, other, poorly educated candidates remained in service. After World War II,
blacks, who served primarily in support units and thus had less combat time and eligibility for discharge, tended to
remain in uniform reducing the number of new African American recruits who could be mustered in. When the
quotas were lifted, some of those, like W. H. Frost, who had been rejected earlier, were notified that they could now
116

38

Lastly, recruitment provided a final impetus for volunteers during the Korean War period.
Male or female, black or white or something in between, the military had a plan to attract
American youths to voluntary enlistments. For boys, the process often started as early as the
high school years. Recruiters visited schools, held career days, and served as display models for
the fancy new uniforms willing candidates might themselves wear one day. Those almost old
enough to serve in World War II absorbed the bombardment of propaganda put out by the
government and recruiting agencies during that war. They internalized the lesson that failure to
serve brought scorn and shame.121 After 1951, high schools throughout the country began to
show a series of films produced by Coronet Films. With titles like “When You Enter Service,”
“Military Life and You,” and “What It’s All About, Your Plans, Service, and Citizenship,” these
sound motion pictures ostensibly attempted to “help guide young people facing the difficult task
of civilian-to-military adjustment” brought about by the draft.122 In reality, the films cast
military service in such a positive light that groups like the National Council Against
Conscription urged people to write their Congressmen and “tell them what you think of their
[Coronet’s] program for making America military-minded.”123
In addition to preparing boys mentally for later enlistment or induction, the various
services offered programs in the 1940s aimed at enrolling younger men. Both the Navy (V5) and
Army (ASTRP) had programs in place for 17 year olds that allowed them to enlist but go to
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school until they turned 18.124 College men, of course, could join ROTC, a program designed to
produce military officers. For blacks this sometimes presented a problem as segregated schools
did not always offer ROTC courses and not all ROTC programs accepted African Americans.125
But other options were available. Charles Bussey recalls joining the Citizens’ Military Training
Camp (CMTC), another system for developing Army officers that was open to men of color.
Before Korea, these recruitment efforts bore enough fruit that not everyone who wanted to enlist
could get into the military. High school diploma in hand, Richard Bevier began looking for a
branch of the service in which to enlist. He first tried the Air Force where he and a score of
others were released after their physical exams revealed elevated pulse rates due more to the fact
that no billets existed for new enlistees than to anything else. He then offered himself to the
Marines which, also out of quotas to fill, cut him loose for dental reasons. Not quite 18, Bevier
found himself a veteran of not one, but two branches of the Armed Forces.126
Once the Korean War broke out, recruiters had billets aplenty and began soliciting male
enlistments in earnest. Though they could not offer bounties or other monetary compensation as
recruiters in the Civil War had done, they promised an assortment of benefits—ranging from free
lifetime health care for those who served 20 or more years to educational assistance under the
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1952 Korean G. I. Bill—whether or not they had the power or authority to make good on their
word.127 One potential recruit, Ray Deimler, found himself dogged by the local recruiting
sergeant relentlessly until he agreed to join up.128 The Armed Forces also spent loads of cash on
advertising and other efforts, so much in fact that Secretary of Defense George Marshall and
Assistant Secretary Rosenberg had to defend their budget.129 Posters appeared in schools and
post offices touting the merits of service and recruiters made the rounds as the Armed Forces
tried to lure young men to service and perhaps to Korea.
Even in the slow years after 1945, the military targeted men for recruitment, but most
branches of the service ignored women, having little use for females within their ranks. By June
1950, the WACs numbered only 7000, the WAVES 3200, and the Women Marines under 600.130
Suddenly, the new mobilization seemed to demand a far larger female presence in all the
services. The Navy wanted female hospital corpsmen to replace men sent overseas.131 All
branches needed women to tend to nursing or administrative tasks so that men in Korea could
hope for rotation out, future scientists could continue college training instead of mustering in,
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and families could remain undisrupted.132 Enlisting females did not necessarily save men from
being drafted, but it could free men up for other things.133 To these ends, a flurry of recruitment
activity ensued. The Navy announced its intention to enlist 10,000 women and after August
1950 raised its female enlistment quota so that by March recruiters were pressing to enroll 528
women per six week period.134 Assistant Secretary of Defense Anna Rosenberg asked Congress
to raise the 2% ceiling on women in the military and prompted Secretary of Defense George
Marshall to form the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) to
assist with and advise on female recruitment.135 Suddenly, posters and even television
commercials advertising the services to women appeared as did a much increased number of
female recruiters.136 By December 1952, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines combined had
close to 250 women in 44 stations exclusively assigned to recruitment.137 As early as July 1951
these efforts were paying off. The WACs could claim 12,000 women in uniform, the WAVES
6300, and the Women Marines 2065. Both encouraged and driven by these numbers, in October
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1951 Rosenberg announced the biggest campaign for female recruitment since World War II.
President Truman personally launched the appeal to women, and rumors circulated that unmet
quotas could result in a draft on women.138 In October 1952, 48,700 servicewomen reported for
duty, but that was still well short of the military’s goal of 112,000.139 In the early months of
1953, the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services launched a new program to
recruit quality female citizens, 18-35, in excellent physical condition, with a high school or
college degree, and of high character. In addition to the usual tactics, potential female enlistees
would be treated to slogans like “There’s a job for you—and you’re needed for it” and “I’m set
for life” (with all the job training opportunities offered by the military).140 Just as it did for men,
the increased pressure of recruitment worked its magic on many young women, casting a spell
that prompted them to muster into one of the services.
During the Korean Conflict, as in other wars, voluntary enlistment for whatever reason
did not ensure that new enlistees would remain satisfied with their decision to join the Army,
Marines, Navy, or Air Force. Soon after mustering in, a great many men and women like
Raymond Delcambre could not help but ask themselves, “What in the world did I get myself
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into!? And how could I get out?”141 Travel, which had seemed so exotic before, became less
glamorous when one was stuffed with 200 other people on an ancient, unheated train with hard
wooden seats headed for a college gym or training barracks.142 Instead of adventure, many
youths found only homesickness and regret as their tours of duty began—regret that sometimes
deepened as news and casualty reports filtered in from Korea confirming that this “police action”
was in fact nothing less than an old-fashioned war. Also, families did not always support their
loved ones’ decision to muster in. When Joe DeMarco joined the Marines, his father responded,
“In the old country they say you gotta go in the army, you go. But here no one says you gotta go
in these Marines. Why you go? You don’t like your home, your family, whatsamatter?”143
Along with the fact that volunteers frequently had less education and scored lower on mental and
physical tests, buyer’s remorse helps to account for the low retention and increased delinquency
rates of enlistees when compared to draftees. Despite claims by Secretary of Defense George
Marshall that volunteers had higher morale and served longer than inductees, volunteers
throughout the Korean War proved less likely to complete their terms of service than those
forced into uniform by the draft.144 While 95% of draftees received honorable discharges, only
62% of volunteers did. Still, the majority of enlistees eventually came to terms with their
situation and more than a few grew to feel that “the Army was home” or that “there’s something
about the Army that I like.”145
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Regardless of long-term satisfaction, motives for enlistment stayed constant throughout
the Korean Conflict. The volume of enlistments, however, dropped with each year of the war.
In fiscal year 1951, 630,000 Americans entered the Armed Forces by enlisting, but by fiscal year
1953 only 397,000 entrants could claim voluntary accession.146 No doubt personal reasons
weighed heavily on the decision of whether or not to enlist, but so did the home front climate. In
the early months of 1950, potential volunteers had no reason to suspect that the Korean Conflict
would command any less of the public’s attention and patriotic support than World War II.
Aside from a few naysayers who wrote President Truman to complain that American
intervention in Korea differed little from the “naked aggression” of Hitler’s regime, a handful of
folk singers like Woody Guthrie, Communists, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, most Americans
supported military efforts in Korea.147 An August 1950 Gallup Poll showed 65% of Americans
firmly behind the war effort.148 Even the Socialist Party’s National Action Committee voted
unanimously to back the action.149
As the war dragged on, however, public interest and support waned. By the first week of
January 1951, after Chinese intervention, only 38% of Americans still thought that Korea was
not a mistake, if they thought of the war at all.150 The buying frenzy that had characterized 1950,
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when people still worried that war would directly affect their ability to purchase sugar,
shortening, or televisions, had drawn to a close, leaving Americans free to concentrate on things
other than the war effort.151 Headlines concerning strikes, domestic events, and even UFOs
rather than war news monopolized the front pages of most newspapers. Servicemen and women
stationed stateside appeared invisible as Korea’s police action status allowed them to wear
civilian duds instead of uniforms when off post and not on duty.152 In October 1951 U. S. News
and World Report labeled Korea the “forgotten war,” not surprising given that in a poll that same
month 56% of Americans agreed that Korea was an “utterly useless war.”153
But, Korea was not totally forgotten. Few people bothered to protest the Korean War
vocally, but anti-war demonstrations did take place, if only on a small scale. On June 25, 1951,
the first anniversary of the Korean War, a half dozen or so Catholic Workers joined David
Dellinger of the War Resisters League and Bayard Rustin of the Fellowship of Reconciliation in
Times Square to call for peace. Despite some public confusion, in this case an angry spectator
mistook the pacifist Catholic Workers for communist Daily Workers and punched Dellinger in
the face, activists planned and executed protests throughout the war.154 Also, folk artists churned
out anti-war songs for the duration of the conflict. In “I Just Wanna Stay Home,” Irwin Silber
opined that he didn’t “wanna die for the stock exchange.”155 Boots Casetta’s “Little Bronze
Medal” clearly tried to stir pacifism by lyrically dramatizing a mother’s plea to save her son after
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having lost a husband and son to war already. It ended with: “I’ve got one more son and he’s
turning sixteen, please don’t take him off for your war; I swear he’s too young for shooting a
gun, and I don’t want no medals no more … Now all of you mothers, just tell all the others that
we don’t want no medals no more.”156 All this negativism and indifference took its toll on the
American public and by extension on enlistments. Support for the war bobbled up and down
from 35% to 37% through 1952 and 1953, finally settling at about 50% in January 1953, but
potential recruits seldom could have imagined that the same patriotic impulse existed for this war
that had materialized during World War II.157
Throughout the Korean War era, men and women did not necessarily flock to enlist as
had their cousins and brothers of the Second World War. And, in general, however much they
liked to believe that they were answering the same glorious call, they marched to the recruiters’
offices without the same single-minded purpose as their recent forebears. For the men and
women who volunteered for Korean service, there was no Pearl Harbor, no Nazi Regime, and no
sacrifice universal enough to be endured by all Americans whether at home or abroad. Instead,
there were a variety of personal needs, a pressing draft, an often indifferent populace, and the
country’s call to colors. Raised to be people of grit and sacrifice, the boys and girls of the Great
Depression and World War II volunteered to muster in and do their duty, perhaps not happily,
but with determination and in greater numbers than their sons and daughters when the next war
started.158

156

Ibid., 54.
Interestingly, while total enlistments fell each year of the war, enlistments in some branches, such as the Navy,
actually increased. U. S. Bureau of Naval Personnel, Memo on Discrimination of the Negro, 24 January 1959, Tab
1, NA, RG 319, Box 7.
158
In fiscal year 1965, the first full year of the Vietnam War, only 351,000 Americans enlisted. Flynn, The Draft,
119.
157

47

The Reservists and National Guardsmen

Altogether, June 1950 turned out to be a bad month for National Guardsmen and
Reservists. Budget crunches early in the month had led to a series of layoffs among active
personnel, who then had to find other means of employment and income. While perhaps
disappointed, few protested the decision. Most reservists, while joining up for the same reasons
as regular military enlistees, expected to be used only in case of emergency and took their move
to inactive status in stride. But the month was not over yet. Sitting in front of his girlfriend’s
house on his way to another town and a new apprenticeship with Monterey Optical Company,
former active Guardsmen Frank Rowan heard news of North Korea’s invasion of South Korea on
the radio. “Oh shit,” he said. “In a month I will be in the Army.”159 It took a little while for the
news to really sink in, but all over the country Guardsmen and Reservists had the same startled
reaction. The impossible had happened—peace had been shattered and Americans were about to
march again to war.
Within days of entering the fighting, Congress granted President Truman the authority to
call units or individuals of the National Guard and Reserves to active duty for up to 21
months.160 The military first sought volunteers from among the reserve components, but when
few appeared, involuntary reserve call-ups proceeded and in August 1950, 600 reserve units
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shifted to active duty.161 For the first time in history, women reservists, especially those in
critical ratings such as hospital corpsmen and supply clerks, were involuntarily mobilized along
with the men.162 National Guard units also felt the pull and from August 1950 to February 1952,
some 19 increments of them would be taken, totaling 138,597 guardsmen in eight Infantry
Divisions, three Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs), and 266 separate battalions, companies, and
detachments.163 Under normal circumstances, all of the reserve troops would have trained raw
recruits and inductees, but low manpower levels in Korea demanded replacements double quick
time and many of the recalled Guardsmen and Reservists shipped out for the war zone as either
soldiers or nurses soon after activation.164 As a result, despite the opposition which developed to
calling up National Guard and Reserve units, even more had to be called to active duty! When
the Korean War ended, close to 700,000 Reservists and Guardsmen could claim service through
recall or activation.165
A handful of reserve personnel simply accepted their orders or even welcomed the
chance to go on active duty when called. Hank Buelow, who had enlisted in the National Guard
at age 15, rejoiced when his unit got activated during Christmastime 1950. Though a full time
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student at Colorado A & M, Hank wanted to muster into active service.166 For the inactive
reserves, the perks of being involuntarily recalled often softened the blow of activation. Unlike
reservists who volunteered for active duty, those forced back into uniform against their wishes
retained their termination promotion rank, giving them an advantage over everyone else and
prompting complaints by jealous regulars and draftees.167 For Martin Markley and others it
seemed a sign that they should not only willingly fall in for service or Korea, but that they should
make a career out of the Army or Marines where no better avenue to advancement existed than
combat.168
Many Guardsmen and Reservists, though, complained bitterly about their recall to colors
and refused to come quietly. One unhappy California Guardsman waiting for his ship to the Far
East told a newsman, “I thought I was signing up to fight Oregon! I didn’t know Governor
Knight was mad at Mao Tse Tung!”169 Others pointed out the inequity of calling older reservists
who had jobs and families while younger men without children could apply for an assortment of
deferments and exemptions.170 And, many of those being tapped for duty had already given a
chunk of their lives to Uncle Sam.171 Wallace Donaldson, drafted during World War II, had just
finished school and finally reached the position where he could make money when he received
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his Korean War recall notice.172 Thomas McLain fulfilled his obligation to the Army and
became a civilian again on June 25, 1950, just three months before being pulled back into olive
drab and put on duty at Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky.173 Scott Defebaugh, a World War II
hospital corpsman who had worked several jobs and used the G. I. Bill to train to be a teacher,
got activated the very day he was supposed to begin teaching 9th grade in Woodward,
Oklahoma.174 Disgusted with their plights, retreads and other individuals called up for the
Korean emergency wrote their senators and congressmen, and sometimes even President
Truman.175 The backlash prompted Major General Lewis B. Hershey, the Selective Service
Director, to declare “Everyone wants out; no one wants in.”176 For its part, the Army pointed
out that those being summoned to service had drawn the pay as guardsmen or reservists.177
Washington officials failed to note, however, that many of those being called to duty served only
in the inactive reserves and thus had received no monetary compensation at all. Fearing a
broader conflict with Russia and perhaps even total war, the military had decided to save its
better-trained, paid active reservists for later.178 Ultimately the military could argue only that
Reservists and Guardsmen had entered their contracts voluntarily and concede that in calling up
the reserves “military necessity overrode considerations of equity and justice.”179
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For scores of Guardsmen and Reservists, recall to service caused more than a minor
inconvenience. The initial uncertainty of just who might be called up caused employers to refuse
jobs to reserve type personnel, and to deny promotions to or even fire those already employed.
Banks and insurance companies turned down loan and policy applications, and the offended
party had no legal recourse.180 For veterans, the July 1951 expiration date of the World War II
Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 could not be put on hold and more than a few worried
that another stint in service would deny them their benefits.181 Once orders came, men and
women had to report regardless of their personal or financial situations and before any effort
toward exemption would be entertained by the military. Regrettably, records of inactive
reservists had not been updated in years, in some cases since World War II, and men with ten
children and nurses with babies and toddlers of their own became at least temporarily caught in
the country’s manpower net.182
Countless others had their whole lives disrupted by the new call to arms. John Saddic, a
World War II purple heart veteran and Marine Corps Reservist, had a wife and family to support
but found himself forced to muster into the Marine Corps at too low a rank to be granted a family
allowance. Welfare told him to sell his furniture, the Red Cross advised him to go on welfare,
and only after he went to the newspaper with his story did he garner any assistance at all. When
he returned home from Korea with frozen feet, the Red Cross began hounding him to repay the
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“loan” he had received!183 Harry VanZandt, another World War II veteran, got his notice to
report while lying in bed with pneumonia. He did manage to get a deferment due to illness, but
in the end it did not save him from leaving his wife and son and heading out for another overseas
tour of war.184 A Texas Reserve sergeant who had worked to set up a prosperous plumbing
business in the years after the Second World War worried that his absence would result in the
repossession of all his tools by the bank, leaving him without much to return to. Professional
men fretted over lost promotions and opportunities, doctors wondered if after service they would
be too old to pick back up again and build a private practice, and recent graduates felt uneasy
about waiting years to apply their education to real-life work.185 Fathers and husbands and
World War II veterans, both male and female, felt punished for their loyalty to country and
cheated that so many Americans were escaping military service altogether while they were
plucked from their civilian lives, many for the second time. Defense Secretary George Marshall
agreed, but at least for a while Reservists and Guardsmen continued to muster in for the Korean
War.186
Mustering in for a second time proved easy enough for most Guardsmen and Reservists,
too easy in fact for some, but the actual process varied from place to place and unit to unit. For
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all, it began with notification. Most Guardsmen and Reservists received an official letter with
orders to report, but MPs visited a lucky few to break the news and some Guardsmen got word in
person while at summer camp. Not surprisingly, Guardsmen, who held weekly meetings, trained
on weekends, and attended summer camps, were caught less off guard than inactive Reservists
who never participated in drills or other exercises and many of whom did not even belong to a
particular unit. After receiving notice, it was time to report and without much delay. Harold
Mulhausen, a Marine Reservist, remembers that he was allowed about a week to quit his job and
make arrangements for his family before checking in at the Reserve Center for transportation to
Camp Pendleton, California.187 George Tsegeletos got activated into the Marine Corps while at
his first summer camp and his unit was ordered home only briefly to “get your things in order”
before returning to Camp Pendleton.188 Conrad Grimshaw, a National Guardsmen, had seven
days to prepare to leave his home for active duty.189 Aside from a few who were too ill to report
immediately or who were still in high school, Reservists and Guardsmen found it difficult to
garner any extra time before reporting.190 Men and women scurried around to un-rent
apartments, resign from jobs, withdraw from college, store possessions, cut hay, move up
wedding dates, and kiss their loved ones goodbye. Some units required members to fit physical
exams or vaccinations into their already hectic schedules or to participate in recruitment drives
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when units were understrength.191 Then, they gathered at the same armories as their World War
II forebears not so many years before, and the same townspeople collected to wish them well and
to memorize the faces that might never return.192 Boarding buses or trains or cramming into
cars, recalled servicemen and servicewomen headed out toward active duty and camps and bases
all around the country.
Once settled at Fort Lewis or Camp Pendleton or wherever else they had ended up,
Guardsmen and Reservists had much to do in preparation for regular military service.
Occasionally medical exams were administered, but more frequently candidates were found
“physically fit for duty” without even being seen by a doctor.193 Those not yet immunized
received their vaccinations and then it was on to the business of making ready for war. From this
point on, time moved rapidly for Reservists. At camp, some reserve units classified their
members as older veterans who were “combat ready,” men who needed a refresher in “combat
training,” and new recruits who needed boot camp, sending them to either the war zone or
training accordingly.194 However, early in the war, when manpower shortages in Korea
demanded more troops immediately, many Reservists regardless of experience spent only days
or weeks drilling before shipping overseas. Sometimes, men who recently had joined the
reserves boarded the troop ship without ever having been taught to handle a weapon!195 One
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Reservist complained that after fighting at Inchon, Seoul, Chosin, and the Guerilla Sweep, the
Marines wanted to send him back to the States for boot camp.196 Nurses especially found
themselves quickly mustered in and deployed, so fast in fact that they had to borrow uniforms.
In more than a few cases, the Navy and Marines discovered married women or mothers within
their ranks, but by then, the women were already at their assignments and had to be formally
discharged as soon as replacements were found.197 National Guardsmen faced much the same
general process as Reservists, but sometimes took longer to leave the camps. In the fifties, the
Guard did not require recruits to take basic training and as a result many Guardsmen started
active duty in boot camp. Volunteers for Korea, though, like the Reservists, steered toward the
war zone with great speed and with only a couple of weeks home before their departures.
As they mustered in, many Guardsmen and Reservists felt that they followed in the
footsteps of the reserve personnel called to service in World War II. In 1950 as in 1941 Guard
and Reserve units mirrored the communities they were leaving behind. The faces of brothers and
cousins filled the ranks as they set out for destination points unknown. But the Korean War
would prove a very different experience. Those who left together did not always remain together
as many units were either broken apart or reconfigured before they ever reached battle.
Recruitment drives plumped up units with new people, the classification of individuals in
different categories of combat readiness splintered units, and often individual replacements were
plucked from the ranks and sent over separately.198 While some units did reach Korea intact,
many others contained totally different personnel by the time they boarded the ship.199
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Reservists and Guardsmen summoned for the Korean Conflict might have expected to be among
friends and relatives when it came their turn to soldier, but a great many found themselves facing
the task alone. With hardship and loneliness caused by their departures, many couldn’t help but
feel “when we slipped our lines at the dock, and later as we passed under the Golden Gate
Bridge, that perhaps this was not quite working out as we had planned.”200

The Draftees and the Deferred

“Greetings from the President of the United States”—boys around the country cringed
when they read the words.201 Harry Truman was not inviting them to a cotillion or dinner, not
even for tea and pastries. In fact, he was not really greeting them at all. The words simply
prefaced the letter informing millions of young men that their time to report for the Korean War
draft had come. Within sixty days of hostilities in Korea, monthly draft calls spiraled upward
from the post-World War II doldrums, reaching 50,000 by September 1950 and 80,000 by
January 1951.202 Calls averaged about half a million a year throughout the war but might have
risen even higher had MacArthur not emptied training units in order to provide combat units in
Korea with replacements, making it impossible to prepare a larger number of draftees for
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service.203 Local boards, made up of unpaid civilians, scrambled to sift through millions of
Selective Service registrants and classify them as fit for selection, deferment, or exemption.204
Amazingly, these boards managed to not only meet the calls, but produce more names than
requested every single month of the war.205 As a result, draftees accounted for over 30% or
about a million and a half of those who mustered in for the conflict.206
Upon receiving their draft notifications, potential inductees had only ten days to report to
the local board for classification. Those who failed to appear for any reason risked having their
names turned over to the United States Attorney General for prosecution for delinquency.207
One fretful woman appealed to Senator Robert Taft on behalf of her husband, a Merchant Marine
aboard a transport ship delivering supplies to the Far East, because the local board had turned
him in to the federal authorities for not reporting or appealing his I-A (available for service)
status in person.208 Others failed to report for less innocent reasons. Some had been careless
about updating address information and had no idea they had even been called, but others
deliberately side-stepped the draft board.209 That World War II sense of participating in
something important had vanished and registrants were sometimes driven to become no-shows
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by their lack of enthusiasm for military life.210 As hostilities dragged on, a kind of malaise about
the war also played a role. Again and again local boards found themselves having to explain to
draftees that “they have an obligation to their country that they must perform.”211 But not all
registrants agreed that they owed such service. Minorities pointed out the irony of the country
expecting them to fight abroad for rights and freedoms they were themselves denied at home.212
One Native American woman wrote President Truman in disgust, saying the Navajos “have not
been helped and you ask for our boys.”213 Many African Americans felt the same way. Not
surprisingly, some men, like Roosevelt Ward, Jr., executive secretary of the Labor Youth
League, and James Lawson, a future Nashville Civil Rights Movement leader, chose prison over
Korea.214
Still, delinquencies ran low throughout the Korean War. Many might have felt like Rudy
Stephens that they “wanted to run away, assume a strange name, and get lost in this big country
of ours.”215 They might even, as Mickey Scott asserts, have known the way to Mexico or
Canada.216 Probably more than a few of them thought the draft board unfair in forcing them into
service while others went free.217 But on the whole, the men summoned to report for the draft
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came when called. In 1950, the Justice Department prosecuted only 4490 men for draft evasion,
convicting 1750. Even fewer inductees attempted to evade the draft in 1951, the first full year of
the war, and of 3680 facing charges only 1560 were found guilty. By 1952, the number of cases
rose to 5610 with 3130 convictions, leading up to 1953, the most popular year for skipping out
on the Korean War draft, when 6300 trials resulted in 3450 guilty verdicts.218 As months of war
lengthened to years, the number of draft dodgers did increase, but never to the levels of the
Vietnam War or even of the World Wars. The numbers remained both low and manageable.
Like Peter Santella and Tom Clawson, few veterans can even remember men who sought to
avoid the draft by fleeing to another state or country.219 Clawson notes, “I had no thought, and I
knew of nobody in high school or college who ever said to me, ‘We’re going to try to avoid the
draft,’ or go to Canada or any of that stuff. It just wasn’t heard of back then.”220
But why did Korean War era inductees, especially those receiving their notices after it
became clear that Korea would never be a popular war like World War II, not stage
demonstrations, burn their draft cards, or simply flee to someplace safe, somewhere where they
couldn’t be brought back, dressed up, and shipped off to war? Given the draft resistance of
World War I, which in some cases required the dispatch of federal troops to quell armed bands of
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deserters, and in the wake of Vietnam, it seems inconceivable that when faced with the prospect
of being sent overseas to fight in the inhospitable landscape of a country most Americans neither
knew nor cared about, most young men accepted their fate.221 Many scholars have concluded
that low draft calls solve this intriguing puzzle. They argue that because so few men were
actually called up during the Korean War, little opportunity for delinquency or incentive for
organized resistance existed.222 While compelling, especially with regard to the two World
Wars, this thesis has severe limitations when applied to Vietnam. The Vietnam War posted far
higher rates of delinquency than the Korean War, but draft calls for Korea consistently outpaced
those of the Vietnam era by some 200,000 annually.223 Also, Selective Service inducted
1,529,539 men from June 1950 to June 1953, almost as many as during the entire nine years of
the Vietnam War when 1,857,304 draftees mustered into the Army.224 And, if draft calls
themselves were to blame for delinquency, the rates would remain steady even if the raw
numbers fluctuated by going up with high calls and down with low calls. Something other than
low draft calls must explain why more Korean War draftees did not choose to evade the draft.
The veterans themselves when asked to explain why they decided to report for duty cite a
number of reasons, with patriotism of one sort or another crowning the list. Called only a few
years after the patriotic fervor of World War II, the men of Korea believed then and still believe
“it was our duty to serve our country.”225 As Joseph Fabiani relates, “I was a very proud young
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American going off to serve my country in a time of war.”226 Unlike many of the next
generation, they would not turn the United States down when it needed men.227 Additionally,
while the draft could present a financial or career opportunity, draft evasion in the fifties would
end in nothing less than humiliation and time in the penitentiary. Mickey Scott remembered the
disgrace heaped by communities on those who tried to beat the draft in World War II, extending
even to their families. “Weather stripping was the snickered name [given to babies born to draft
vulnerable men], the connection being to keep one out of the draft.”228 Rudy Stephens realized
that if he tried to outrun his orders to report, “the military would be looking for me for a long
time to come” and he “didn’t want to take the chance of going to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to
spend time behind bars.”229 As a generation, Korean War era draftees, trained by the Great
Depression to accept their responsibilities without question and hardened from witnessing the
sacrifices made by many Americans during the Second World War, could not conceive that it
might be possible to refuse Uncle Sam’s invitation to the draft and get away with it. They “came
from an era of ‘It’s your privilege to disagree, but not disobey.’”230 For them, despite great
public indifference to the Korean War, no TET Offensive took place to rally the forces of
opposition and make draft resistance seem an almost moral choice, and, unlike Vietnam, the war
ended before average Americans had time to get tired enough of it to protest. And, if their
determination to fulfill their duty wavered, the draftees, like the volunteers, had plenty of
226
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examples encouraging them to accept their turn as soldiers. Fathers, uncles, cousins, brothers,
and friends had already served in one of the World Wars or even in Korea. How could they
refuse to do likewise? For most, the answer was clear, they could not.
Once deciding to report, potential inductees presented themselves to the local board of
their community where they received classification in the least liable category for which they
were eligible.231 Those without claim to deferment or exemption moved on to Armed Forces
Examining Stations for preinduction exams, both mental and physical.232 These tests determined
whether a registrant would be rejected (classified IV-F for mental or physical exam failure) or
classified I-A (available for service).233 Rejections, however, like deferments, could be
temporary.234 Throughout the war, Congress and Selective Service lowered test standards in
order to widen the manpower pool, meaning that many who had been disqualified on the basis of
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test failure later had to be reclassified as acceptable.235 Classification, even for those deemed IA, did not end the suspense of the process. Low draft calls meant that not every person available
for service needed to be called up. While local boards followed an order in summoning draftees
to muster in, it could be difficult to predict the date when one would be required to appear for
induction.236 Dan Grimes complained that the draft board alerted him of his imminent call-up in
November 1950, but kept delaying his entrance into the Army. Finally, he informed the local
board that if they did not draft him fast he was going to enlist in the Air Force. Soon he found
himself wearing the Army’s uniform and “considering pros and cons of deserting.”237 Whether
good luck or bad, not everyone received such a quick response. Delays and uncertainties made it
difficult for men, especially those with wives, to prepare for their departures. As one potential
inductee wrote, he did not know whether to store his belongings and rent his house immediately
or wait because neither the draft board nor he knew when he’d be leaving.238 Eventually, when
the call came, draftees went through a final induction exam, took their oaths, and pulled on their
uniforms in preparation for shipment to basic training.
In theory, all young American men of draft age should have shared equally the burden of
the draft, but Selective Service provisions and deferment and exemption policies worked to
spread service liability unevenly. During the first few months of the conflict, mental test
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qualification standards led to a high rate of rejection among men from underprivileged
backgrounds, allowing them to avoid service while leaving better-heeled and better educated
registrants stuck in the draft pool.239 In fact, mental test failure became a major source of
“deferment” or exemption during the war for African Americans and others who were too poor
to attend college or to show that military service worked a financial hardship on their families.240
By June 1951, the Universal Military Training and Service Act rectified the inequity by
dramatically dropping the minimum allowable AFQT score and allowing many of those who
previously had been disqualified to enter service.241 Rejection rates based solely on the mental
test fell from 16.5% from July 1950-December 1951 to 13.2% of those selected in 1952.242
Rejection rates as a whole, whether for administrative reasons or mental or physical exam
failures, also fell as the war continued and manpower needs increased. In July 1950, Selective
Service rejected 59% of all candidates for induction, but the percentage continued to drop to a
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low of 27.7% in February 1951.243 Lower rejection rates meant that a broader base of males was
eligible to be called into the country’s service.244 Eliminating one imbalance in the system,
however, did not prevent others from forming or continuing. Eligibility to serve became more
widely spread with each passing year of the conflict, but some boys remained more vulnerable
than others to Selective Service and involuntary induction.245
Throughout the war, ministers of religion and divinity students received exemption, but
conscientious objectors did not.246 Conscientious objectors were liable for either noncombatant
service or civilian work, depending on how they felt about contributing to the war effort.247 Ted
Head discovered this the hard way. Classified I-A by the local draft board, Head attempted to
avoid service by seeking reclassification as a “pacifist on religious grounds.” Failing at that,
Head went through all the in-processing until reaching the induction center where he refused to
“‘step forward’ when his name was called to place him officially in the military service.”
Convicted of draft evasion, a judge sentenced the twenty-two year old to three years in a federal
penitentiary with the possibility of a stay of sentence only if Head agreed to muster in as a noncombatant.248 Since no distinction had been made for COs who served during World War II,
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many conscientious objectors found themselves drafted for a second time during the Korean War
as if they were registering for the first time. Such was the case with Robert Dudgeon who had
already served 22 months in the Second World War. The local board classified him as IV-E
(conscientious objector opposed to both combatant and non-combatant role but available for
service), rather than as exempt for previous service.249
In general, exemptions also went to military veterans who had served for a minimum
period of time and been discharged under honorable conditions.250 Timing could be cruel,
however, and a great many men missed exemption by only days or weeks of service. Raymond
Johnston served in the Pacific from August 1945 to August 1946, racking up enough terminal
leave to earn him a cash settlement from Congress, but found himself 19 days short of the one
year mark that would have gotten him a Korean War draft exemption.251 Marvin Beech, Jr., a
World War II Navy veteran who served 33 months of his 3 year enlistment before being
discharged in the congressional effort to reduce manpower also found himself called up for
Korea. While willing to serve, Beech could not “see why I have to do my duty twice.”252
Similarly, Doug Brown, who had served 10 months in the Navy during 1945-46 and been drafted
again in November 1950, wondered why he and others like him could not be at least “given
credit on a month for month basis for previous service toward the present requirement of 24
monthly.”253 For those in the Merchant Marine during World War II, legislation offered no
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exemptions at all, disappointing given that men currently in the Merchant Marine Reserve, many
of whom had never even seen duty, enjoyed exemption.254 Men who had risked their lives in
Italy or on islands in the Pacific could not believe that they would be subject to the Korean War
draft simply because they had been mustered out before six months or a year of active duty.
They had wives and homes and new college degrees and as a group they felt that their
obligations to country had been met. In the end, the pleas of veterans failing to meet the
minimum service guidelines for exemption went without further action on their behalf, but a
majority of World War II veterans and a sizable chunk of those who began service after that war
did obtain immunity from the draft.255
In addition to exemptions, a number of deferment options offered temporary relief from
draft vulnerability during the Korean War years. The 1948 Selective Service Act deferred for
dependency reasons all married registrants as well as most men with children. In any given year
of the war, about a million registrants held dependency deferments.256 This policy caused much
controversy, however. Angry reservists complained that they had been recalled without
consideration of their marital or dependency status. Divorced, non-custodial fathers pointed out
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that even if they paid child support they could not be considered for deferment.257 And, some
men tried to take advantage of the system by stacking dependency deferments on top of other
deferments. Louis Perrino, given a postponement of induction in order to complete school,
married shortly before his time to report and tried to get a dependency deferment from the local
board on account of his wife’s pregnancy.258 In actuality, cases of deferment pyramiding were
rare, but the perception that men were evading service led to changes in the law.259 As Private
Gerald W. Long, whose wife was expecting triplets, learned, by 1951, married men without
children could not expect a deferment unless they could prove hardship and the policy of
discharging soldiers with four or more dependents applied only to “civilian components of the
army—such as the Oklahoma national guard” and not to draftees or volunteers.260 In 1953
President Dwight Eisenhower issued an executive order ending deferments for fatherhood
altogether.261
Despite surpluses in government warehouses, many farm workers could thank political
lobbying and leftover World War II protections of agriculture for qualifying them for II-C
classification (deferred for agricultural occupation).262 For some, like Bill Dallas, who got to
stay home only until crops could be harvested in the fall of 1950, the deferment proved only
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temporary.263 For others, faced with local boards either indifferent to or downright antagonistic
toward removing farm hands from the draft pool, the deferment turned out to be elusive. One 55
year old farmer with 600 acres to work bemoaned the fact that his eldest son had been drafted in
September 1950 and his younger son was set to be called in early 1951.264 Another man,
afflicted with “double herna and arthuritus [sic],” had 139 acres of corn to harvest but couldn’t
be assured by the board that his 22 year old son would get an extension to see them through the
season.265

In tens of thousands of other instances, though, farm types did get deferred, often for

the duration of the conflict and even when they quite clearly should not have.266 Public opinion
held that farm hands should be drafted, but ultimately a higher percentage of agricultural laborers
received deferment than any other occupational group during the Korean War.267
Farmers secured more than their fair share of deferments, but Selective Service sought to
protect other occupational fields as well. Classes II-A (deferred for occupation) and II-B
(deferred as government official) existed to defer men employed in any one of a number of
professions deemed essential to the national health, safety, or interest.268 The government
especially concerned itself with protecting industrial manpower, science, technology, and
production. Petroleum drillers, microbiologists, engineers, geophysicists, machinists,
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millwrights, patternmakers, saw-smiths, shipmasters, tool and die makers, mathematicians,
government officials, and many others could count on staying home instead of mustering in.269
Lastly, large numbers of students enjoyed deferments during the Korean Conflict.270
Under the Selective Service Act of 1948, high school students under age 20 and some college
students received I-S classification (student deferment to complete high school or the current
academic year) so long as they continued to do satisfactory schoolwork.271 This system,
however, which really only delayed induction for a short while, proved inadequate at mollifying
many Americans. Students halfway through their degree programs wanted time enough to finish
college before beginning military service. Professional and scientific groups warned that
drafting college students would deplete the country’s personnel resources in the very fields
crucial to winning the Cold War. These elements pressed at the national level for more generous
college deferments.272 On March 30, 1951, despite his desire to avoid any type of “class

269

Annual Report of the Director of Selective Service for the Fiscal Year 1951, 55. About 30,000 such men received
deferment in 1952 and 1953. Annual Report of the Director of Selective Service for the Fiscal Year 1953, 20.
270
Student deferment actually dates back to World War I and the 1917 Student Army Training Corps which was
devised to allow students under 21 to complete 3 years of college before beginning military service. After many
revisions which lowered the age of students to below 18 and the amount of education to 9 months, the virtually
unused system puttered out with peace. Marmion, “Historical Background of Selective Service in the United
States,” in Little, ed., Selective Service and American Society, 39-40. Post-World War II conditions probably helped
to ripen the Korean War era for a new student draft deferment system. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the
federal government gave vast amounts of money to universities for research and development, so much so that
colleges like Stanford University developed a dependency upon federal patronage and expanded into applied
research to meet military and government needs. Rebecca S. Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The
Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 120-122. This link established in the
minds of at least some Americans the idea that university trained men were essential to the nation’s security and that
drafting future scientists and engineers actually put the country at considerable risk.
271
After the passage of the Universal Military Training and Service Act in 1951, men 18.5 could be inducted and the
number of men in I-S classification began to rise. By 1953, local boards began classifying younger registrants in
earnest and class I-S grew even larger. Annual Report of the Director of Selective Service for the Fiscal Year 1953,
18. Selective Service placed strict limits on college registrants. College students who had already had their
induction postponed because of student status, who had been previously occupationally deferred, or who had already
had some sort of educational deferment were not eligible for a Korean War student deferment. Annual Report of the
Director of Selective Service for the Fiscal Year 1951.
272
Annual Report of the Director of Selective Service for the Fiscal Year 1954, 20. Flynn, The Draft, 145. Also,
Benjamin Fine, “Colleges Urge Student Deferment, Citing Need for Future Leadership,” Special to the New York
Times, 11 January 1951, 16.

71

legislation,” Truman issued an executive order creating a new student deferment program.273
College males wishing to postpone induction until graduation could do so by passing with 70%
or better the 150 question multiple choice Selective Service College Qualification Test or by
ranking in the top half of their class, and then asking the local board for II-S (student deferred to
complete college) classification.274 Undergraduates and graduates alike were eligible, but those
deferred could only earn a single degree under the system and their draft vulnerability extended
to age 35.275 Hundreds of thousands of men took the SSCQT during the war and tangible results
followed. About half a million Selective Service registrants succeeded in getting II-S
deferments.276 By 1952, three-quarters of the nation’s male college student population had
secured some kind of deferment or exemption to shelter them at least temporarily from military
service.277
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Whether exempted for a low score on the exam or veteran status or deferred for school
work or as an agricultural worker, most of the millions of men shielded from the draft considered
themselves just plain lucky and nothing else. They did not see their draft status as privileged
treatment and many expected to take their turn if or when the time came. College students in
particular viewed deferment as merely a postponement of military service—and for good
reason.278 Amendments made to the Universal Training and Service Act in 1951 extended the
liability for service to age 35 for men deferred for reasons other than hardship or dependency.279
When sociologists questioned a sample of students at 11 universities in 1953, 91% of them said
they anticipated serving at least three years in the military after completing their education.
Overwhelmingly they acknowledged military service as a duty of citizenship and frowned upon
deliberate attempts to evade it.280
For Americans outside of draft protection, however, things often looked quite different.
Draftees could not help but notice just who failed to turn up at basic training or more revealingly
in the foxholes of Korea. While college deferred men often talked of their willingness to serve
after completing their schooling, few rushed to enlist after getting their degrees. Of 11,079 men
classified II-S in April 1951, only 20% had entered the military a year later, with 50% still II-S
and the other 30% reclassified but not yet mustered in.281 Some university students went to great
lengths to legally avoid military responsibility. William Dannenmaier marveled that both a
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football player from the University of Missouri and a basketball player from Washington
University in St. Louis failed their mid-1951 physicals while he passed with flying colors.282
James Brady watched the son of “some big noise in Washington” get off the troop ship in Japan
while everyone else went on to Korea.283 Mothers wanted to know “why college students have
any more right to be deferred than a young man … working and waiting until financially able to
take the training for his life’s work.” They asked, “Isn’t this country, the college boy’s country
and hasn’t he just as much right to defend it … as the less fortunate ones who were nabbed
before they were financially able to enter schools?”284 Other Americans, sensing that draft
policies failed to share service obligations fairly among draft age cohorts, insisted that “the rich
should go as well as the poor.”285 Foreshadowing the troubles of the Vietnam era, charges of
class and race bias followed the draft throughout the Korean War.286 No matter what registrants
with exemptions or deferments thought about their classifications, average Americans and
inductees often believed that middle and upper class white men had managed to get a better deal
from Selective Service.287 So widespread was this notion that President Eisenhower’s Assistant
Secretary of Defense John Hannah labeled Korea “a poor man’s war.”288
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In reality, the draft probably did catch more men from Harlem or Muskogee than
Manhattan or Tulsa, with high school rather than college diplomas.289 But, Selective Service
provided only one avenue to military duty during the Korean War period, accounting for far
fewer accessions than voluntary enlistment. If one considers that college-educated men joined
up in numbers roughly proportionate to their percentage of the population, and that regardless of
income factors the military participation rate for the draft age cohort averaged 70-75%, the
Korean era military seems quite equitable in its manpower procurement.290 Also, though the
regular draft slanted in favor of the rich and educated, Selective Service targeted doctors,
dentists, and others with the 1950 Doctors’ Draft. All males under 50 in medical, dental, or
allied fields had to sign up, even those already in the draft pool.291 Like regular inductees, they
could try for deferments or exemptions, but in 1952 shortages of qualified personnel led the
Department of Defense to decree that anyone fit to carry on a private practice was fit for military
duty.292 The Doctors’ Draft actually resulted in few inductions, but it did pressure tens of
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thousands of men into enlisting, picking up commissions and bonuses, and serving 12 months.293
And, it helped to remedy some of the inequalities inherent in the Selective Service system.
Like draftees of the Civil War and World War I and even the “Good War,” most of those
who appeared for induction during the Korean War would rather have stayed home. Few
draftees relished the idea of stomping around in military issue boots, especially if those boots
marched them into a war zone. Even fewer wanted to leave everything and everyone familiar
behind. Unlike many of the boys of World War I or World War II who served alongside friends
or neighbors, the draftees of Korea rotated in and out of service alone.294 They tried for
exemptions and deferments and they blamed local boards or appeals boards or the “damned”
Selective Service when it came their time to muster into the Army. But they did not riot like
New Yorkers conscripted during the Civil War nor attack federal officials enforcing the draft as
men did during the First World War and they seldom ran from the draft as many of their brothers
of the Vietnam era.295 They groused and griped and grumbled, but draftees did the jobs Uncle
Sam asked them to do and they did it better in many instances than those who willingly signed
up for military service.296 The draftees, though, by and large remained civilians at heart. They
wore the uniforms, but it was the value that they placed on citizenship, the acknowledgment of
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duty drilled into them during childhood that caused them to pack up and go “to unknown places
to serve our country as our leaders suggested.”297

Who Mustered In During the Korean War Era?

Dressed in olive drab or navy blue and with ready salutes, the men and women who
mustered in for the Korean Conflict looked much the same as those who entered the Armed
Forces during other American wars. But, as scholarship has shown, the composition of the
American military has never remained constant, and the color and kinds of faces in uniform have
changed from generation to generation. And, Korea was a war between wars—between World
War II, when participation in the military became a generational experience, and Vietnam, when
service grew into an issue of socio-economic class.298 So the question arises, just who served in
the Armed Forces during the early 1950s and what characteristics did they share with each other
or with veterans of other eras? Was the Korean War military a middle ground between World
War II and Vietnam?
As soldiers and military personnel go, those who served during the Korean Conflict were
a youthful lot. Conditions in Korea demanded the quick mobilization of manpower, but unlike
World War II or even the Civil War the Armed Forces did not need every able man young or old
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to slip into uniform. Initially, the Department of Defense recalled Reservists and Guardsmen for
shipment to Korea, but as the war continued Selective Service and recruiters targeted younger
men for induction and enlistment.299 Despite the efforts of local boards to call up older
registrants first, the draft pressured enough teenagers to enter the Army and Marines that mothers
complained about being “sick and tired of this child draft” and asked “when did this country get
so bad off it has to take our children directly out of schools to protect us?”300 By 1952, troops in
the field noticed the “youthful homogeneity” of their platoons and noted that most of their
comrades seemed to be between the ages of 18 and 21.301 In all, the average age of American
soldiers was 23 during the Korean War, three years younger than in World War II and the Civil
War and two years younger than in World War I.302 But, if one considers that this number
includes the typically older reserve type personnel called up during the first year of the war, it is
possible that the average soldier of Korea, especially after 1951, was actually closer in age to his
19 year old Vietnam War counterpart than the statistics imply.303 Also, given the types of
299
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MOS’s for which men with less education could qualify, great probability exists that younger
men more often found their way to the war zone as front line soldiers or Marines than did older
candidates who had more skills or experience to offer.
Though not subject to the same draft pressures as men, enlisted women and even many
female officers in the Korean War Armed Forces tended to be quite young.304 Perhaps because
of regulations restricting married women and mothers from military service, teenagers made up
40% of new female recruits after June 1951. By December 1952, more than half of the enlisted
women in all branches of service were under age 26 and in the Marine Corps 52% were 18-21
and in the Air Force 47% were 18-20. The Army and Navy retained greater numbers of older
enlistees, but the Army still had 35% between 18 and 20 in its ranks and the Navy had 27%
under the age of 20. Not surprisingly, nurses and women medical specialists in all the corps
were older, having completed degree programs of one type or another before entering service.
But, officers not infrequently fell into younger age groups. About 36% of female Army officers
were age 30 or under and in the Marine Corps 51% were age 21-25. Only the Navy could boast
67% of female officers over the age of 30.305 For women as for men during the Korean War, the
faces behind the uniforms reflected a certain youth as service became the obligation of ever
younger Americans, a trend that would continue into the Vietnam era.306
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Despite their age, recruits and draftees in the early 1950s possessed educational levels
favorably comparable to those of their World War II brethren. America had changed in the
interwar period, giving kids the opportunity to acquire more years of schooling at a more tender
age than in the past.307 Also, with manageable draft calls, Selective Service could be somewhat
more selective in choosing registrants for active duty.308 As a result, about 50% of Army
enlisted personnel in the Second World War had completed at least 12 years of school, but
52.6% of enlisted military personnel in 1952 had high school diplomas and another 9.9% could
claim some college credit though not a university degree.309

In this way, the Korean War

proved a stepping stone to the better educated Armed Forces of the Vietnam War when about
60% of the troops had high school diplomas.310
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While pressure from the Korean draft ensured the enlistment and induction of high school
graduates, student deferment policies worked to reduce the draft vulnerability of college and
university students, resulting in a decline in the percentage of servicemen with college diplomas.
In World War II, 8.5% of the troops held bachelor’s degrees or better, but by the Korean War
only 3.9% did and the rate would slip further to just 2.6% during the Vietnam War when gross
inequities resulted in protest.311 Not surprisingly, however, officers had a higher level of
education than enlisted men.312 Some 46.6% of commissioned officers during the Korean
Conflict had college degrees and an additional 29.6% had at least some college. Only 4.4% of
officers had not completed high school. This trend toward a better educated base of officers
continued after the war and by 1965, over 70% of officers would possess a college diploma and
less than 1% would lack a high school degree. 313 Among average G. I.’s, though, college
diplomas remained scarce.
Ironically, despite mental test qualification standards and the drift toward better educated
personnel, a large percentage of men with less than a fourth grade education filtered into service,
especially into the Army, during the Korean War era. Almost 150,000 men of 2 million
receiving special training fell under the label “illiterate, non-English speaking, and below 4th
high school. Reports and Statistics Service, Office of the Controller, Veterans Affairs, Bringing the War Home,
Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 11 April 1972, 303. Also Appy, Working-Class War, 25-26.
311
Hoiberg, “Military Staying Power,” in Sarkesian, ed., Combat Effectiveness, 214. A Department of Defense
study places the rate of college degreed enlisted men much lower for the Korean and Vietnam Wars. It found that in
1952 only 2.8% of enlisted personnel had college degrees, still higher than in 1965 when only 1.3% did. Moskos,
The American Enlisted Man, 196.
312
The Air Force provides one possible exception to this. From July 1946 to December 1947, 77% of 14,000
regular commissions went to officers without college degrees. In 1948, 75.4% of regular Navy officers and 62.8%
of Army officers possessed a baccalaureate degree compared to only 37.05% of those in the Air Force. Struggling
with low educational levels, the Air Force instituted a number of college credit programs on the eve of 1950, but the
outbreak of war served to keep educational levels low throughout the early 1950s. John Darrell Sherwood, Officers
in Flight Suits: The Story of American Air Force Fighter Pilots in the Korean War (New York: New York
University Press, 1996), 11-13.
313
Moskos, The American Enlisted Man, 196. Some sources estimate that 55% of all Korean era officers had college
degrees. Klassen, Military Service in American Life Since World War II, 255.

81

grade educational level.” More than twice as many men were so categorized during World War
II, but they amounted to a small minority of the 7 million trained.314 By the Vietnam War, less
educated men would again find it difficult to qualify for military service and only about 21% of
Americans with less than an 8th grade education would muster in as opposed to the Korean War
when 35% did.315 Still, as a whole the 1950s military seemed to be moving away from both the
uneducated and the highly educated and toward the vast middle ground of high school graduates.
Given the narrowing educational level of G. I.’s during the Korean War, one might
reasonably wonder if the social classes of the men and women answering the call to colors also
changed. Did the burden of service fall to members of all social strata as in the Second World
War or did the sons and daughters of the working class disproportionately carry the
responsibility as in Vietnam?316 Increasingly aware of student and other deferments, many
people at the time certainly came to believe that draft policies protected an economic or
“intellectual elite” while pressing poorer folk into the military machine.317 Assistant Secretary of
Defense John Hannah even asserted that “there is too much validity in the statement often made
that the son of the well-to-do family goes to college and the sons of some of the rest go to
Korea?”318 While many scholars agree, asserting that Korea was indeed a “poor man’s war,” the
likelihood of military service in actuality had less to do with whether or not one came from a
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wealthy family than with other factors like reserve call-ups, draft pressure, and recruitment.
Office managers, steelworkers, salesmen, and the unemployed all sent their sons into the Army
or Marines or one of the other branches of service in roughly proportionate numbers, with 6776% of draft age cohorts donning uniforms. Only the sons of farmers could claim a significantly
lower rate of military service, with 56% of them joining up.319 In general, service remained the
obligation of all classes of eligible men.320
While social status had little effect on whether or not one mustered into the Armed
Forces during the Korean War, it probably did affect how men served their time. Upper class
youths who had been able to not only complete high school but afford some college before
entering service were well-positioned to move on from basic training to either advanced training
or specialized units while the sons of the lower classes with their rudimentary schooling shuttled
off to the front lines as combat infantrymen.321 A study of men from Detroit determined that the
casualty rate dropped as the income level rose and that nonwhites suffered a rate twice that of
their white counterparts.322 While flawed in various ways, the study does support the
conclusions of many scholars that combat units in the war zone had an unduly high concentration
of soldiers from the lower and working classes.323 Also, the Bradley Commission concluded that
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while 64% of accessions in the Army at home during the Korean War had tested above mental
group IV, only 15% of men sent to overseas commands had.324 The Korean War military might
not have suffered from class bias, but the units in Korea quite likely did.
Unlike men, women came to the military from a more limited range of social classes.
Regulations requiring a high school diploma or the equivalent effectively weeded out women
who for economic or other reasons had failed to finish their education. Women with few work
skills and those on the lower end of the occupational pay scale also tended to remain civilians.
At least in the Air Force and Navy virtually no domestic workers, food service personnel,
agriculturalists or horticulturalists left their day jobs to answer Uncle Sam’s call.325 Similarly, on
the upward end of the scale, few coeds traded their textbooks for service stripes and female
managers and professionals steered clear of the recruiter’s office. Of servicewomen claiming a
previous career, the vast majority listed clerical or secretarial work as their mainstay.326 Later, as
days of war spun into months and years, all of the services accepted younger women who had
neighborhoods because of small lot sizes and multi-family housing structures. Also, wealthier areas often consist of
older residents rather than of parents with draft age kids. One might well expect a higher participation rate from a
younger, more populated area than one with older and fewer people. So, the casualty rate of neighborhoods might
not accurately reflect the class composition of the troops as compared to the home community. Still, many scholars
make the claim that the lower classes were overrepresented in combat units in Korea. See Moskos, The American
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not yet begun gainful employment, but nothing suggests that these teenagers differed socially
from their more mature peers. The women who looked for opportunity in the Armed Forces
belonged to neither the lowest station of society nor the highest.
Racially, the faces of the troops during the Korean War revealed a new and slightly
darker American military. During World War I and World War II as in the years before Korea,
the Armed Forces employed a variety of means to limit minority and especially black
participation in the military.327 All branches of service established quota systems, allowing only
a certain number of African Americans into uniform, and then shepherded the fortunate few into
special segregated units.328 On the eve of Korea, however, racial policies began to change.
Hamstrung by black resistance to his proposal of Universal Military Service and genuinely
touched by the plight of African American World War II veterans, Truman issued Executive
Order 9981 in July 1948.329 This order not only called for equality of treatment and opportunity
for all servicemen, by which Truman meant the eventual integration of the military, but for the
creation of the Fahy Committee which would suggest and implement changes.330 Ultimately,
pressure from the Fahy Committee along with manpower needs in Korea caused the Army and
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even the Marines to integrate troops in the war zone and abolish quotas.331 By April 1950 the
legal barriers blocking black enlistment had lifted. As a result, the percentage of African
Americans mustering into the military began to rise, especially in the Army. In 1949, only 5.9%
of those in the Armed Forces and 8.6% of Army soldiers were black, but by 1954 7.9% of
military and 11.3% of Army personnel could claim African heritage.332 This trend continued
into the next war. By 1965, 9.5% of military personnel and 12.8% of the Army were black.333
And, unlike their brothers of the First and Second World Wars, the “tan” soldiers of Korea and
Vietnam were more likely than others to do their duty “in country” and in combat.334
Every state produced recruits and inductees for the Korean Conflict, but a lower
percentage of draft eligible men mustered in from the Far West and South than from other
sections of the country. Overall, 79% of Northerners and 76% of Midwesterners served, but only
70% of men from the Far West and 72% of Southerners did.335 In part, the rural nature of states
like Mississippi or Wyoming helps to account for this disproportion. With a high percentage of
331
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their populations living outside of metropolitan areas or small cities, Western and Southern states
simply had lots of men eligible for agricultural deferments and a higher percentage of rural
dwellers in these areas got deferred than in other regions of the country.336 Also, especially in
the South, the general health and educational level of residents prevented many males from
entering the military. Mental exams like the Armed Forces Qualification Test had a provisional
minimum threshold equivalent to about an eighth grade education.337 This presented a stumbling
block for men in states like North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and
Louisiana where the median number of school years completed by persons age 25 and older fell
months or even a year short of the eighth grade standard.338 Consequently, these states led the
country in IV-F classifications with Mississippi suffering a higher rate than the Virgin Islands.339
In all, the Armed Forces rejected only 11% of Northern boys, but declared almost 18% of
Southerners unfit for one reason or another.340
Saddled with high rates of rejection, some Southern states might have failed to shoulder
their share of the manpower burden for Korea, but Southern men were still well represented in
the Armed Forces. West Virginia had 95,000 men or 4.73% of its total population in uniform.341
Only Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont could come close to that rate of participation.
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Alabama alone of the Southern section ranked among the ten states with the lowest rates of
service, not surprising given that as late as the induction exam Selective Service rejected 6.5% of
Alabamans.342 Also, though Southern states did not provide the sheer numbers of men that New
York, Pennsylvania, or California produced, a high percentage of Southerners ended up as
casualties of the war.343 Almost 1% of West Virginians in service died in action as did .7% of
men from Kentucky.344 West Virginia, Kentucky, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Virginia, Louisiana,
Tennessee, Mississippi, Missouri, and South Carolina all fell into the top twenty of states which
suffered the highest percentage of population killed or wounded.345 And, Southerners supplied
much of the leadership for the Korean War as men from the South were more likely to muster in
as officers or officer candidates than men from other sections of the country.346 Memoirs and
scholarly studies alike make reference to the Southern flavor of military leadership.347 Despite
entering service at a somewhat slower pace than their Midwestern or Northern counterparts,
Southern men did fulfill their duty to country throughout the early 1950s. Unlike the Vietnam
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War, which ironically would have a distinctly Southern bent, no single section of the country
during the Korean Conflict bore a strikingly disproportionate burden in delivering soldiers.
Like men, women came from all over the United States and from as far away as Puerto
Rico to join up. Also like their male counterparts, many came from states like California,
Pennsylvania, New York, and Illinois.348 Overwhelmingly, though, female candidates hailed
from small towns or cities rather than from sprawling metropolitan areas. In 1952, the Marine
Corps determined that only 35% of its female recruits lived in cities of 100,000 or more and the
Army, Navy, and Air Force found that fewer than 30% of their enlistees came from cities that
size. In all branches of service about another 25% of women called cities of 25-100,000 home,
but 35-52% traded farms or small towns or cities for the military life. Except for nurses and
medical specialists who came from places large enough to have accredited schools, female
recruits tended to come from places with smaller populations.349 Strangely, this pattern
resembles the manpower paradigm of the next war in which rural and small town America
provided more military personnel proportionately than central cities or even working class
suburbs.350
Whether from the West Coast or the East or from somewhere in the middle of the
country, many soldiers of Korea had already mustered into the Armed Forces at least once.
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Especially early in the war when manpower needs reached critical levels, the Armed Forces
pulled World War II veterans out of Reserve or Guard units and returned them to active duty.
And, leading the return troops were the old salts, sergeants or lieutenants or other officers who
had stayed in service after the Second World War, or in some cases the First World War.351
Eventually, newly minted military men became the face of Korea’s Army and Marines, but at
war’s end 20% of soldiers could claim service in at least two wars.352 Close to a million men
served in both Korea and World War II.353 But, duty did not always stop in 1953 or 1954.
Almost 200,000 of those who had served in both World War II and Korea went on to wear their
uniforms for the Vietnam War, as did another 273,000 veterans of Korea alone.354 For many
young men, Korea turned out to be only one of their defining wars.
In the end, the men and women who filled uniforms for the Korean Conflict both
resembled World War II’s “Greatest Generation” and foreshadowed Vietnam’s reluctant one.
They came from all parts of the country and most sectors of the economy and they shared the
patriotism and willingness to serve of an earlier time. But, increasingly throughout the early
1950s the faces of the troops reflected the shifting demographics of postwar America. Younger,
better educated, and more racially diverse than their brothers and sisters of World War II, these
new soldiers became a generation of their own and a stepping stone to the Armed Forces of the
next war. Not all who mustered into the military, though, would march to the beat of Uncle
Sam’s drum. First they would have to cross through that age-old rite of passage, basic training.
351

James Hamilton Dill, Sixteen Days at Mungol-li (Fayetteville, AR: M&M Press, 1993), 402.
Boris R. Spiroff, Korea: The Frozen Hell on Earth: A Platoon Sergeant’s Diary, Korean War 1950-1951
(Baltimore, MD: American Literary Press, Inc., 1998), 9.
353
President’s Commission on Veterans’ Pensions, Readjustment Benefits: General Survey and Appraisal. A
Report on Veterans’ Benefits in the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 161.
354
U. S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Analysis, Office of Program and Data
Analyses, Data on Veterans of the Korean War, June 2000 (online publication at
http://www.va.gov/vetdata/demographics/KW2000.doc), 2.
352

90

CHAPTER 3: YOU’RE IN THE ARMY (OR NAVY, MARINES, OR AIR
FORCE) NOW!
“Your military career is about to begin. Perhaps you think it has begun already, but you haven’t seen
anything yet. You’re in the Army now.”—Major General John M. DeVine to “rawcruits” at Fort Dix
Induction Center, 1950.1
“I was frightened, homesick, hated the sergeant, and the food was terrible.”—Stanley Cohen, Korean War
veteran, on his first days in service.2
“[Training] is when I learned to smoke cigarettes and drink beer.”—William Gilwee, Jr., Korean War
veteran.3
“Marine boot camp—what else can I say? The Drill Instructors started by scaring the hell out of us, then it
got worse.”—James Murphy, Korean War veteran.4
“…By discipline and modern military technology, young men from farms, urban areas, slums, rural
communities, and wealthy suburbs are molded into a group of killers.”—Daniel Wolfe, Korean War veteran.5
“It is foolhardy to assume that we can undo a lifetime of moral and ethical training in fourteen weeks and
actually train men to kill.”—Army Intelligence Officer.6

The crowds could sometimes be fickle, especially when the buses or trains were only
headed toward Boot Camp training grounds and not toward actual combat. Depending on the
weather or the number of men and women leaving or the size of the community or whether or
not the country happened to be at war, farewell gatherings might be as small as a few loved ones
or as large as the whole town. In any case, the new soldiers arrived at the train or bus station
with duffle bags in hand, as ready as possible for the upcoming weeks or months that would
transform them into “Government Issue.” Then the oft repeated ritual began. Anxious mothers
and wives tried to keep from crying too hard, sweethearts planted kisses in hopes that they might
not be forgotten, fathers gave last minute pieces of advice, and babies squealed while older
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children clambered up and down the safety rails oblivious to the day’s portent. Even a few
husbands and boyfriends turned out to bid farewell to wives and girlfriends who had either
enlisted or been called up from the Reserves.7 Then, when the order came, these soon-to-be
servicemen and servicewomen piled into train cars and bus seats, waving goodbye and blowing
barrages of kisses to their friends and families and civilian lives. The men and women who
would serve during the Korean War belonged to the military now.8
It did not take long to wash down the last bites of a Red Cross doughnut with coffee or to
smoke a few of the free cigarettes handed out by the various military service clubs and it did not
take long for those headed toward basic training or Boot Camp to realize that they had left much
of the familiar behind and that more than miles separated them from home. The train ride alone
often proved eye-opening. Young men and women who had been sheltered in America’s small
enclaves could only wonder at the multitude of vices indulged in by other trainees en route to
their training destinations. Still naïve if not just plain green when he left Oklahoma for Camp
Pendleton, California, Harold Mulhausen had heard about “goings on,” but never really
witnessed such an abundance of drinking, gambling, cussing, dirty song singing, and smoking as
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when he boarded the troop train.9 One can only imagine what he might have thought of fellow
Marine James Putnam who joined other recruits in drinking and partying even before the train
arrived at the station to carry them to Parris Island, South Carolina. Putnam and his cronies
became so uncontrollable that the train conductor simply unhooked their cars, leaving them to
party outside of Atlanta, Georgia until they all ran out of money and the Marine Corps found and
attached them to another east-bound train.10
These antics, while entertaining, usually turned out to be only one of many firsts
experienced by troops along the well-worn train tracks carrying them toward military life. Many
trainees had never traveled far from home before and had never come into close contact with
people from other sections of the country. Now they found themselves crammed into close
quarters aboard troop trains with people who spoke and looked differently than they did.11 For
Northerners the journey could be especially unsettling. Training centers did exist in the North,
but far more were located south of the Mason Dixon line where climate made year round training
much more viable.12 That meant that men and women accustomed to a more integrated world
learned firsthand the rules of the segregated South. Years later, Mary Robinson remembered her
astonishment at seeing “White Only” sections in Virginia train stations and segregated barracks
9
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at Fort Eustis: “This was a surprise to me—a kid from the North.”13 For African Americans
born and raised in New York or Philly, the introduction to the South went beyond surprising—it
was nothing less than traumatic. Despite their military status, blacks in the South were simply
black and had to obey the signs dictating where they could drink, eat, use the restroom, enter or
exit train or bus stations, and shop for supplies.14 Even so, these recruits and draftees had
entered a world of non-civilians and as time went by trainees accustomed to segregation had
adjustments of their own to make. The military not surprisingly shipped and trained men and
women separately, but over time all branches of the Armed Forces phased out racial segregation
in the training and transport of troops. Executive Order 9981 in 1948 had ordered the integration
of the military and by March 18, 1951 all basic training within the United States was
integrated.15 Southern trains might still enforce segregation, but once trainees entered the
military reservation they left all guarantees of racial separation behind and almost certainly could
look forward to at least some exposure to persons of other colors.16
For a few recruits and draftees, the train ride provided the only introduction to military
life before reaching Boot Camp or basic training, but many others stopped off at reception
13
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battalions somewhere along the way for a week or two of processing-in.17 Here, trainees got
their first real glimpse of military life. Cadre at these centers greeted them by calling roll—
mispronouncing even the simplest of names—and by assigning the bewildered-looking
newcomers a variety of tasks and putting them to work right away. Depending upon one’s luck
or demeanor, they could end up “policing” or cleaning the grounds, standing guard at night, or
pitching in on KP or kitchen duty. Additionally, trainees had to attend to numerous other details.
Piles of paperwork had to be completed, including medical history forms and the assignment of
allotment insurance to wives or parents in case one died while in service to Uncle Sam. Written
examinations had to be taken to allow the military to gauge whether or not one needed remedialtype training or to determine an individual’s assignment within a particular corps.18 Physical
examinations, including tooth inspections and, in the case of men, “short arm” or genital
inspections for venereal disease, had to be endured, complete with vaccinations for those not yet
immunized.
More importantly, while at the reception battalions, trainees began the long and painful
process of leaving their individuality behind and accepting their place on the lowest rung of the
military ladder. Warned before leaving home to pack only the bare essentials—a toothbrush and
razor, a pair of underwear or two, and maybe a change of clothes—trainees by both necessity and
instruction began to dress alike once they received their uniforms from the quartermaster. Only
17
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the fact that the military required trainees to stencil their names and serial numbers onto
everything issued them distinguished one pair of fatigues or boots from another. In addition to
dressing alike, all trainees made a mandatory visit to the post barber shop where the barbers
invariably asked each customer how they wanted their hair cut. Most men wanted a little off the
sides or top or perhaps a nice trim, but all left the chair with the same close, clean, standard issue
buzz cut. As Louis Baldovi notes, “In less than a minute I was practically bald.”19 For women,
hair was normally cut to the bottom of the jacket collar, shorter hair being discouraged as
unfeminine and perhaps a sign of lesbian tendencies.20 By now, the trainees not only looked
alike, they had learned to act alike as well, to conform to the military’s demand that they obey
orders. John Williams and his tent mates had internalized this lesson so completely that they
complied when men came to their tents at three in the morning, ordered them to fall out, fall in,
and double-time march for two miles in the cold. Told at the end to wait for the next soldier,
Williams and the others didn’t move until morning came without anyone else appearing and they
realized that they were standing on the road beside their tent.21 Indeed, even before reaching
Boot Camp trainees discovered that military life could be filled with hardship.22
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However educational the trip to basic training turned out to be, though, it still did not
prepare most trainees for what awaited them on the other end. Regardless of branch of service,
basic training or Boot Camp had one mission—to tear down the civilian and build up an effective
member of the military machine.23 And the clock began ticking the moment that new recruits
and draftees stepped foot on the military post. From that point forward it no longer mattered
who or what one had been in civilian life—male or female, black or white, rich or poor, educated
or unschooled. The only thing that mattered was that trainees learned to be homogenous if not
interchangeable parts of their particular armed force, accepting of orders, disciplined, and
prepared for whatever duty lay ahead. Still, basic training for those who would serve during the
Korean Conflict varied in length and intensity from service to service and sometimes from year
to year within the same service.

Army Basic Training

Throughout the Korean War era, no branch of the Armed Forces strained harder to train
new recruits and draftees than the Army. Of the 5,720,000 selective service registrants examined
from July 1950 to July 1953 who went on to serve in the wartime military, 2,834,000 received
their training from the Army. In addition, the Army accepted 1,475,700 or 94% of the era’s
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draftees into its ranks.24 Under the best of circumstances, training so many new soldiers would
have posed difficulties, but the situation in 1950 made completing the task frighteningly
burdensome. Post-World War II personnel cuts had all but emptied the Army’s pockets of
qualified basic training instructors, and the immediate deployment of Reserve troops to Korea in
the early months of the war intensified that shortage. With few options open, and with stateside
trainees and Korean War soldiers and units waiting, the Army simply decided to shorten the
basic training cycle so that existing schools and instructors could more quickly churn out
overseas replacements and possible training cadre.25 By August 1950, basic training for men had
been reduced from 14 weeks to only 6 weeks to be followed by another 8 weeks of technical or
unit training.26 Even so, the Army continued to hunger for replacements and in October 1950 it
shortened WAC basic from 13 to 8 weeks so that more women soldiers would be available to
replace men in stateside jobs, freeing them to in turn replace men in Korea.27 Throughout the
war, high ranking officers as well as various members of the press complained that 6 or 8 weeks
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of basic turned out green troops, but with few exceptions the Army stuck to its guns, producing
an astounding number of new soldiers in a very short period of time.28
Regardless of when one entered the Army or how long basic training lasted, the
experience remained fairly similar for Korean War trainees. Most men and women arrived at the
training camp with strangers that they had just met on the train or bus rather than with hometown
friends.29 In the years of peace after World War II, the Army entirely abandoned previous
policies of creating geographically-based units to come to basic, train, and then serve together.
Instead, trainees from all over the country shipped in to basic training camp, only to be assigned
to different units based on individual skills after completion of the course. And, not infrequently
these trainees approached training camps for the first time well after dark. Whether official
policy or not, the Army took advantage of nighttime arrivals to throw new troops off balance. In
fourteen or twelve or even six weeks, the Army hoped to transform these undisciplined civilians
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into combat-ready infantrymen and the sooner trainees could be mentally torn down, the sooner
training cadre could rebuild them as soldiers.30
Naturally, given the Army’s mission, most recruits and draftees did not find the Army
particularly welcoming upon their arrival at basic. Some drill sergeants and training cadre made
a point of immediately heaping abuse on men and women fresh from induction centers or
reception battalions. Rudolph Stephens remembers that as soon as he got to basic “a big black
sergeant started cursing us and calling us foul names.”31 For men like John Kamperschroer, who
came from homes where “4 letter words were not used,” such language provided a rude
introduction to military life. 32 For Stephens, this particular incident “was hard to take because
very few of us had even spoken to a black person in our lives.” In reality, training cadre usually
greeted newcomers somewhat more cordially than this, but trainees still tended to feel a wave of
regret upon arriving at basic training. Homesick, frightened, and tired, they “didn’t know what
to do or why I was there.”33 Before long, though, most realized that they simply had to get used
to things because “there wasn’t anything any of us could do about it.” 34
No matter what time of the day or night trainees pulled into camp, they soon found their
way to the barracks for a first look at their new home. Certainly, Korean War era volunteers and
draftees did not expect luxury, but even so they could not help but be disappointed when they
30
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saw the buildings that would house them for the better part of two months. In order to
accommodate the huge flow of trainees after the outbreak of the war, the Army reopened camps
that had been mothballed or simply left to rot after 1945.35 Troop quarters consisted of
“temporary” wooden structures built cheaply to house the soldiers of a different war and they
had the appearance of abandoned buildings.36 Some even had doors or windows missing, and
almost all relied upon primitive coal furnaces for heat. At Camp Lee, Virginia, smoke from a
local chemical plant permeated everything including the female trainees’ uninsulated living
quarters.37 But, “since their flimsy walls and floors had not yet collapsed, and their showers
were still functional, they were deemed appropriate to accommodate the recruits for Korea.”38
Inside the barracks, more surprises awaited the temporary occupants of these temporary
shelters. Comfort and privacy had become things of the past. Rows and rows of beds, really just
three inch thick mattresses resting on wire springs, ensured cramped, uncomfortable quarters for
would-be sleepers.39 In the bathrooms, common showers ruled the day.40 Forty or fifty men or
women might be expected to rotate through only five or six showers each morning before
marching to the mess hall for breakfast. Toilets sat unshielded by stalls and not uncommonly
faced the only available sinks. As one veteran recalls, “sometimes, depending on what was
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served for dinner, a trio or quartet would be performing for an uninterested audience of
handwashers or shavers.”41
New trainees almost always received some type of orientation from company
commanding officers either at the reception battalion or shortly after arriving at Boot Camp.42
“Your military career is about to begin,” these lectures started. “Perhaps you think it has begun
already, but you haven’t seen anything yet. You’re in the Army now.”43 Part pep talk, the
speeches went on to detail all the benefits of Army life—free food, clothing, housing, and a
steady salary, not to mention status. “Mama will be very proud that her boy is not a mama’s boy
any longer.” But they also informed “rawcruits” that “in return, you are expected to work, and I
mean work” and warned that some would never make the grade because “the going is too
rugged.” Trainees also learned some of the do’s and don’ts of Army life, starting with “do not
go absent without leave.” Some camps even issued information packets with admonitions
against going AWOL printed repeatedly throughout.44
With introductions out of the way, training began in earnest. Designed to tear down
trainees’ civilian identities, inculcate them with military customs, and work them into physical
fitness, the first couple weeks of basic training made even the toughest men and women question
their abilities. Highly regimented, each day typically began before sunrise and sometimes before
reveille. Trainees got up, showered, shaved, dressed, and got into formation to march to the
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mess hall for morning chow.45 After eating, it was time to either clean the barracks and latrines
or head off to training.46 Rain or shine, every day included not just classroom sessions on
subjects like map-reading, achievements and traditions of the Army, and personal hygiene, but
also plenty of outdoor field exercises and calisthenics.47 Occasionally, films on topics like the
need for soap and how to use it broke the monotony.48 By lunch, hungry trainees devoured
whatever the cook gave them and then returned to the day’s business.49 After the evening meal,
trainees finally had some free time, but even then they had to polish shoes, wash and iron
uniforms, and “police” their living quarters. If they finished their chores quickly enough, they
might slip down to the service club for a game of ping pong, a snack or beer, some live
entertainment or even a dance if women had been brought in by a local social group.50 Lights
out came around 2100 hours or 9 p.m., not a minute too soon for most of the exhausted trainees,
but training cadre not infrequently awakened them in the middle of the night to inspect
footlockers or wooden floors.51 Around the clock, strict instructors demanded perfection from
the hapless trainees who could not help but feel that “even by trying to do right, one could be
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humbled quickly and unfairly.”52 Luckily, most trainees adjusted fairly swiftly to military life as
they were either too busy following orders to think about it or too tired to give any thought to
whether or not they were happy.53
In between inspections and physical conditioning, the Army imparted a number of
fundamental skills to trainees in the first few weeks of basic training. These largely
undisciplined troops learned to obey orders and conduct themselves with a military bearing.
Men and women who had come to camp slouching and dragging their feet, became accustomed
to standing up straight, lining up in an organized manner, and marching on demand, sometimes
for miles. Through drills and classroom instruction they learned to find their way with only a
compass, read maps, properly attach gas masks, sanitize living quarters, employ appropriate
military jargon, and, in some cases, distinguish their left hand from their right.54 Trainees also
became familiar with the most important tool of their new trade—the M-1 rifle. No one would
have the opportunity to actually fire this weapon until at least the third week of basic training,
but by then all trainees would be proficient in disassembling, cleaning, and assembling it.
Without exception, drill instructors and training cadre emphasized the M-1’s centrality to
battleground survival and told their trainees to “make it your friend, take it apart, oil it, keep it
clean, and take it to bed with you.”55
By the beginning of the third week, recruits and draftees were on their way to physical
fitness and it was time for the real work to begin. Having beaten trainees into submission, drill
instructors and cadre now started to build soldiers. Some trainees got the chance to participate in
52
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“confidence courses” to boost their self-esteem. Daniel Wolfe describes how his unit marched
three miles before beginning just such a course where the men had to hop from tire to tire, crawl
through puddles under barbed wire fences, hurdle a twelve foot wooden wall, and cross a stream.
After ten minutes rest, the men then embarked on a hike through the mountains that kept them
out until almost two in the morning.56 Tired or not, trainees still had duties, like KP or standing
watch as fireguard, to attend to and they still had to get up early the next day ready to process all
of the information that the Army deemed crucial to their survival. Specialists taught trainees
elementary first aid, the art of camouflage and concealment, the proper way to construct field
fortifications and dig foxholes, and how to effectively wield a bayonet.57 Under supervision—or
more accurately under scrutiny—trainees practiced hand to hand combat, obstacle courses, and
foxhole drills where tanks rumbled right above their heads.58
After the first few months of the Korean War, the Army also added more realistic
maneuvers to its basic training line up. In general, the Army had done little to update training
methods or technology since the Second World War and had become quite complacent in the
belief that no reason existed for tough, realistic training.59 When North Korean forces almost
pushed American troops off the peninsula, however, the Army recognized that it had to better
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prepare its soldiers for the task of fighting.60 As a result, basic training personnel began to
develop infiltration and other exercises to familiarize and inure trainees to the sights, sounds, and
smells of real battle.61 At Fort Dix, cadre treated trainees to a course where they crawled under
barbed wire obstacles dragging their M-1 rifles as buried explosive charges detonated around
them and live machine gun bullets “whizzed inches above our heads.”62 Then, officers examined
the rifles for dirt and anyone unfortunate enough to have emerged with a less than clean M-1 had
the pleasure of repeating the ordeal. At the end, drill sergeants gave the order to fix bayonets and
charge dummies that had been strung up in the trees. Seymour Bernstein remembers that one of
his officers marked the occasion by shouting, “Scream, damn you! Scream as you go in for the
kill! That’s how you scare the hell out of the enemy!”63 By 1952, Fort Dix had also added a
maneuver taken straight from the hills of Korea. In their last week of basic training, soldiers
charged “Ridge 102,” using live ammunition.64 Similarly in an exercise described by one
veteran as a “son of a bitch,” the Hawaii Training Center had trainees jog uphill behind tanks for
almost a mile only to be assaulted with live ammunition at the base of Hill 904.65 Such
simulated battle conditions were thought by more than a few to be worse than those in the
Korean war zone.
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Whatever else trainees did while at basic training, they spent the majority of their time
after the first two weeks learning to use the Army’s stockpile of weapons.66 The M-1 remained
the primary focus, and in eight weeks each trainee fired some 502 rounds in an effort to achieve
reasonable accuracy.67 Cadre also introduced trainees to a host of other devices being used in
Korea such as M-30s, browning automatic rifles (BARs), 60 mm mortars, .30 caliber air-cooled
machine guns, bazookas, .45 caliber pistols, 37 mm recoilless rifles, and all types of grenades.68
Not surprisingly, accidents could and did happen. At Fort Hood, a private gunned down a
lieutenant saying he “would do anything to get out of the army” and at Fort Dix a corporal
narrowly saved the day when a trainee froze after unlocking a grenade.69 Private Charles
Burrows died not long after his arrival at Camp Stoneman, California when someone
accidentally shot him.70 Such incidents coupled with the amount of time spent firing different
weapons prompted many trainees to conclude that the entire object of basic training was to teach
them to “forget thinking and learn to kill.”71 Like Rudolph Stephens, they believed that they
“learned the same thing over and over again, and that was how to kill, kill, kill. That’s all you
heard day in and day out, how to kill someone.”72 True or not, if trainees managed to internalize
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the willingness to take another life, then they had in fact made the transition from citizen to
combat soldier that the Army desired.73
For both men and women, basic training ended the same way, in a long bivouac designed
to expose them to everything that they might encounter on a real battlefield.74 Just as they would
have to do if sent to war, trainees left the security of their barracks and marched or jogged ten or
twenty miles weighted down with full packs, heavy tent equipment, M-1 rifles, and the
disassembled parts of various other weapons. Ambulances tagged along behind to pick up men
who fainted from exhaustion, but otherwise no one could expect to hitch a ride on a truck.75 As
one Korean War veteran told William Abreu, “In Korea there might not be trucks. It may rain all
day, snow all day, and sweat may be running down your ass all day.”76 After setting up camp,
trainees engaged in a number of different activities. Some cadre continued weapons training.77
Others conducted more grueling exercises such as dumping trainees out miles from their new
camp, handing them a compass, a map, and a book of matches and expecting them to find their
way back alone.78 Usually, trainees participated in some sort of a mock battle. They assaulted
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hills, tried to infiltrate enemy lines, and dug foxholes. No matter how well individuals or units
did, instructors quickly pointed out that “this was a piece of cake compared to what you’ll find in
Korea.”79
For men who graduated basic training after the first few months of the Korean War, such
warnings had great resonance.80 Army policy in previous years had been to assign new soldiers
either to advanced training or stateside duty stations before shipping them abroad. As late as
July 1950, the Army sought enlistments by promising “no present plan” to “use the recruits
overseas.”81 However, manpower shortages in Korea increasingly pressured the Army to send
men fresh from basic training to the war zone as individual replacements and by September 1950
the press and others began accusing the Army of using green troops in the Korean theater. Army
spokesman, not surprisingly, denied these charges, but admitted that soldiers with at least
fourteen weeks of individual and unit basic training could be sent. 82 Just over a year later and
deeper into the war, the Army officially revised its system, allowing men entering service for the
first time to be sent overseas directly after basic training, which by this time had been shortened
to produce more soldiers in fewer weeks.83 The FECOM assignment became so common for
new basic training graduates that in some cases the Army simply mimeographed the order and
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passed out copies when men returned from their final bivouac.84 Some trainees did manage to
enter advanced training programs or officer candidate schools after their six or eight weeks of
basic, but for many more basic training provided the only training they would receive before
departing for Korea as “qualified killers.”85
Both during and after the war, questions about the adequacy and effectiveness of the
Army’s basic training in preparing soldiers for battle surfaced. In 1950, one high ranking officer
complained about the “creampuff army,” declaring “we’ve got to teach ‘em how to fight, get rid
of the non-essentials and get down to tough, hard bed-rock training.” 86 He went on to say that
basic training needed to be longer, at least fourteen to sixteen weeks, and that training needed to
include more night training, reconnaissance on foot, and guerilla warfare tactics. A colonel in
Korea told reporter Marguerite Higgins that soldiers had been “nursed and coddled, told to drive
safely, to buy war bonds, to avoid VD, to write a letter home to mother, when somebody ought to
have been telling them how to clear a machine gun when it jams.” He reminded Higgins of the
human consequences of making men “learn in combat, in a matter of days, the basic things they
should have known before they ever faced an enemy.” They became casualties because “some
of them don’t learn fast enough.”87 After the war, an Army panel found that the Army could
have fought better in Korea and lamented that “the Chinese were tough…they knew how to
endure…[while] we had to have three squares a day—and two of them had to be hot or junior
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would write his congressman or his mother.” One of the officers declared, “We are training for
survival and the sooner everybody understands that, the better.” Mostly composed of Korean
War veterans, the panel recommended major overhauls in Army training, starting with stricter
discipline, off-post saluting, and a merit-based ranking system.88 General Walter Beddell Smith,
appearing before a subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, acknowledged that men
with only a few months training saw action in both World War II and Korea, but asserted “it
would be criminal if we did it again.” Smith believed that twelve months training of soldiers
would be best, but that “6 months represents an irreducible minimum.”89 As prisoners of war
began returning in the wake of “brainwashing” allegations, Army officers and psychiatrists in
part targeted the training which had failed to inculcate the kind of devotion to God and country
that would fortify soldiers during such an ordeal. The Army had been too solicitous of its
trainees’ welfare, such critics charged, leaving soldiers undisciplined and ignorant of American
democracy.90 Many Americans simply believed that the Army had not provided tough enough
training to its recruits and draftees and as a result had not produced men mentally and physically
conditioned to fight.91
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The troops themselves often agreed that their military schooling had holes in it larger
than those made by their M-1 bullets. Exhausted, they missed out on lectures that could “spell
the difference between life and death” in Korea and, while reaching a certain comfort level with
the Army’s weapons, few became marksmen in so short a time.92 Sometimes men earned
proficiency ratings on equipment that they could barely use. On the day of his tank driver’s test,
Vince Krepps could not get the tank out of first gear and simply ambled around aimlessly until
the instructor asked a soldier sitting next to him how he had done. “Great,” was the reply and
Krepps passed the exam.93 In more than a few cases, men found themselves on a Korea-bound
troopship trying to make up for what they had not learned at basic training. Walter Ogasawara
found out after sailing that he would become the gunner of a 57 mm recoilless rifle team. “I
knew shit about firing a 57 mm recoilless rifle.” So, while en route, he simulated firing it
without ammunition. Similarly, Pedro Behasa worked on getting used to the 60 mm mortar
while aboard ship, but he at least received eight rounds of ammunition for “live” practice.94 No
wonder, then, that a great many of those ordered to Korea felt like Merle Wysock, that “I really
wasn’t ready to be an infantryman even after…basic training.”95
For men who entered service before the outbreak of the Korean Conflict, another factor
hindered the effectiveness of their basic training—the fact that they had completed it months or
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even years earlier. Lured into the military by recruitment posters that emphasized the benefits of
military life, these troops joined an Army that in the post-World War II 1940s seemed to have
forgotten that the principal business of soldiers remained to fight and if need be to die.96
Convinced of the supremacy of nuclear weapons, the Army in these years used basic training to
apply a thin layer of military socialization before ordering men to their first assignments.97
Unfortunately, this system allowed men to learn a particular specialty without really internalizing
how to be a soldier. Consequently, when hostilities began in Korea, Army cooks, lifeguards,
drivers, teletype officers, and clerks suddenly found themselves headed to the battle zone as
riflemen and infantrymen, jobs for which they had never received adequate preparation.98 Such
was the experience of Milton Griffey, operator of a quartermaster laundry in Japan in 1950.
Ordered to the Pusan Perimeter, Griffey on arrival asked where to find his laundry. To Griffey’s
horror, he received an M-1 rifle and the news that “You are an Infantry soldier. No laundry duty
here!”99 Griffey made a fast transition and performed well, but others proved less lucky. Men
died, went home wounded, and even became prisoners of war because their training had been
either incomplete or too long before the war to remember. Also, longtime soldiers often carried

96

Roy Appleman in James H. Toner, “American Society and the American Way of War: Korea and Beyond,”
Parameters 11:1 (1981), 81. Also, T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness (New York:
Macmillan, 1963), 100.
97
Only after 1948 did all recruits and draftees take the same basic training. Before that time, the Army sent men to
the branch in which they would serve for Boot Camp. “New Soldiers for New Tasks,” New York Times, 23 July
1950, 4. As early as 1949, the Army, realizing the poor state of many of its troops, did begin a new training
initiative aimed at establishing combat-readiness, but the Korean War came before it could be completed. Some
scholars have argued, though, that this new initiative did get the Eighth Army in shape before Korea. Thomas E.
Hanson, “The Eighth Army’s Combat Readiness before Korea: A New Appraisal,” Armed Forces and Society 29:2
(Winter 2003), 167-184.
98
Terry Addison, The Battle for Pusan: A Korean War Memoir (Novato, CA: Presidio, 2000), 1. Addison himself,
sworn into the military on the basis of a graduate degree and having no military training or active duty service since
ROTC in 1948, shipped out to Japan immediately after swearing in. Also, Susumu Shinagawa in Baldovi, ed., A
Foxhole View, 4-5; “Waste in Training Laid to Army Units,” New York Times, 26 December 1951, 1; and “New
Soldiers for New Tasks,” New York Times, 23 July 1950, 4.
99
David K. Holland in Donald M. Buchwald, ed., Tales from the Cold War: The 13th Armored Infantry Battalion on
Freedom’s Frontier (Victoria, Canada: Trafford Publishing, 2004), 116.

113

the additional weight of physical unfitness. Speaking of the Occupation forces sent to Korea in
the early days of the war, one sergeant remarked, “Some of them are so goddam fat they can’t
hardly walk around. Most of them haven’t had to put their pants on for years; always had a
couple of geisha girls to do that for ‘em.”100 Some, in fact, went to war so out of shape that when
enemy forces broke the lines they just sat down and waited to be captured.101
Still, while Army basic training had some grave limitations, it did prepare most men well
enough that they survived their wartime tours of duty. Not every skill of soldiering could be
imparted in a matter of weeks, but even the softest recruits and inductees who completed the
course left it strengthened physically, conditioned to obey orders and perform duties despite fear,
and more confident in themselves and their superiors. The sleepless conditions at basic became
tutorials for battle where exhausted men had no choice but to work and fight through days,
nights, or even weeks.102 Films and classes on hygiene translated into fewer deaths from disease
and infection than in previous wars.103 Hours and days spent at the firing range encouraged the
bulk of the Army’s trainees to shoot their weapons even if they did not feel totally comfortable
with the idea of killing. The ratio of fire, or the percent of men firing their weapons in battle,
increased significantly in the Korean War from World War II.104 Especially after combat
veterans returned from Korea to become instructors, basic training became more informative,
more relevant to the war at hand and trainees increasingly felt “physically and mentally
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conditioned to fight.”105 Pointing out that many of the Army’s trainees had been born into the
Great Depression and grew up during World War II in distraught homes with absent fathers, one
officer claimed that the Army provided men with discipline and something more—a newfound
pride in themselves.106 A few even developed a life-long admiration for the way the Army could
“train young soldiers to do things they had not previous talents for…in short periods of time.”107
Observers from the press duly noted that Army basic training had taken clerks, factory hands,
and schoolboys and given them the “weathered look of well-trained troops.”108 By December
1951, the Senate Preparedness Committee concurred, pronouncing Army training satisfactory.109
In the final analysis, Army basic training in the Korean War period had both strengths and
weaknesses, but drill instructors and cadre usually did the job they were called to do—they
provided trainees with an introduction to warfare. And, then, as now, the Old Salts rested easy
with the knowledge that the Army could teach men to march and give them the fundamental
skills of soldiering, but that no amount of training or time could prepare soldiers for combat like
combat itself.
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Marine Boot Camp

“Sand Fleas,” “Shit Birds,” Boot Camp “POWs,” you could call them anything but
Marines. 110 Recruits and inductees in the Korean War era could not be Marines, could not even
wear the Corps’ emblem until successfully completing Boot Camp.111 Like the Army, the
Marine Corps in the early 1950s had an obligation to train and produce combat-ready
infantrymen in as short a time as possible, but the Marine Corps stood unparalleled among the
Armed Forces in instilling esprit de corps in those who would join its ranks. Unlike Army
trainees who could end up at any one of many basic training centers, all with their own strengths
and specialties, all regular Marines passed through either Parris Island or the San Diego Recruit
Depot, Boot Camps dedicated to only one thing, the building of Marines.
More challenging than the basic training offered by other branches of the military,
Marine Corps basic began almost the moment that trainees boarded the camp-bound shuttle. If
enlistees or draftees had entertained any notions that Boot Camp would not be as bad as the
stories they had heard, the desolate landscape along the way must have given them pause.
Except for a few loblolly pines and a red cedar or two, Parris Island, tucked away in the sandy
part of South Carolina, supported virtually no grass or shrubbery and in the hot, sultry summer
months the unshaded heat beat down on buses, buildings, and people relentlessly.112 San Diego,
110
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of course, appeared less foreboding, but even there entering trainees would have been hardpressed to not realize the camp’s utter isolation from civilian life.
At the end of the line, things only got bleaker. Instead of providing reception battalions
or a slow, easy in-processing phase, the Marine Corps immediately began to tear down and
discipline trainees. Mean-tempered sergeants boarded the buses cursing and shouting at their
new charges, ready to enforce all the rules and make it clear that “our souls belonged to God, but
our butts belonged to the United States Marine Corps.”113 Huston Wheelock recalls that on his
arrival at the San Diego Recruit Depot, three guys lit up cigarettes in front of a “no smoking”
sign. The Marine cadre threw “them up against the wall and beat the hell out of them right
there.”114 Anyone still unconvinced that the Marine Corps meant business had a very long eight
to fourteen weeks ahead of them.115
Marine Boot Camp followed the same general format as Army basic training and instilled
many of the same skills. Just as in the Army, newcomers repeated such mundane tasks as
policing the barracks and making the bunks while cadre interminably found fault with their
efforts. Physical drills, calisthenics, long marches, and bivouacs trimmed down the overweight
and built up the skinny and scrawny. The undisciplined learned, often through hard knocks, to
stand at attention, to address everyone over the rank of private first class as “sir,” and to obey
orders unquestioningly. Educational films and lectures informed trainees about the ravages of
113
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venereal disease, the proper way to treat minor wounds, and a plethora of other military subjects.
Boots memorized the General Orders, endured the gas chamber exercise, and demonstrated their
swimming proficiency. A few weeks in, trainees began regular trips to the firing range to
practice their marksmanship with the M-1 rifle and other weapons.116 And, like their Army
counterparts, Marine trainees looked forward to earning some “free time.”
But, Marine Corps Boot Camp for all its similarities was not Army training. Determined
not only to achieve the highest possible survival rate in battle, but to be the premier branch of the
Armed Forces, the Marine Corps pushed its trainees, at least its male trainees, to the limit both
mentally and physically.117 Drill sergeants awakened Boots before dawn to begin days that
would last sixteen to twenty hours.118 And in those long days, Boots learned to perform with
perfection or to suffer terrible consequences. Serious about stamping out individual identity and
building Marines, cadre unhesitatingly employed corporal punishment. Men caught smoking
had to smoke an entire pack of cigarettes with a bucket over their heads.119 Those who failed to
shave at the ordered intervals found themselves dry shaving while marching and singing the
Marine Corps Hymn.120 Messing up during a drill could earn one a whack on the head with a
“swagger stick,” a cut down broomstick. Freezing during grenade practice might result in a good
beating administered by the drill instructor. One trainee caught with three candy bars had to eat
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them on the spot, wrappers and all.121 Another who coughed up phlegm and spit it out without
permission had to lick it up off the ground. Not infrequently, an entire platoon paid for one
man’s mistake by missing out on recreational time or by drilling longer.122 From the standpoint
of the cadre, one man’s mistakes in battle could cost the lives or freedom of everyone.123
Similarly, in war, one simply did not have any recreational time so why should there be
any at Marine Boot Camp? Technically, Marine trainees had Sundays off, but in reality the
pressures of basic training rarely subsided even for a day. Unsatisfied and overzealous drill
instructors took free time away in a flash, ordering platoons which had performed poorly during
the week to drill on Sundays and organizing competitive and compulsory football games and
boxing matches to fill the day for the others.124 Even treats, like a trip to the movies, could be
used to teach lessons. Ralph Cutro remembers that once a week on very cold nights the cadre
marched recruits to the drive-in to freeze “our tails off” in a sort of cold weather exercise.125
While brutal, most Marines who served in the Korean War and other wartime eras look back
upon Boot Camp as instrumental to their survival. “They taught us everything we needed to
keep us alive when we went into combat.”126 Some even credit it with “the most amazing
transition I can ever imagine…much of that training helped all of us involved, both in Korea, and
life long after.”127
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Even more than the Army, the Marine Corps regimented the life of its trainees. Almost
from arrival, Boots did everything as a group and they did it in a uniform way.128 They got up at
the same time and made their bunks at the same time in the same way. When it came time to
shower, the men lined up, marched to the showerhead as a group, pulled the ring to wet their
bodies, applied soap in the prescribed order to their various body parts, rinsed, dried, and
marched back to the bunks. Trainees went to chow together, trained together, and learned to do
every task identically throughout their day until they all went to bed at the same appointed time.
Boots even learned to communicate with one another using approved Marine vocabulary.129 No
longer did male or female trainees go upstairs or downstairs—they went topside or down below.
They hit the deck, not the floor, and walls and windows became bulkheads and portholes while
latrines became heads. Also, Boots learned that no matter where they were, the rules and
procedures remained the same. Whether on base, at the pool, on a train, at the movies, stateside,
or overseas, the Marine Corps expected Marines and Marine trainees to employ the lessons they
had been taught and to recognize the chain of command.130 In quick fashion, trainees learned to
act and be alike and they also learned to respect and rely upon those who had internalized the
same lessons as themselves. For many Marines, this lesson stuck with them not only in the heat
of battle where they acted without ever doubting that their comrades would back them up, but in
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later life as well. They, like Norman Weibel, were certain that “I could always count on my
buddies and they on me. Response would be instantaneous.”131
Those who completed Boot Camp felt more than a deep sense of accomplishment. They
had watched some of their number wash out, unable to handle the constant pressure, and seen
others held back by an inability to perform satisfactorily on proficiency tests. But they had made
it and these new Marines saw themselves in a new light. Strict drill instructors and cadre had not
only prepared them well for whatever duty lay ahead, they had transformed them as individuals.
“We arrived at boot camp as mere boys, but left there as men.” 132 No prouder day could be
imagined than graduation where the former trainees finally got to pin the Corps emblem on their
uniforms, a symbol that they had entered the exclusive world of Marines. They passed in review
in front of the camp’s big brass while a Marine Corps band played and friends and family looked
on. Whatever else they did in life, Korean War era Marines could reflect on the fact that they
had accomplished this.
Marines they might be, but for those destined for wartime duty in Korea, more training
waited just around the corner. Unlike the Army which shipped new soldiers straight from six or
eight weeks of basic to the war zone, the Marine Corps decreed in September 1950 that all
Marines leaving for Korean duty had to have at least twelve weeks of training.133 Also, by the
end of the war, all war-bound soldiers had to pass through specially designed programs at Camp
131
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Pendleton, California before their embarkation to Korea. New Boot Camp graduates assigned to
any of the supporting arms groups, such as artillery or tanks, first entered a Supporting Arms
Regiment for an additional four weeks of training. All men at the rank of sergeant or below with
less than six months in a military occupational specialty (MOS) passed through the Infantry
Training Regiment for four weeks of infantry training. All Marines, regardless of length of
service, joined the Staging Regiment for three weeks of processing, physical and combat
conditioning, lectures and demonstrations, and intensive cold weather training.134
At the Staging Regiment, the final stop before heading to the Far East, Marines received
all of their combat equipment from helmets and rifles to mess kits and canteens. They updated
their administrative records, including pay allotments, insurance, wills, emergency data forms,
and dog tags. Doctors and dentists performed thorough examinations, making sure cavities got
filled, shots were up to date, and men met the minimum standards of physical fitness. “Nothing
was left to chance, no body part left unexamined.”135 Trainees attended lectures and classes on a
variety of subjects such as how to live in the field, laying and removing land mines and booby
traps, and life aboard troop ships. Experts warned them once again of the dangers of venereal
disease, producing photos and films that showed “scabbed, deformed, and oozing genitalia.”136
Officers emphasized the Universal Code of Military Justice, again and again cautioning Marines
not to do anything that might land them in a naval prison or worse. Men practiced for war by
marching, completing obstacle courses, conducting close order drills, throwing live grenades,
and firing pistols, carbines, and BARs.
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Perhaps most importantly, especially for those leaving for Korea in winter, Marines at the
Staging Regiment underwent cold weather training. While still at camp, they watched films
demonstrating how to survive the cold and the consequences of improper preparation. James
Brady recalls a color film clip in which the surgeon didn’t have to cut off the toes of a frostbite
victim, “he simply bent them back and they broke off in his surgical glove, all five toes, bloody
at the stump but otherwise black and dead.” Brady also remembers the lesson—“Avoid
this…keep your feet dry, change your socks, and don’t get frostbite.”137 Then the men received
the latest in military issue winter clothing—long underwear, fur parkas, wool gloves, socks, hats,
vests, and, by late 1952, rubber thermal boots—along with another demonstration on the use and
care of their new items. After such preliminaries, the men were loaded onto Greyhound buses
for a twelve hour trip to Pickel Meadows, California in the Sierra Nevadas where they would
spend six days and nights surviving the elements.
At Pickel Meadows, the Marines learned many things about surviving in the cold.138
They built shelters for themselves, melted snow to make water, warmed frozen rations to an
edible temperature, and came to understand that weapons performed differently at extreme
temperatures. After the second day, Marines spent their time hiking through the snow, breaking
trails, crossing streams, and living out of their packs. Now sufficiently beaten down by the
weather, trainees learned that the Marine Corps had another lesson in store for them. Frostbite or
hypothermia could kill, but so too could the enemy. Marines pretending to be Chinese soldiers
took every opportunity to attack the hapless and exhausted trainees—they pounced in the dead of
night after men had bedded down, at wayside lunch breaks, and as men stopped to catch their
137
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breath after miles of hiking through the thin air. Trainees unfortunate enough to be captured did
not return to some safe, warm holding cell. Instead, their captors interrogated them all night in
sign language and Chinese terms.139 Eventually, the exercise ended and the trainees returned to
Camp Pendleton, but the brutal and realistic experience left its mark on all. Back at camp, some
men even had to be treated for frostbite.140 Only now did the Marine Corps deem its men ready,
after a final parade and a weekend of liberty, to ship out for the real war in Korea.141
Marine Corps basic training differed from Army Boot Camp in many ways, but most
importantly, for the Marines basic truly represented only a single step in a thorough and lengthy
training process. In explaining why Marines in prisoner of war camps did not “crack” as often as
Army soldiers, Colonel Frash emphasized that the Marine Corps did not rely only upon past
training, but instead continuously trained its troops. He said, “From the day a man enters the
Marine Corps he is under training of some sort or another….His officers are constantly under
training.”142 And the kind of training that Marines received mirrored the situations they would
face in combat as nearly as possible. Trainees underwent extreme physical and mental
challenges with little rest or respite. Thus, the Corps rarely had occasion to commit “green” or
under-trained troops to battle or to command positions within the war zone.143 As a result,
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Marines in Korea could fall back on what they had learned and represent well the Corps that sent
them.

Navy and Air Force Boot Camp and Basic Training

Like all branches of the military, the Navy and Air Force used basic training to
indoctrinate recruits and prepare them for life within the service.144 Trainees learned military
customs and courtesies, discipline, personal hygiene, pride in unit, rules of conduct, emergency
first aid, and military insignia.145 Most Boots also got the opportunity to drill and become
familiar with weaponry, such as the M-1 rifle.146 In general, however, both Navy and Air Force
basic training focused less on the development of combat skills than on other things.
Navy Boot Camp, which lasted 9 to 11 weeks during the Korean War period and took
place at either Great Lakes, Illinois or San Diego, California, sought to instruct recruits on naval
history and traditions while familiarizing them with the skills they would need aboard ship or in
future technical training.147 The Navy provided trainees with a copy of the “Sailor’s Bible,” or
the Blue Jackets Manual—outlining the duties and requirements of becoming a seaman and
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containing information on ships—and expected them to know it. Both men and women studied
naval exploits from John Paul Jones to the Battle of Midway and learned to recognize different
types of ships and flags.148 They learned about naval organization and the different rates and
rankings of personnel. Classroom lectures explained compass directions, semaphore signaling,
ship navigation, the types and uses of aircraft and weapons, and the contents of the Universal
Code of Military Justice. Cadre conducted hands on drills to familiarize trainees with fire
fighting techniques, damage control, anti-aircraft gunnery, and gas mask usage.149 Male
enlistees also watched films on the prevention of venereal disease and underwent exercises
designed to help them survive at sea. At some point during their training, men jumped into the
water from twenty or thirty foot towers and then took off their trousers to use them as flotation
devices.150 Throughout the course, recruits took a number of pop quizzes and exams on the
material thrown at them, but in the end, everything came down to whether or not one could
swim. No matter how well a trainee had done on other things, he or she could not graduate Navy
basic until passing a swimming proficiency exam, treading water for thirty minutes and
swimming the length of the pool.151
Having separated from the Army, the Air Force revamped its 8 to 13 week basic training
in the late 1940s and early 1950s.152 Recruits continued to learn military drill and basic military
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subjects, but new elements became increasingly important. For women, more formal studies
replaced long marches, bivouacs, and combat training. Female trainees attended refresher and
new courses in advanced mathematics, citizenship, airplane recognition, map reading, first aid,
personal hygiene, and survival in the tropics or the Arctic.153 Men submitted to an Airman
Classification Test Battery where information on their educational background, occupation,
hobbies, and aptitudes was collected and handed over to Career Guidance personnel who then
assisted the trainee in selecting the best Air Force specialty for him. Army instruction did not
completely go away, but it did become so watered down that soon after the Korean War, while
the Army tried to increase the length of its basic training, the Air Force reduced its Boot Camp to
six weeks for any recruit selected for technical training.154
While Navy and Air Force basic training may have been less physically or emotionally
demanding than that offered by the Army or Marines, it was still Boot Camp. Drill instructors
and cadre told recruits when to eat, sleep, shave, shower, march, and even write home.155 In the
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Navy, trainees learned not just the proper way to wear their uniforms, but how to fold and
launder them. Wet clothing had to hang dry, held in place by “tie ties,” little pieces of string tied
into square knots with the loose ends tucked out of sight. Each morning roaming inspectors
graded the laundry and anyone unfortunate enough to have made mistakes might find his wet
clothes thrown down on the deck.156 Trainees, in fact, found their every move subject to
inspection and correction and men or women who did not conform to military standards faced
punishment. After getting caught chewing gum, a substance banned because of the possible
damage to ship decks, Glen Schroeder had to wear the offending piece on his nose.157 One naval
recruit who refused to shower regularly and wore dirty underwear got ordered to the shower
where three members of his squad bathed him clothes and all.158 For countless others, minor
infractions and mistakes resulted in the loss of weekend liberty or the assignment of extra duties
or physically draining drills.159 As one veteran notes, the cadre may not have used corporal
punishment, but “it doesn’t mean that they did not inflict pain.”160
Also, just as at Army basic training and Marine Boot Camp, Navy and Air Force trainees
lived in cramped and uncomfortable quarters. WAVE recruits slept in small cubicles with two
double-deck bunks and four lockers while WAFs occupied two bed cubicles in barracks of fifty
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or more women.161 Male Navy trainees often stayed in more typical barracks, but had to stow all
of their belongings in sea bags and ditty bags that hung from the front of the bunk.162
Surprisingly, Air Force enlistees could only dream of the luxuries enjoyed by those in other
branches of the military. Lackland Air Force Base, the Air Force’s primary basic training
location, became so overcrowded during the war that rumors of suicides, epidemics, and deaths
spread, prompting various investigations. With almost 70,000 recruits crammed into the camp,
which was built for less than 30,000, the Air Force could only offer tents for housing and the
training program all but collapsed. Senators accused the Air Force of greedily snapping up the
country’s top notch volunteers, who hoped to avoid the draft, and denying the Army of quality
manpower. Senator Lyndon Baines Johnson publicly censored the Air Force, prompting further
studies of the crowded conditions. Red Cross, Air Force, and other reports eventually
exonerated the Air Force, finding “no instance of actual hardship,” but countless recruits suffered
the cold winter rains or hot summer winds in their leaky, rickety tent city. The Air Force might
have seemed an easy alternative to Army service, but training conditions at Lackland ranked
among the worst in the military.163
In most cases, what happened at Navy or Air Force Boot Camp stayed at Boot Camp, but
one offense in particular could haunt recruits for the rest of their lives. Throughout the 1950s, all
branches of the military scrutinized trainees for evidence of homosexuality, but the Navy and Air
Force enforced the military’s anti-gay policy with special vigor. In a reversal of World War II
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practices, both began intense indoctrination programs designed to encourage revulsion toward
homosexuals and impart a willingness to inform on those suspected of being gay.164 At their
physical exams, future female airmen had to answer a series of questions like, “Do you prefer
going to parties with all boys or all girls?” and “Have you ever had any feelings for women that
you think might not be acceptable to other women?” The Office of Special Investigations
stalked possible lesbians, opening their mail, questioning them in the middle of the night, and
interrogating their friends.165 For its part, the Navy treated WAVES to a three part series of
lectures on the legal, medical, and moral consequences of homosexuality. Line officers
explained that women who “branded and disgraced themselves” with homosexuality would
receive less than honorable discharges and could even be court-martialed. Medical officers
debunked the idea that homosexuals “are born and not made” and affirmed that lesbians too
contracted gonorrhea and syphilis. Chaplains warned against women alienating themselves from
God and spirituality through even a single homosexual encounter.166 For men, the anti-gay
lectures could be even more graphic. Recruits received explicit advice on how to spot gays,
reject their advances, and report them to officials. In 1948, the Navy made a startling connection
between homicide and homosexuality. Instructors described “grisly murders” where “sometimes
the bodies of these victims are horribly mutilated” and noted that the impulse which led to such
events could usually “be linked to homosexuality.”167 For recruits careless or foolish enough to
get “outed” at basic training or after, disastrous consequences awaited. General discharges under
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less than honorable conditions or dishonorable discharges carried with them more than shame.
Even if a court-martial did not follow, the recipient of such discharges could lose the right to
vote, the ability to work in any government or government-affiliated agency, and veterans’
benefits.168
The men and women who completed Navy or Air Force basic training, not unlike the
trainees of other branches of the Armed Forces, welcomed graduation day. Bands and buglers
heralded the end of Boot Camp rigors as the recruits passed in one final review before beginning
their new military careers. Undoubtedly some Boots had mixed feelings as they reflected upon
their new status, but most felt very proud of their achievement.169 Not only did they possess
more knowledge, skills, and physical fitness than when they enlisted, but they had survived the
trials of military training.170 Now, these newly minted servicemen and servicewomen had only
to be fitted into their respective services, to enter the professions in which they were needed.
Many would attend advanced training, some would ship out to the war zone, but all would go
where ordered by Uncle Sam.171
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National Guard and Reserve Training

As early as the Revolutionary War Americans dreamed of an army of patriots, citizensoldiers who would muster in during times of national crisis and then go back to their own lives
when peace returned. The balance, though, often proved tricky—men too wedded to civilian
ways remained difficult to manage and unskilled in the art of war while those too well-trained
found themselves best suited for the regular military. Still, in the years after World War II,
Army planners, scrambling to devise a system which would both allow for a smaller regular
army and provide the country with adequate military protection, decided to lean heavily on the
National Guard. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and others gambled that Guard units,
which answered to their respective states rather than to the Army except when federalized, could
transform “weekend warriors” into a combat-ready M-Day or Mobilization-Day force capable of
augmenting the Army at a moment’s notice.172 The sudden and unexpected outbreak of the
Korean War, however, revealed the training and preparation of the Guard unworthy of such a
burden. The immediate deployment of Guard troops to Korea or anywhere else simply could not
take place. Only months of additional training, including Army basic training, could prepare
guardsmen for active duty.
In the mid-1940s, the Army had developed a six year training program for national
guardsmen, but these plans never reached fruition. Confronted with the reality of three year
enlistments, the National Guard halved the length of its training in 1948. Theoretically, recruits
would spend one year each on basic soldier skills, beginning specialist training, and advanced
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skills.173 But, a year of National Guard training throughout the 1940s and 1950s consisted of
only 96 hours of weekly or biweekly drills and a two week summer camp, a very short time in
which to produce qualified infantrymen or artillerymen.174 Also, because guardsmen never
completed basic training of any sort, NCOs and officers not only had to hone the skills of their
recruits, but to somehow fit lessons on military customs and rules into their schedules.175
Personnel turnover further intensified this time crunch by ensuring that the thinly stretched
Guard had to offer separate classes for men of different skill levels.176 Not surprisingly, the
Guard recruits, who lived at home and trained in their own neighborhoods with friends or even
relatives, lacked the kind of indoctrination given regular Army draftees or enlistees and remained
amazingly independent of military life and unprepared for the battlefield.177 By early 1950, an
Army Field Forces report lamented that “it is doubtful if the training and overall efficiency of the
Guard will ever reach its desired standards.”178 The press agreed, stating that though guardsmen
“were called soldiers, they were not soldiers, and, in the true meaning of the word, had never
expected to be soldiers.”179
National Guard training before activation for the Korean War might have been
inadequate, but the fault usually lay with the system itself, with the lack of training time and
equipment, and not with the NCOs and officers. By 1950, many of those in charge of educating
173
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recruits could claim wartime experience, having served in World War II or even World War I.180
They knew the demands of battle and tried to impart as many martial skills as possible to their
men in the time allotted. On drill nights, guardsmen marched, trained on weapons ranging from
rifles to 50 caliber machine guns, learned Army regulations and tactics, performed close order
drills, and practiced the particular specialty of their company—artillery, maintenance, etc.181
When summer came, they got the opportunity to play soldier for a couple of weeks at camp. The
men went on bivouacs where they lived in the field, learned to shave with cold water, and ate crations. Even here, though, discipline remained much more lax than in the regular Army. Frank
Rowan remembers that after being denied a pass, he simply snuck his girlfriend into the camp to
spend the weekend with him, an action that would not have gone unnoticed or unpunished in
Army basic training.182 Certainly, these experiences could not replace the basic training given to
regulars.
Consequently, when news of war in Korea broke, few guardsmen had been prepared even
for their traditional role—taking over the stateside training responsibilities left behind by
deployed reservists—and more than a few seemed surprised to be activated at all.183 Ordered to
prepare for active duty, National Guard units had much to do. The ranks had to be filled, no easy
180
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task given that the draft took its allotment of eligible men and that the Guard could no longer rely
upon high school student enlistments to pump up the numbers.184 Equipment had to be put in
order and prepared for shipment to wherever the Army had decided to send the unit. And, as
much training as possible had to be squeezed in around administrative paperwork and
processing.185 Then, the units gathered at the armories to be formally brought under Army
orders, ready to ship out for further training.
Before they could be of use to the Army either at home or in the war zone, newly
activated guardsmen had first to go through basic training. Like other Army recruits, they left
home for camps around the country where they marched, fired weapons, passed through obstacle
courses, and endured bivouacs. But, the nature of the National Guard made for a different kind
of basic training experience. Guardsmen stationed at a camp near home could return to their
families at night as long as they made it back to training by reveille. Officers and NCOs
refrained from much of the usual harassment of trainees and allowed enough free time that the
men could wile away evenings at the PX or cruise the local bars in search of women.186 More
importantly, because National Guard units had to put together a unit and not just train individual
replacements, they had to continue to offer basic training to “fillers” even after original members
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of the group had completed the course.187 So, at any given time, a National Guard unit might be
conducting training on all levels from individual basic to regimental drills. Command of all of
this complicated training could fall to almost anyone because officers and NCOs continuously
rotated in and out of the unit while attending various schools. Arthur Kelly remembers that as a
second lieutenant he became battery commander by default, saddled with the responsibility of
conducting basic training, qualifying men for individual weapons, and getting everything ready
for overseas orders.188 Similarly, at only eighteen years old, George Hubbard, who had been in
the Army for just six months, began leading men through basic training.189
Finally, after many months of individual, company, battalion, regimental, and division
training and numerous proficiency tests, the Army deemed National Guard units ready for duty.
Some remained stateside to function as training battalions, but the Army ordered many others to
ship out to Japan or Korea.190 Not surprisingly, guardsmen headed for the Far East felt great
apprehension about their new assignment, a fear only made deeper by the upheaval that their
units faced on the eve of departure. Even while packing equipment and conducting last minute
drills, some units actually had to find replacements to bring them up to strength. Levies taken by
the Army to sustain divisions already in Korea drained off hundreds of members while Army
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policies requiring fourteen weeks of basic for overseas duty disqualified some of the men on
hand.191 Despite having enlisted in part to go with the men they knew, many guardsmen found
as they boarded the troopship that they would instead be going alone. Still, many felt proud that
the Army had chosen to send them.192 When relatives of men in the Oklahoma Thunderbird
Division staged a protest against the division’s overseas assignment, bombarding state and
federal congressmen with letters demanding that the 45th not be sent to Japan or Korea, members
home on leave discouraged such activities and put an end to the movement.193 Most guardsmen
simply felt that they would rather deal with the communist problem at hand than leave it to
become a larger problem for their children to solve and echoed seventeen year old Private First
Class Joseph Popolo who said, “What comes, will come. We are all ready to go if called.”194
For National Guard troops, training often did not end with arrival in the war theater.
Units in Japan and Korea continued to train, either completing drills that had been left unfinished
or applying lessons from the situation at hand as they now understood it, before actually entering
the conflict.195 Even so, regulars continued to eye guardsmen suspiciously and to believe them
inadequate and poorly trained.196 Whether that was true in general or not, guardsmen did possess
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varied and uneven levels of training, leading many after the war to conclude that before entering
the Guard men should have to complete Army basic.197 Much as their militia forebears had to
do, Korean War national guardsmen all too often learned their new trade “the hard way on the
battlefield.”198
Like their brethren in the National Guard, members of the Reserves, especially the
inactive Reserves, greeted the Korean War with gloomy unpreparedness.199 Although the postWorld War II Navy conducted Boot Camp for its reserve recruits, other branches of the military
not infrequently allowed weekly meetings and summer camps to suffice for training.200 Worse
still, some units, pressured to recruit and retain enlistees, made even this trivial amount of
training voluntary. In Evansville, Indiana, where high school coaches recruited a number of
teenage athletes for Marine Corps Reserve service, reservists did not have to attend a single
meeting or summer camp in order to maintain their reserve status.201 Additionally, in times of
peace, reservists could quit any time they chose.202 As a result, training cadre could not afford to
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make training too strenuous or meetings too dull. Instead, Reserve get-togethers emphasized fun
and games, leaving new recruits completely uninformed and unprepared for the possibility of
actual combat. Veterans too suffered from this lack of vigorous training as any skills they had
acquired during active duty faded away through years of tepid or nonexistent drilling.203 Thus on
the eve of the Korean Conflict the ready-to-go Reserves, like the National Guard, stood in dire
need of time to train its members.
Unfortunately, reservists stood next in line behind the tattered and understrength regular
military to enter the Korean battleground. All too quickly conditions grew grim along the Pusan
Perimeter and the military had no choice but to call on the Reserves to deploy as replacements
regardless of whether or not they had received adequate training. Fresh faced high school and
weathered veteran reservists alike found their fates suddenly sealed.204 In short order, they
shuttled to military hubs, often located on the coast to allow for quicker deployment, for a couple
of weeks of refresher training and then boarded Japan or Korea-bound ships or airplanes.205
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Official policies called for underage or under-trained recruits to be removed from combat duty,
but the drive for expediency sometimes meant that such rules got overlooked.206 One
commander promised his teenage charge “all the boot camp you want” after returning from
Korea.207 Another reservist notes that after serving at Inchon, Seoul, Chosin Reservoir, and the
Guerilla Sweep the military advised him that his turn had come for basic training.208 Pat Burris
recalls that a couple members of his Marine Corps squad enlisted after the war began and had to
be taught how to handle their weapons while on the troopship.209 The Air Force sent “qualified”
pilots, but many had not flown since World War II and a three week refresher could not prepare
them for all that had changed since then. Most reservists had been trained on propeller planes,
not jets, and few had experience with the type of formation flying now deemed essential.210
Reservists simply had to learn while on the job and in the war. No wonder that many felt
unprepared for war and that regulars frowned upon having to serve with reservists.211 But, as
Martin Chamberlain, commander of the Seattle Organized Naval Reserves Number 1, declared,
“Anyone who joins a reserve unit by that action has told Uncle Sam he’s willing to go.”212
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In general, however grudgingly, most reservists during the Korean War accepted their
assignments. Infantrymen, some of whom had held a gun for the first time on their way to
Korea, humped from village to village and battle to battle. Seamen left their wives and children
for months or years to ferry soldiers back and forth between the war and home or to cart supplies
to the troops. Pilots qualified on propeller aircraft learned through trial and error to fly jets over
the Asian hills.213 But, some backlash from reservists did occur during the war. Air Force pilots,
frustrated that an inordinate number of reservists were being sent to Korea while regulars
remained stateside, grumbled that “the regulars are policemen, so let them fight the police
action.”214 Some attempted to evade duty by claiming a newly developed fear of flying or by
trying to resign. Finally, in April 1952, six flying officers training at Randolph Air Force Base
staged a “stay-down” strike in part to protest the use of reservists in the Korean War.215 Well
aware of both the inequities of the reserve call-up system and the problematic nature of reserve
training, the House of Representatives introduced a new Armed Forces Reserve Bill in mid-1951.
The bill provided among other things for reservists to be classified as either “ready” or
“standby,” depending upon how much time had passed since basic training and/or active duty.216
The bill came too late, however, to be of any use to the thousands of reservists uprooted from
civilian life and sent to Korea with little regard for the current status of their training. They
would simply have to learn whatever else they needed to know when they arrived in the war
zone or die trying.
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Training Oversights and Distractions

As days of war spun into years in the Korean hills, pitting American troops against both
North Koreans and Chinese “volunteers,” all branches of the Armed Forces stepped up efforts to
make troop training tougher and more realistic. The Army especially turned away from “spit and
polish” to focus instead on the mechanics of combat.217 These revamped programs did manage
to give recruits and draftees a more realistic foretaste of battle, but in a major training oversight
the military failed to help trainees understand just exactly why they had been called to learn
military skills at all and why they might have to fight in Korea. As a result, even after arriving in
the war zone, soldiers bitterly questioned their assignment, complaining “I’ll fight for my
country, but damned if I see why I’m fighting to save this hell hole.”218 By the time Matthew
Ridgway took command of the Eighth Army in Korea in late December 1950, the new had
completely worn off the war and he discovered that rallying the troops would have to wait until
after he explained why their mission mattered and how it related to the homespun values of
freedom and democracy.219
While the military rested easy in its authority to train men and order them to whatever
post seemed most appropriate without explanation or apology, such cavalier treatment did
nothing for the morale of those being sent to fight in a war far from home and in fact disregarded
the very nature of the American fighting man. The crusade-like nature of World War II’s total
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mobilization perhaps left the Armed Forces with amnesia, allowing them to forget that unlike the
forces of many countries, American troops, pulled from the ranks of the citizenry, needed a cause
to believe in before making what could turn out to be a total sacrifice.220 As early as the
Revolutionary War, Baron von Steuben had written in explanation of Americans “You say to [a
Prussian, French, or Austrian soldier], ‘Do this,’ and he doeth it. But I am obliged to say [to an
American soldier], ‘This is the reason why you ought to do that,’ and then he does it.”221 In the
intervening century and a half, not much had changed and while Americans might have enlisted
out of patriotism, vague notions of devotion to country could give only cold comfort to men
caught in a “limited” but still very hot war. If they were to serve and fight effectively overseas,
Marines, Army infantrymen, pilots, and even sailors needed something more concrete to sustain
and encourage them else their only focus would be on the day they could rotate home.222
A little under a year into the war, the Department of Defense introduced a new
citizenship education program designed to impart servicemen in the Army, Navy, and Air Force
with a better understanding of that for which they would be fighting.223 Developed by the
Teachers’ College of Columbia, “Hours of Freedom” consisted of one hour sessions, each
dealing with a basic concept of democracy. Through lecture, discussion, debate, and
dramatization, men would learn the value of an individual in free society, the differences
between democracy and communism, people’s role in government, and presumably the
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importance of American involvement in a place as seemingly small and insignificant as Korea.224
Unfortunately, the new program debuted at Boot Camp, where young trainees crowded into
classrooms too tired or bored to concentrate on the material at hand. Also, not infrequently,
those in charge of educating the men had little knowledge or experience themselves and no time
to prepare.225 In the end, men continued to filter into Korea throughout the war with almost no
information on why they had been sent, a poor recipe for combat effectiveness no matter how
complete other training had been.226
Men might have had few thoughts on democracy while at training or on the way to war,
but they often thought about home and family. The military certainly attempted to make training
all-consuming, but for many of those who would serve during the Korean War financial hardship
and the problems faced by their families as a result of their military status became real
distractions. During World War II, Congress created a system of family allowances to eliminate
dependency as a cause for automatic exemption, but such legislation, deemed too costly, had
lapsed by the Korean War.227 As reservists and draftees mustered in, leaving civilian jobs and
pay behind, they found it next to impossible to support themselves much less their families on
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the $75 or $85 a month that the military paid them. Despite the 1940 Soldiers’ and Sailors’
Relief Act, which offered protection against the loss of a home should a man be called to active
duty, servicemen watched helplessly as creditors foreclosed on their houses and repossessed their
belongings leaving wives and children to move in with relatives or fend for themselves.228 Such
was the case with Jim Kasler, Donald Sipes, and Robert Gates. Kasler, an Air Force lieutenant,
made so little money even with his flying allotment that his wife and daughter had to move in
with his parents.229 Sipes’ wife, left with a one year old and only $20 in her pocket when her
Marine Corps reservist husband left for active duty, struggled with the thought that a sewing
machine bought on time would soon be repossessed and that a home they had purchased could
no longer be afforded but was also in no shape to rent or sell.230 Similarly, Barbara Gates,
mother of two small children, agonized that not only did they lose the home they were
purchasing with a G.I. loan when her husband left, but “they took the furniture, too.”231 How
could servicemen focus on preparing to fight for their country when they were losing their very
hearths and homes in the process?
By August 1950, the realization that America’s men at arms desperately needed financial
assistance had become widespread. Some states and localities responded quickly, offering cash
or other benefits to the dependents of men sent to training or shipped overseas. Washington
State began to provide assistance to military wives with minor children through Welfare’s Aid to
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Dependent Children program, convincing federal authorities to match funding.232 On the
national level, President Harry Truman appealed to Congress to make benefit payments to
military dependents and both the House and Senate debated various proposals.233 Ultimately,
federal payments from the government to families of the lowest ranks of enlisted men found
approval, but servicemen also had to chip in, sending money from their pay home.234 These
allowances relieved some of the pressure felt by servicemen, but as late as 1952 the Senate
sought a three percent raise for enlisted men and junior officers who continued to have difficulty
supporting their families.235
Largely because of the social climate of the 1950s which stressed the American male’s
role as provider, servicewomen rarely benefited from legislation designed to assist service
families. Although paid more equitably in the military than in other sectors of the economy,
female members of the Armed Forces found it almost impossible to qualify for the same
allowances being handed out to the military dependents of men. The government automatically
allotted support to the wives, children, and even parents of male service members, but gave
nothing to the husbands or dependent parents of servicewomen.236 In order to receive dependent
benefits for their families, female service members had to prove that they contributed at least half
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the support of their loved ones. Not until the 1970s would this discriminatory application of
military allotments be challenged.237
Given quarters pay and other perks, officers usually had less cause to worry about money
than the average G.I., but those headed to the battlefront sometimes had good reason to wonder
whether they remained too “green” for war. Many avenues existed for becoming a
commissioned officer, not all of which provided a solid military education. The United States
Military Academy at West Point and other service schools as well as OCS proved rigorous and
exacting, an excellent preparation for Korea or anywhere else a soldier might end up, but
R.O.T.C. and other programs could at times be less so. Also, even if an R.O.T.C. program
challenged its members, they might not enter the regular service until much later. One second
lieutenant stationed in Japan by mid-1950 reflected that he had “experienced not a single day of
active duty or training since the ROTC days at Purdue in 1948” and had been sworn in as a
regular Army officer simply on the basis of having completed a graduate degree.238 Such
officers could only turn to their outfit’s seasoned NCOs for help and hope that they learned fast
enough to lead their men in war.
Doctors and other specialists could get rank with even less military instruction. Hank
Litvin enlisted in a Navy program for doctors which gave ensign’s pay in return for two years of
Navy service after residency. Before he could go through Boot Camp or receive any training or
indoctrination at all, Litvin ended up at Inchon where a supply clerk issued him a rifle and the
unsought and unwanted opportunity for on-the-job training.239 More fortunate medical personnel
did attend a short basic training before shipping overseas, but that did not mean that the military
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had prepared them for all of their new duties.240 Many doctors and nurses arrived at MASH units
or hospital ships with little knowledge of field medicine, surprised to find that their particular
specialty mattered far less than the ability to learn fast and fill in where needed.241 In Korea,
general practitioners became anesthesiologists or VD officers and surgeons operated literally by
the book, performing procedures that they had never even seen done.242 Unfortunately for both
the Armed Forces and the young soldiers counting on military doctors to piece them together
again, the rotation system left doctors in the war zone for only about a year. By the time a doctor
became really useful, the military replaced him with an untrained and unskilled newcomer.
Throughout the Korean Conflict, all branches of the military did what the government
expected by churning out enough servicemen and servicewomen to alleviate the manpower
shortage and keep the war effort alive. To accomplish this, however, the Armed Forces all too
often trained officers and enlisted men with haste, heedless of the fundamental needs of trainees.
Soldiers would fight simply to avoid being killed, officers would lead despite inexperience, and
doctors would try to save lives without knowledge of combat medicine, but shortcuts in training
left many American troops less motivated and effective than they could have been. Asked to
make their lives forfeit, to leave their families behind come what may, those sent to Korea
deserved to be trained not adequately, but well, and their sacrifices warranted an explanation of
why their mission mattered.
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Beyond the Mechanics of Warfare: Training and Race

From the standpoint of the United States Armed Forces in the late 1940s and early 1950s,
military training existed only to create competent service members, not to alter prevailing
societal attitudes or to effect social change. Thus when President Truman issued Executive
Order 9981 in 1948, requiring an end to racial discrimination in the military, most of the services
responded glacially, refusing to integrate anything, much less their training camps. Led by
Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall and Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley, the Army argued
that segregation did not constitute discrimination and need not be ended.243 Following suit, the
Marine Corps and Navy refused to mix white and black troops.244 Only the Air Force, led by
Stuart Symington, accepted the order and quickly began to phase out all-black units and end
racial preference as a factor in personnel policies.245 But, by the end of 1950, domestic political
pressures and then manpower needs in Korea eroded resistance to desegregation and all branches
of the service started to integrate at least basic training.246 Born primarily of military necessity,
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changes in the racial composition of troops at Boot Camp or other training sites had little effect
on military infrastructure, but did greatly impact individual troops. Suddenly and intimately
exposed to persons of other races, trainees learned lessons that went well beyond the mere
mechanics of warfare.
For all its trappings of a modern industrial country—large cities, a proliferation of
factories and businesses, a visible and active scientific community—America in 1950 remained
astonishingly parochial. Individuals and families, of course, had moved around both during and
after the Second World War, but most Americans still knew little about people and places
beyond their own street corners and neighborhoods. Except perhaps in larger metropolitan areas
where the fabled melting pot more closely resembled real life, people drew lines to keep
themselves separate from those who looked or seemed different from themselves. In particular,
and most especially in the South, racial separation maintained a not quite invisible and almost
unbridgeable chasm between white citizens and others. Thus when men and women followed
the beat of Uncle Sam’s drum to newly integrating training centers during the Korean War, they
could only guess at what life would be like shared with people from the other side of the line.
Carefully packed among the toothbrushes, underwear, and other personal possessions,
most recruits and trainees carried with them to training camp their own ideas about Americans of
other colors. White troops often took for granted that African Americans would be dirty, foulmouthed, lacking in self-control, and untrustworthy in combat.247 And, the stereotypes did not
always end there. Asked in 1950 how he felt about integration, one twenty year old private
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replied that blacks were human but shouldn’t be mixed with white soldiers because “some of
them, the bestest [sic] percent, are still like Head Hunters. They have bad blood, some of them
are like animals.”248 A few whites did voice the opinion that the “Negro soldier has the right to
rate the same as any other man no matter what,” but a greater number resented the very idea of
sharing sleeping quarters or a mess hall with blacks.249 For their part, African Americans often
entered service with the notion that no matter how well they performed white comrades and
superiors would never give them the credit they deserved. For others, especially those who had
experienced Jim Crow first hand, negative feelings ran deeper and some freely admitted “I hate
white people.”250
Entering the Armed Forces did not automatically erase trainees’ personal biases on the
issue of race, but in general Boot Camp and other training centers offered little opportunity for
men or women to act upon such prejudices. Regardless of what one might have preferred, from
the moment of swearing in recruits and inductees had no alternative but to do things the military
way—even if that meant bunking, eating, or sweating with someone of a different color. And, as
the process of turning civilians into “Government Issue” continued, new habits and ideas began
to supplant those so carefully brought along by trainees from home.251 As black and white
soldiers shared tents, meals, conversation, and the rigors of training, they discovered a multitude
of similarities and often developed not only a new tolerance for one another, but also interracial
friendships.252 White trainees, at first resentful of being placed in interracial outfits or barracks,
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came out of the experience averring that “now some of my best friends are of the Negro race. I
can see no reason at all why colored and white cannot get along together in the Army.”253 Some
concluded that it “is all in your mind….If you can live with whites you can live with most
colored.”254 Even national guardsmen “changed my thinking… [blacks are] just the same as we
are.”255 As Charles Moskos noted, “The thickness of a man’s lips is not a factor if he offers you
a drink from his canteen in the Texas desert.”256 African Americans underwent a similar
transformation in racial attitudes. The enlisted man who hated white people went on to say that
“if all white people were like the boys in this company it wouldn’t take long before everybody
would get along well.”257 Indeed, Southerners marveled at “the amiability of the white and
colored here [on the military reservation].”258 As servicemen and servicewomen of different
colors trained and spent time together, they became more accepting of individual comrades and
more positive about desegregating the military as a whole.259
Racially mixed training also produced troops more favorable toward integration in
general. Having spent a good deal of time at basic training getting used to the idea of associating
freely with soldiers of many colors and nationalities, men and women, both black and white, who
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ended up at southern duty stations found themselves indignant at the existing inequalities of Jim
Crow communities. Suddenly it seemed strange to them that bus stations, airports, movie
theaters, and even municipal buildings had “white only” and “colored only” water fountains,
restrooms, entrances, and sections. They resented the local customs and laws which prevented
friends who dined and drank together on post from sitting together on the bus to town and from
frequenting the same bars or restaurants once there. While the various services accepted the
segregation and discrimination just outside their gates, troops who through integrated training
had been taught to judge worth by character rather than color sometimes had trouble leading this
double life. Some argued that the South, like the Army, should simply be integrated, that after a
time people there “would accept the American Negro as an individual who is only reaping the
benefits of those rights due him under the Constitution of the United States.”260 Others took a
more active approach. In San Antonio, white servicemen ordered food for their black buddy
who by prearrangement was to join them at a white restaurant.261 Lieutenant Thomas Williams,
a pilot in training at Craig Air Force Base, refused to sit in the colored section of a bus traveling
from Florida to Alabama, stating that he did not feel obligated to obey laws which were
unconstitutional.262 Gilbert Branche, sent to Biloxi, Mississippi by the Air Force, ignored a shoe
store clerk when told not to try on any shoes because white folks would not buy anything tried on
by a black man.263 In Columbus, Georgia, men headed to and returning from Korea rioted in
response to police brutality toward black soldiers and the beating of a uniformed African
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American by white policemen at a night club.264 Throughout the Korean War era, incidents like
these proved few and insignificant—acts of civil disobedience belonging more to a later
generation—but they clearly illustrate the changing viewpoints of men and women trained in
integrated settings. Boot Camp did not necessarily educate trainees to become social radicals,
but the close contact it provided between the races did chip away at stereotypes and foster
expectations of a more integrated world.265
Certainly not all of those who went through mixed training altered their original ideas
about people of a different color. Moreover, even within the military integration faced
difficulties. As late as 1951, at least one Army base, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, had yet to
implement anything other than token integration and at other locations tensions between black
and white troops actually erupted in violence.266 Additionally, even if trainees accepted a more
racially diverse corps, officers and noncoms sometimes resisted the changes ordered from above.
One Army Division Commander when asked about integration replied that “It’s God’s law of the
fish in the sea, the birds in the air, the animals on land. You don’t mix them.”267 In Fort
Jackson, South Carolina, two white sergeants brutally beat an eighteen year old black private and
at Camp Atterbury officials allowed the 31st Infantry (Dixie) Division Military Band to wear
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gray uniforms reminiscent of Confederate attire.268 Sent to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri for
Boot Camp, Stanley Stone wrote his mother that the Army discriminated against blacks by
forbidding them to go into any of the nearby towns and that “we are being trained by some
Negro hating white officers who are Southern bred…we are cursed at and berated and the
Southern Negroes here are afraid to move.”269 Leadership and circumstance could make all the
difference in how men who trained together felt about each other.
To its credit, though, the military did try to prevent such racial incidents and uphold its
commitment to institutional integration and equality of service. On posts throughout the country,
PXs, movie theaters, and even swimming pools ceased to operate on a segregated basis. Men
and women who worked together during the day found themselves able to socialize on their own
time as well. Troops did not always take advantage of this opportunity. On some reservations,
blacks and whites informally divided up recreational facilities or limited their use to service
members, especially if the potential existed for men and women to come into close contact.
Often clubs became segregated on dance nights or sponsors enforced the unwritten rule that men
would dance only with partners of their own color.270 Whatever impact integrated training had
on the racial attitudes of trainees, it seldom prepared them for unbridled social integration. The
most liberal might espouse equality yet still affirm “I don’t think they should marry one
another…but that’s all.”271
For African Americans, mixed training in the 1950s sent mixed messages. On the one
hand, from the moment of swearing in black men and women could expect to be treated just as
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any other recruit or draftee, a rare luxury in an America still divided by color. They would
proceed to processing, be issued clothing, enter basic training, and eventually receive an
assignment based on their skills and performance.272 With few ratings now restricted, blacks
could even move into positions where they gave orders to whites—a situation deemed “nothing
less than a miracle” by veteran Reuben Carter.273 But, after being trained alongside whites,
African Americans could then find themselves assigned to all black units.274 Throughout the
Korean War, the Army maintained segregated units and even re-segregated some units.275 Also,
both during and after training, African Americans learned that military protections ended the
moment they stepped off the base. All branches of the military demanded that service members
bow to sectional customs, including segregation, or face the consequences alone. Commanding
officers in the South passed out maps of local communities showing black troops which
neighborhoods, streets, and sections of town they could go to and warning that anyone breaking
the rules would be at the mercy of the local police.276 Townspeople in some places bragged that
“When the colored [soldiers] come to town, they conform to the way we do things.”277 Taking a
lassiez-faire approach to relations between nearby communities and uniformed blacks, the
military even declined to intervene when locals clearly mistreated soldiers off post. In
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Columbus, Georgia, police routinely terrorized black servicemen, beating them, taking their
money, jailing and fining them, and warning them to stay out of town—and yet the Army did
nothing.278 At a Greyhound Bus terminal in Memphis, Tennessee, policemen beat Corporal
Jonathan Thomas on the head with a nightstick when he answered “Yeah” instead of “Yes Sir”
when they asked if he had a ticket.279 White townspeople forced Sergeant Herbert Bradshaw
from his car at gunpoint in Brownsville, Tennessee, dragged him to a building, and had a civilian
beat him with a pop bottle as four police officers looked on. Tellingly, protests of Bradshaw’s
treatment came not from the military but from the NAACP.280 Southern military installations
might themselves have been perfect examples of integration and racial harmony, but during the
Korean War era, the Armed Forces did little to ensure fair treatment to its members off post.281
Integrated training and service instilled many African Americans with a new pride and sense of
worth, but the realization that their equality—even from the military standpoint—ended at the
reservation gates left them bitterly aware that in the real world they remained simply black.
The military had only one goal when conducting training, to produce more effective
infantrymen, sailors, and airmen. But, the very nature of the process, tearing down civilian
identities and rebuilding individuals, left men and women more open to new ideas and
experiences. When boot camps and basic training integrated in the late 1940s and early 1950s,
the Armed Forces merely saw the development as an easy way to boost efficiency, but for the
tens of thousands of recruits of all colors who learned to live together it became a mild
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revolution. Perhaps unintentionally the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines imparted a new
attitude toward racial equality along with weapons training and close order drills. Not all
servicemen and servicewomen took the lesson to heart, but along with battlefield experiences,
mixed training influenced many who returned to civilian life to envision a less monochromatic
future for America.

Ready for Duty

The weeks or months of training may have seemed to last forever, but for every soldier,
sailor, airman, and Marine the time eventually came to report for duty. Most hoped for a lucky
break—stateside orders to keep them safe and sound or perhaps assignment to some European
post where they could see the world and while away the time owed to Uncle Sam. War in Korea,
though, meant that many of those completing basic or advanced training in the early 1950s began
their military adventure aboard a crowded troopship bound for the Far East.
Men destined for Japan or Korea usually had only days to prepare for departure and much
to do.282 All civilian clothing and personal effects except for handheld musical instruments,
radios, or cameras had to be sent home. Since cars could not be driven to the point of
embarkation, they too had to be sold or stored.283 Medical and dental records had to be updated
and farewells had to be said.284 Some men hurried home for a few days with family or friends or
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to marry their sweethearts before shipping out.285 A few attended parades given in their honor
by hometown folks.286 Still others made the most of the freedom they had left by hitting bars
and clubs and forgetting for a moment what lay ahead. Then, just as they had before basic
training, men piled into buses, trains, and “cattle cars,” this time on their way to the piers at San
Diego or Seattle.287
For the first time in a long time, the men could relax and reflect upon where they had
come from and where they were headed. Thoughts of home like freight cars hooked to an
overnight express sped through their minds as did a million questions. Would home be as sweet
when they returned in a year or two—if they returned at all? Would other neighborhood kids
grow up and join the Army? Why had they been chosen to serve when many others had
successfully defied the draft? What would it be like to live or maybe die so far away from
remembered streets and familiar faces? Had the military already changed them? The answers
could only come later and for some they would not come at all.
Eventually those slated for overseas service reached the docks. As they boarded the
ships, crowds cheered them and bands played in their honor. Sometimes officers addressed the
moving sea of olive drab. “God bless you, soldiers. You are the best-fed, best-equipped, and
best informed army in the world. Complete your mission and we will be here to welcome you
285
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home.”288 Then, troopships pulled out of the harbor with courses set for the land of morning
calm and men standing on the decks waving goodbye and wondering if they would ever see
home again.
Even for men accustomed to military life, troopships offered some nasty surprises.
Living quarters consisted of bunks stacked four or five deep floor to ceiling and about eighteen
inches apart. The narrow aisles soon became cluttered with seabags, field packs, and weapons.
Helmets, though, proved in short supply. Men unused to sailing soon became violently seasick,
vomiting into whatever they had handy. For days, the latrines remained occupied with helplessly
sick soldiers. At the mess hall, which consisted of rows of waist-high counters that men stood at
while eating, the floor became a gross mixture of spilled food, water, trays, and vomit. Weather
permitting, men stayed on deck to avoid the putrid smells and sights of the ship.289
Most men eventually developed sea legs on the two to three week journey, but they still
looked forward to dry land, no matter if that put them closer to the war. Upon arriving in Japan
or Korea, everyone rushed to the deck to catch a glimpse of the Asiatic landscape. Soldiers
gaped in awe at the rugged beauty before them. “Its [Korea’s] mountains and trees seemed to
come right down to the water’s edge. Of course, if we had any inkling the hell that was awaiting
us there we might not have thought it so beautiful.”290 Soldiers prepared to disembark. The time
had come to put their military training to the test.
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CHAPTER 4: IN COUNTRY IN KOREA—A WAR LIKE ANY OTHER?
“Americans in 1950 rediscovered something that they had forgotten; you may fly over a land forever; you
may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it, and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and
keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young
men in the mud.”—T. R. Fehrenbach.1
“I keep asking myself what I am doing here. The funny thing is I can’t answer my own question.”— 19 year
old corporal in Korea.2
“They may call this a police action, but men are loseing there [sic] lives the same as in the last war. We are
fighting here for the freedom of the people, the same as in World War II. Why are we any different from the
‘G.I.’ of the last war?”—Letter to Senator Robert A. Taft from men on the line.3
“I have one request. If I don’t survive, please don’t leave me to rot in Korea. When the Army permits, let me
come home to rest.”—Sergeant Robert Jamieson in a letter home.4
“My memories aren’t of gallantry or brave deeds that won a battle, but they do represent a good number of
guys who did their assigned duties and performed much-needed services during the Korean War.”—Korean
War veteran.5
“My war was one of long periods of boredom with a few flashes of intense terror. I returned safe and sound
to a nation that did not seem to know I had ever been gone.”—Korean War veteran.6

With memories of World War II still playing in their heads, newspaper reporters
canvassed Korea throughout the Korean War in search of “human interest” stories for hometown
readers. No doubt they hoped and expected to find troops filled with the same patriotic spirit and
singleness of purpose as in the last war, but the tired and ragged young soldiers they encountered
simply could not supply the pithy anecdotes that would have made such good reading back in
Gainesville, Texas or Old Forge, Pennsylvania. Arriving in country, servicemen, and, in the case
of military nurses assigned to the war theater, servicewomen, often took a dim view of the land
1
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Uncle Sam had called them to defend. Few had ever seen such poverty. Here existed a place
where to own a shovel made a person rich, where orphaned children survived by eating garbage,
and where the stench of human waste permeated every breath.7 Even those most sympathetic to
the Korean people had to wonder what such a place could be worth. Not surprisingly, then,
when asked what they were fighting for, troops seldom mustered the bravado for the kinds of
answers journalists wanted to hear. Instead they insisted “I’ll fight for my country, but damned
if I see why I’m fighting to save this hell hole” or “I’m here because the goddam president of the
United States would put me in jail if I didn’t report for duty.”8 They asked themselves over and
over, “What the hell am I doing here? Why should I be fighting for this stinkin’ rice paddy?”9
And, like one nineteen year old corporal who found himself in Korea during the early months of
the war, too many of those in the war zone discovered that “I can’t answer my own question.”10
Hastily pulled from civilian life, with its baseball games and high school dances, or from
the somewhat sedentary peacetime American military, the men and women stuck at ground view
during the Korean War can be forgiven for not immediately understanding the reasons for their
sacrifices or the forces which swept them to that remote corner of Asia. An abbreviated, limited,
half-won, seldom remembered conflict, Americans today, more than half a century later, still
grapple with America’s first hot war of the Cold War. What justified American involvement in
7
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Korea? What were the political implications for the United States? How can victory be
measured? Who really won and by how much? Frequently, though, Korea ends up only in the
footnotes of other, longer or more successful wars and even scholars sometimes settle for citing
the numbers: Almost 6 million men and women served in the United States Armed Forces from
June 1950 to July 1953, the Korean War era, but only 1,789,000 actually went to the Korean
theater. Of those, 36,940 died in country, 92,134 suffered non-fatal wounds, and 8,176 ended up
missing in action.11 But, beyond the statistics, it has become clearer in the last fifty years just
how and why American troops ended up on the Korean Peninsula in 1950 and perhaps why they
remain stationed there today.
Before World War II, America had little interest in Korea, the small, backward colony of
Japan. It possessed a certain barren beauty in the form of rough, jagged ridgelines, but aside
from a few dams built to produce hydroelectric power and some stretches of Japanese rail lines,
Korea had little to offer monetarily or strategically to the United States.12 After World War II,
Korea was the same—a country of dirt roads and populations living on the edge, mired in
poverty and illiteracy and susceptible to devastating waves of diseases—but now the world
looked different to policymakers in Washington. The fall of the Nazis and Imperial Japan should
have made the world a safer place, but instead it merely divided nations into two very polarized
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camps, those who believed in “free” government and those who adhered to the doctrines of
communism. As the allies dismantled Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the
United States had to decide what to do about these territories, whether to move in and block
Soviet influences or risk losing them to communism forever.
The choice seemed clear, even for places as seemingly remote and irrelevant as Korea.
Thus, American units, like their Russian counterparts, moved into Korea even before World War
II officially ended. In a sort of gentleman’s agreement, the uneasy allies accepted a temporary
split of Korea at the 38th Parallel, with the thought that the country eventually would be reunited.
Until then, Russians would remain above the line and Americans would stay below it.
Unfortunately for the Koreans, time brought no resolution to the tensions between the United
States and the Soviet Union and what had begun as a temporary division hardened into a
separated Korea. In North Korea, Kim Il Sung created his own little communist state while in
South Korea Syngman Rhee leaned heavily on U. S. aid to fashion a pro-American country if not
exactly a democratic one.13 Satisfied enough with the status quo and confident that it would
stick, the United States began withdrawing servicemen until the last 7500 troops left in mid1949, leaving only a token number of Americans in Korea to staff the Korean Military Advisory
Group (KMAG).14
While the Americans and Russians seemed complacent about the arrangement in Korea,
neither North nor South Korea shared that contentment as both still dreamed of unifying the
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country. Finally, after years of border skirmishes, Kim Il Sung made his move, sending the
North Korean People’s Army, or the Inmun Gun, over the border in the early morning hours of
June 25, 1950. Composed of hardened veterans fresh from fighting in China and supplied with
modern weaponry, including Russian-built T-34 tanks, the Inmun Gun quickly crushed the far
inferior and underequipped South Korean forces it encountered and began a quick march south.15
President Harry Truman found himself in much the same position he had occupied in 1945.
Should he let South Korea fall into communist hands or should he gamble American lives and
resources on the chance that the country was worth the cost of saving it? Only a short while
before, South Korea seemed not even worth the $110 million in promised American aid, only
slightly more than half of those funds having been delivered by June 1950, but now, in the wake
of China’s recent fall to communism, Truman felt compelled to draw a line in the sand.16 Within
days Truman ordered American troops to the defense of South Korea in the name of “collective
security” and called upon the United Nations to join in as well.17 Whether soldiers at the time
understood the forces at play in bringing them to Korea or not, American troops fought in Korea
because of vague, if lofty American ideas about containing communism and because of Harry
Truman’s unwillingness to let South Korea become another China either in reality or in the
minds of the American public. They fought because one half of a country invaded the other and
to the President of the United States and to a good many other people that action threatened
“human liberty,” and “the free way of life.”18
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Throughout the war, it became almost as difficult for troops to discern what military plan
directed operations in country as to figure out the reasons for U. S. involvement in Korea. Men
engaged in the actual combat of wars often have trouble envisioning the larger picture, but the
nature of the Korean Conflict made strategies and objectives especially troublesome to figure
out. Unlike World War II, where men served in different theaters of the war but had the same
ultimate goal of total victory, the war in Korea unfolded in different and distinct phases,
sometimes without benefit of clearly defined war aims. Unfortunately for those whose lives
remained forfeit to the cause, the Korean War proved a haphazard affair. In the end, one’s
wartime experiences very much depended upon the luck of the draw and when and where a
person served in the war zone.
American air and ground personnel committed to Korea in the early months of the war
had no idea what to expect. Most of them had been stationed in Japan on easy duty as
occupation troops and they did not really understand that what President Truman persisted in
calling a “police action” was in fact a war. Rounded up from lifeguard duty, mess halls, and
both support and infantry units, the first men sent to Korea to hold off the North Korean advance
and save South Korea from communism believed their officers who reassured them that they
would be back to the good life in Japan in thirty days after “handily whip[ping] the North
Koreans’ asses.”19 In reality, they would be gone quite a bit longer than that, many of them not
returning for years, if at all.
In this first phase of the Korean Conflict, Truman initially charged American troops with
simply hanging on in the peninsula and not allowing themselves to be driven into the sea. Even
this limited task proved difficult. In sharp contrast to the seasoned troops of the Inmun Gun,
19
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American soldiers often lacked the conditioning and training necessary for effectively waging
war. Some of the men stationed in Japan or elsewhere and subsequently hurried to Korea in June
or July 1950 had already cracked under the pressure of battle in World War II and been placed
on “limited service,” a bad omen for their potential combat performance in this war.20 Others
had become physically unfit for the rigors of battle. Huffing and puffing up the hills of Korea in
August 1950, Sergeant Marcelo Vendiola could not help but notice that “no one was in physical
shape.”21 Commanders did not help matters any when they plugged men into units wherever
they were needed regardless of expertise. Truck drivers, ROTC graduates, and men who hadn’t
seen an M-1 since basic training had to become gunners, artillerymen, and infantrymen literally
overnight.22 As one colonel of the Eighth Army noted, “They’ve had to learn in combat, in a
matter of days, the basic things they should have known before they ever faced an enemy. And
some of them don’t learn fast enough.”23
Regardless, for weeks upon weeks men entered Korea in what they perceived to be
scattered bands along a fluid and ever-changing front. Casualties mounted as did the numbers of
Americans taken prisoner by the North Koreans.24 Maybe the generals had a plan, but on the
ground it looked like the war would last forever and the sacrifices would never amount to
20
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anything at all. Still, by September 1950 these piecemeal groups had managed to secure a
perimeter, the Pusan Perimeter, around the southeast corner of Korea. While far short of
anyone’s definition of victory, this achievement did at last encourage President Truman and his
officers in the field to begin planning the reclamation of South Korean territory still held by the
North Korean People’s Army and the second phase of the Korean War.
The successful landing of Marines and soldiers at Inchon Harbor on September 15, 1950
transformed the war in Korea. What had for Americans begun as a shaky defensive operation
now metamorphosed into a tactical offensive. The war without end gave way to almost certain
victory as United Nations and United States ground forces trapped and neutralized what units of
the Inmun Gun remained between the Pusan Perimeter and roughly the 38th Parallel. South
Korea had been saved and American G.I.s, ragged and worn down from their months in country,
began to talk of going home for Christmas or even Thanksgiving.25 If not for General Douglas
MacArthur’s determination to exploit North Korea’s military setbacks and reunify Korea
American-style, these hopes might have been realized and the war ended as early as October
1950.26 Instead, with heavy boots and heavy hearts, and quite possibly without President
Truman’s blessing, the full force of the Eighth Army along with other U.N. troops crossed the
38th Parallel on October 9, 1950 with a new objective, the conquest of North Korea.27 After a
week or so of hard fighting, the North Koreans up and retreated, leaving Americans to capture
Pyongyang, the northern capital, and advance toward the Yalu River, the border between North
Korea and Manchuria. Americans once again smelled victory and the sweet aroma of Christmas
25
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dinner that would welcome them home before long. The United States had achieved its original
goals in Korea and more.
Unfortunately, filled with hubris, General MacArthur, with President Truman in tow,
failed in the drive toward triumph to heed warnings from communist China that should United
Nations forces cross the 38th Parallel, “the Chinese People’s Republic will send troops to aid the
People’s Republic of Korea.”28 As American, United Nations, and ROK forces dutifully
gathered in North Korea in late October 1950 to mop up the remnants of war, a new and
unexpected third phase of the Korean War erupted. Stationing about 180,000 “volunteers” in
front of the Eighth Army and another 120,000 in the mountains around Chosin (or Changjin)
Reservoir, the Chinese made good on their threat.29 By early November, ROK forces began
reporting engagements with Chinese units and before long all of the United Nations troops in the
north learned to dread the haunting whistles and bugle calls that accompanied attacks by Chinese
Communist Forces.30 As in the early days of the Korean War, American troops had to pull back
and try to find a line they could hold. Unlike those early months, the enemy resisted even their
retreat and men caught at Chosin Reservoir and elsewhere had to fight no matter which direction
they chose to go. Battle took its toll on soldiers and Marines alike, and the bitter Korean winter
exacted a heavy price from those held in its grip. Surprised by both Chinese intervention and
28
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temperatures plunging well below zero, sometimes as much as thirty degrees below zero, the U.
S. Armed Forces had yet to supply many of the troops with adequate cold weather gear.31
Fighting day and night for weeks at a time against a determined and far more numerous foe as
socks and guns froze to their feet and hands, soldiers quickly became casualties of both enemy
fire and frostbite. From their vantage point, more than just real estate, taken so easily and
quickly after the Inchon Landing, passed into Chinese hands. Fingers and toes and lives went
missing, too, and these were lost forever.
Back in Washington and Japan, war planners had to reevaluate not only the strategies of
the war but the entire war ethos. What should the U. S. after Chinese intervention now hope to
accomplish in Korea? Largely unanswered throughout the rest of the war, this question still
weighs heavily on the American conscience. But, by this stage in the game, men in the field did
not really care anymore what politicians and generals wanted to gain from the war. They had
already determined that “the only thing of value it [Korea] holds for the men here is a 6x6x6 plot
of burial ground and what future is that to look forward to?”32 Many of them had entered the
conflict in its early days, prepared to spend a month or so in country. One month turned into six
or seven and in that time they had pushed forward, pulled back, gained ground, given it up again,
and sought refuge in the very same shelters going both directions.33 After months of dirt and
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grime and countless tragedies, they still could not see what, if anything, Korea could be worth.34
“A lot of them were saying, ‘Fuck this place, I want to go home.’”35
By July 1951, the war in Korea settled into its fourth and final phase, a deadly stalemate
between Chinese volunteers and United Nations troops. All along the 38th Parallel both sides
dug in, forming “a rambling messy ditch or series of ditches five to seven feet deep.”36
Reminiscent of France during World War I, men lived and fought for months from dusty,
littered, fixed positions on a static line. To be sure, Americans and Chinese alike initiated
actions beyond the main line of resistance (MLR), as in the outpost war in the hills around the
parallel, but by and large G.I.s had it right when they complained that “the Army wasn’t going
anywhere, and everyone knew it.”37 In some places demoralized Army troops established a
temporary and informal truce with the enemy across the way, causing a few Marines to wonder
at the “blatant lack of aggressiveness on the part of our Army.”38 More than a year into the war,
young men both in the war zone and stateside wanted to know, “How can the President have
‘guts’ enough to ask my fellows to sign up for the armed forces or draft them, after seeing what a
heavy loss we’ve already had?…I still don’t know what we are fighting for.”39
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With public opinion at home wavering on the Korean War and the realization that the
reunification of Korea would cost too much in terms of American lives and money, the United
States decided that the time had come to compromise. NSC 48/4 called for a unified,
independent Korea, but if war with the Soviet Union could be avoided, Washington would now
accept a defensible border for South Korea somewhere in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel. On
June 29, 1951, General Matthew Ridgway, the United Nations Commander, let North Korea and
China know that the U. N. was prepared to negotiate an armistice. The first meeting of peace
negotiators opened on July 10, 1951 in Kaesong, the ancient capital of Korea. The talks went
nowhere, adjourning until October 1951, but the fact that the United States was seeking to solve
the conflict on the bargaining table set the tone for the last two years of the conflict.40 From the
perspective of those Americans called to fight the war, “The Chinese sat down at the peace tables
of Panmunjom in July of 1951 because they were hard pressed. And instead of pushing harder,
we sat on our asses for the rest of the war.”41
The Army, Air Force, Marines, and Navy continued to ship reluctant replacements into
what remained a hot war, but negotiators in Panmunjom and tight-fisted officials back home
compelled the Armed Forces to limit their efforts as the war might end soon anyway.42 On the
ground, troops suffered not only from ammunition shortages and the feeling that their country
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had forgotten them but from the frustration of accomplishing nothing.43 Fighting within full
view of the balloons floating above Panmunjom, one nineteen year old sergeant complained,
“We are doing nothing but holding on to what we already have and fighting to get back what we
lose. Then, after getting it back we sit down and wait for them to try and take it away again. We
should be pushing on and getting this war over and done with.”44 Another G.I. observed, “Most
of us are pretty fed up with the peace talks over here. One guy said last night he wished we’d
stop all the backing and filling and get on with the fighting.”45 Fighter pilots echoed these same
sentiments when pointing out their frustration at having “to watch the enemy strike at them from
what General Douglas MacArthur has called their Manchurian sanctuary.”46 Washington
ordered American aircraft to stay strictly below the Yalu River, leaving them unable to knock out
enemy anti-aircraft guns or pursue the enemy MIGs which crossed the border between
Manchuria and Korea at will to attack them.47 Until the bitter end, however, the peace talks
reigned supreme. United Nations commanders planned offensives in order to hasten China’s
acquiescence of terms at the table or to sweeten the pot for the United States and other U. N.
member countries, not to bring a victory like the soldiers of World War II had won, and the men
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in Korea knew it.48 Eventually, they reassured themselves, negotiations would bring peace. All
that many of the troops hoped for now was to live to see it. No one wanted to “be the last guy
killed.”49
At 10:00 p.m. on July 27, 1953, the guns finally fell silent in Korea. Twelve hours earlier
the representatives of North Korea, Lieutenant General Nam Il, and the United Nations,
Lieutenant General William K. Harrison, had met at Panmunjom to sign a ceasefire agreement.50
Though only an armistice and not a treaty, soldiers on both sides of the line could at long last lay
down their weapons and most could return home. Newly elected President Dwight D.
Eisenhower informed the American public that this ended “the fighting between the United
Nations forces and the Communist armies.”51 Perhaps breathing a sigh of relief, Americans
returned to their business and all but forgot about the bitter little war in Korea that had claimed
36,940 American lives. But on the men and women who served and fought in country from June
1950 to July 1953, the Korean War left indelible marks. Like the Revolutionary War, the Civil
War, the two World Wars, Vietnam, Iraq, and all the wars fought from time immemorial, the
Korean War forced participants to experience new, often unpleasant things, and to rethink the
certainties that once had defined their lives. But the Korean War, a limited, integrated,
unfinished war against a new type of enemy, also became for those who participated in it a war
like no other.
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Into the War Zone

On June 27, 1950, just two days after the Inmun Gun’s attack on South Korea, President
Truman ordered the first Americans, naval and air personnel stationed in the vicinity of the
peninsula, into the war zone to support ROK forces.52 United States Navy destroyers, like the
USS Mansfield, De Haven, Collett, and Lyman K. Swenson, and cruisers, like the USS Juneau,
hurriedly answered the call, abruptly transporting men from peacetime patrols to firing positions
along the Korean shoreline. There, American sailors entered the conflict, shelling land positions
and establishing a blockade that would prove useful for the duration of the war.53 Similarly,
airmen, so recently enjoying life in their own little enclaves in occupied Japan, very quickly
became commuter warriors.54 With airstrips all but nonexistent in Korea, pilots and their crews
began flying missions out of Japan and over Korea, returning home to wives and kids, backyard
barbecues, and “O” Clubs at the end of the day.55 With the American Navy and Air Force in
place, the first deployment of U. S. ground forces landed in country on July 1, 1950, followed
just days later by 57 female Army nurses charged with setting up a hospital at Pusan.56
Dispatched swiftly and unexpectedly, these first American arrivals in Korea, especially
those on the ground, often simply dropped into the war zone with no particular preparation.
Desperate in the early weeks of the war to stop the North Korean advance, the Army pulled men
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from all units and military occupational specialties in Japan to form a fighting force for Korea.
With no time to spare for additional training or even the notification of families, the men of Task
Force Smith and later other outfits of the 24th Infantry Division, airlifted straight into Korea
where the Army expected them to begin fighting almost immediately.57 Even when
replacements shipped in from duty stations other than Japan after the initial deployments, the
process of entering the war zone remained frenetic. Sailing from Sasebo to Korea in July 1950,
Private First Class Susumu Shinagawa received an M-1 rifle and ammunition to go with it, but
no poncho or combat boots. Possessing only dress shoes, he had to borrow boots and stuff them
with toilet paper to make them fit.58 Worse yet, Marty Nelson arrived in Japan only to be rushed
off to Korea without a rifle.59 Certainly, this could not have been the introduction to war that
most American servicemen expected. Once in Korea, however, these early troops could count
on the gratitude of the South Koreans. In a scene to be oft repeated during the first couple
months of the war, more than 1500 townspeople gathered in the drizzle to applaud and cheer
Americans passing through Taejon on July 2, 1950 while a brass band played in their honor.60
Aside from a few dramatic landings, like the ones at Inchon Harbor in September 1950 or
of replacements sent to North Korea in the winter of 1950, American arrivals in country settled
into more predictable and systematic routines as the war progressed. Both Army and Marine
replacements almost always filtered to the front by way of Japan, docking in Kobe or Yokohama
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for a few hours or days. With any luck, men headed to Korea got enough liberty to enjoy the
crowds at the pier, hire rickshaws for sightseeing, or simply head into town to shop or search out
ladies for one last bit of female companionship.61 Then, the time came to resume travel. Some
returned to the troopships, but most boarded trains bound for the inter-island ferries at Sasebo.62
Already tired, men found the train rides wearing. Not only did the trains take hours or even days
to reach their destinations, but smoke funneled into the cars through open windows and at best
restroom facilities consisted of oblong holes in the floor of the car guarded by latrine orderlies
who made sure that people disposed of their waste before exiting.63 At the docks of Sasebo, the
troops climbed aboard the flat-bottomed ferries with their weapons, packs, and c-rations and
waved goodbye to the G.I.s and Japanese who had gathered below to throw rolls of confetti and
shout “Sayonara” while the bands played. Leaving under blackout orders, after having seen the
grim look on the faces of those returning from the combat zone, young replacements began to
consider that “this is a one way passage for many of us” and wonder “who will return in
coffins.”64 Perhaps for the first time they realized that they were in fact sailing out of one world
and into another and that regardless of how many men went with them they would enter the war
alone.
No matter what month or year men and women arrived in Korea during the war, getting
settled in proved a real challenge. First impressions of the peninsula often served to reinforce
that Americans did not want to be in this place at all. For some, the haunting, “ghostly shadow
61
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of Korea rising out of the mist” gave them pause, but for most the smells and sights of the land
made them long for home.65 While still miles out, those aboard ferries could smell the fecal odor
emanating from Korean rice paddies and farms, and upon landing the scents of charcoal, garlic,
smoke, unfamiliar food, and gunpowder helped create a sickening combination.66 As days of
war lengthened into months and years, newcomers saw only devastation as they looked around
them. Broken buildings, ripped up roads, hungry refugees, ever present clouds of dust and flies,
these characterized Korea. But, however much they might have wished to turn back around to
Japan or the United States, soldiers, Marines, doctors, nurses, and later Air Force personnel had
no choice but to dig in and stick it out in Korea for the remainder of their tours.
Harried and desperate in the first days of the war, the U. S. Army could do little to help
personnel acclimate to their new surroundings or to improve living and fighting conditions in
country. The need for soldiers at the front frequently outweighed protocol which called for
staging areas to orient soldiers before turning them loose in the combat zone. Men in the
vanguard of the Eighth Army Far East Command docked at Pusan or elsewhere while South
Korean bands played and then rushed off to the battle on trucks or on narrow gauge railroads
built decades earlier by the Japanese. Reaching positions late at night or early in the morning,
they furtively dug foxholes, sometimes while under fire by North Korean artillery.67 Even when
soldiers had the chance to pass through a staging area, communications could fail with
unpleasant results. One soldier recalled that after arriving in Pusan his outfit marched to a
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warehouse “staging area.” After spending the night there, the men realized that their staging area
was actually a collection point for the human feces used by Korean farmers.68
Later in the war, both the Army and Marine Corps established more regular reception
centers for their troops. Soldiers got unit and station assignments in Pusan while Marines
trucked into ASCOM City to await assignment and transport.69 At ASCOM City, Marines
heading to the MLR turned in their seabags, which carried most of their personal possessions,
and prepared to live out of field packs, called “Willie Peters” because of waterproofing. After a
couple of days Marines moved out by train, with new replacements stopping at the battalion
command post for four or five days of orientation. Here Marines heard lectures about the
Korean War in general and the units opposing them, made practice patrols at night in the
paddies, and received additional equipment.70 Unlike Marines, soldiers sometimes shipped
straight to the line from the reception center without any sort of explanation of what to do or
what to expect.71 As one Army draftee put it, “That’s what scares you the most when you’re
new. Nobody tells you anything.”72
Once at the front, all that men could do was wait for the war to come to them. Some, like
Marine Second Lieutenant John Nolan felt prepared, perhaps even anxious for the fight to begin.
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“I thought that was what I had been trained to do, educated to do, I felt ready to do it.”73 But
most found the anticipation of battle harrowing. As men neared positions on the line, they grew
quieter, more afraid and more contemplative. Some examined the faces of those who had
already experienced battle, taking note of the “thousand yard stare” and determining that “days
of combat without sleep, water, and food and being close to being killed every day must have
done that to them.”74 Others began to wonder how they would perform under fire and whether
they would survive at all, realizing suddenly that “I will soon have to kill a man or be killed by
him.”75 All in all, whether one arrived before the Inchon Landing or after the entrance of
Chinese volunteers, the minutes, hours, or days before one’s first experience in battle filled
soldiers and Marines alike with “a spooky feeling.”76 War might prove different altogether, but
the experience of waiting for it was “all very strange and terrifying.”77

Fighting in Korea

Whether in the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marines, a good many of the men serving in
theater during the Korean War did end up in combat sooner or later. Precise figures remain
elusive, but recent surveys of veterans suggest that upwards of 70% of those stationed in country
saw action.78 Certainly, in this limited, conventional ground war, Army and Marine infantrymen
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had the greatest risk of finding their way onto the battlefield and suffered the most casualties and
fatalities, but Navy and Air Force personnel also served and died on the front lines during the
war.79 Flying from aircraft carriers off the coast or from bases in Japan or Korea, pilots flew
more than a million sorties over the Korean peninsula, dropping bombs, providing air cover to
troops below, and engaging in deadly duels with enemy MIGs, all while trying to evade hostile
fire.80 Men aboard ships delivered soldiers and Marines to the war zone, but also not
infrequently became combatants themselves. They cleared coastal waters in small
minesweepers, manned the guns while “softening up” land targets with heavy and sometimes
reciprocated bombardment, evacuated soldiers and civilians, and tendered protection and support
to men on the battleground.81 Regardless of branch of service, American servicemen in Korea
endured combat and shared an uncomfortable intimacy with war. The passage through battle
often left survivors with not only ideas about the true costs and realities of armed conflict but
with physical or emotional scars that would mark them for life.
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For ground troops, the topography and climate of Korea could hardly have been worse
for fighting. Marines and soldiers at every stage in the war had to hump up and down steep,
craggy hills weighed down by M-1 rifles and packs stuffed with c-rations, extra socks, and
ammunition—all the necessities of life within war.82 Members of crew-served weapons added to
their loads heavy, bulky pieces of equipment and even heavier large caliber rounds. One 138pound BAR man complained that he had eighty pounds of gear with which to keep up.83 Before
even arriving at the battlefield, men grew weary. And, often, reaching the battlefield meant
attacking uphill with grenades and bullets raining down from the North Koreans or Chinese
entrenched above. As Corporal Jay Hidano put it, “Braving enemy fire was one thing, but
having to crawl up the steep slopes with bullets buzzing and striking all around us was just
madness.”84 Generals, politicians, or reporters on the sidelines might have dreamed up romantic
names like “Heartbreak Ridge” for the hills of Korea, but those doing the marching agreed with
one wry soldier who retorted it’s “more like Ass break Ridge.”85
The hills of Korea became nemesis to many a G.I. during the war, but extremes of heat
and especially of cold made this war particularly miserable. Summertime in Korea meant
monsoons and temperatures soaring well over 100 degrees with humidity reaching the 90 percent
range. But, if troops longed for cooler weather, they soon had cause to regret it. Winters dished
out even harsher conditions on the peninsula as temperatures dipped to 30 or 40 degrees below
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zero.86 Men trying to live, much less fight under such conditions had real troubles. As at Chosin
Reservoir when Chinese volunteers overran American positions, men succumbed not just to the
enemy but to the freezing cold. A few froze to death in their foxholes and a great many more
suffered from frostbite, losing toes or developing other problems that would plague them for
life.87 Socks and even equipment froze to unprotected skin. Pete Behasa remembers one man
having to urinate on another man’s hand to free his palm from the rifle muzzle where it had
stuck.88 Water had to be cut with alcohol, c-rations had to be chipped out of the cans and melted
in one’s mouth like ice cubes, and vials of morphine had to be kept warm in the mouths or
armpits of medics and corpsmen.89 The permafrost-like ground made digging foxholes and
graves a misery if in fact they could be shoveled out at all. Sometimes the dead just had to be
strapped onto the running boards of vehicles, buried in holes blown out of the earth with TNT, or
left until the spring thaw.90 Hot and tired or cold and tired, the ground troops of Korea had to
manage to survive the elements and find the resolve to pick up their guns and fight.
Stowed away aboard ship or flying above the ridgelines, sailors and airmen had less
cause to worry about the Korean landscape or climate when involved in engagements than their
infantry counterparts. Still, especially for pilots, the weather and nature of the peninsula posed
certain challenges. So long as airmen remained airborne, they did not need to worry about what
lay below. But, if forced to crash land or abandon the aircraft for any reason, pilots experienced
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some of the same problems as ground soldiers as well as a few all their own. The rugged layout
of the land, a series of slopes and valleys, made emergency landings risky at best. Even if a pilot
could lay the craft down safely, how could he be rescued? Other pilots unfailingly did what they
could to save a fallen comrade, risking their own lives to circle the crash site and hold off the
enemy until rescue helicopters could arrive.91 But, this wasn’t always enough. Men burned to
death after crashing into hillsides and froze to death after parachuting into Korea’s icy cold
waters. In winter, a downed airman could expect to live for only twenty minutes after landing in
the sea—a very short time in which to mount and complete a rescue mission. After the first four
minutes in the drink, a man’s hands froze stiff, his face turned purple, and his feet became
useless.92 The Korean Peninsula itself could kill airmen as handily as the North Koreans or
Chinese.
Aside from extremes in weather and topography, the combat experiences of men in Korea
proved largely reflective of the American war experience as a whole. No one knew how
individuals or units would perform until after the first couple of battles or missions. Thinking of
the competency of a BAR man almost tossed out of the military before the war, Uzal Ent noted
one “can’t tell beforehand who’s going to perform well in combat.”93 Similarly, an outgoing
platoon leader warned new platoon leader John Nolan, “You really won’t know what you have
until you go through a fire fight with the members of your platoon.”94 Spit-and-polish
servicemen sometimes washed out when it came to the business of killing and surviving while
other types discharged their duties heroically.
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In the Air Force, the widespread lack of prewar training, especially early in the war, made
it equally difficult to predict how men would fare under combat conditions. Pilots learned new
formations through “trial and error” in the Korean skies and certified combat-ready just hours
before setting off on missions in aircraft they had seldom or never flown before.95 Upon arriving
at his outfit, “Boots” Blesse, an F-80 pilot, learned that he would have to fly a P-51 on his
mission the following morning. Not yet certified to fly that particular aircraft, Blesse spent the
rest of his day training in a “clean airplane,” completing three hours of flight time and ten
landings. The next day Blesse set out in a storm, his P-51 loaded down with napalm rockets and
a .50 caliber machine gun.96 Similarly, Bob Ennis, an Air Force pilot with no flying time at all in
B-26s before the war learned to fly them in Korea and Robinson Risner was declared “combat
ready” after seven hours and thirty minutes flying time in the F-86.97 How Blesse, Ennis, Risner,
or anyone else would do under enemy fire before they had gone through it remained a mystery at
best.
So just what was combat like in Korea? Firefights, at least for infantrymen, began in a
number of different ways. Early in the war, when they enjoyed numerical superiority, North
Korean troops simply attacked en masse, pushing forward in a huge, rolling human wave. In
instances where Americans had surrounded themselves with concertina wire, the first North
Koreans to reach the barrier threw themselves onto it, allowing those behind to move ahead by
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stepping on them.98 Regardless of the number of dead, soldiers of the Inmun Gun kept
advancing until they reached enemy positions or died trying. With the possible exception of men
who served in the Pacific during World War II or in the Philippines during the Spanish American
War and Philippine Insurrection, few Americans had ever faced an enemy like the North
Koreans. The North Korean determination and disregard for human life unnerved G.I.s who
dreaded encountering the enemy or even smelling the tell-tale garlic on their breath or hearing
the unpleasant burping sound their guns made when fired.99 As North Korean numbers dwindled
and American forces grew on the peninsula, however, North Koreans husbanded their manpower
resources more carefully, abandoning the costly human wave assaults. Then, both sides usually
initiated operations by pounding the enemy with artillery to soften targets. Before sending men
clambering up the hills, artillerymen from the attacking side shelled enemy strongholds until the
land resembled nothing so much as a barren, pockmarked moonscape or something out of a
nuclear holocaust nightmare. As one soldier remembers, “At night I witnessed artillery fire so
violent that it lit up the sky to an incredible degree. I still wonder how anyone survived such
terrifying onslaughts.”100 Amazingly, men did live through these barrages, but found them
terrifying. Like Private Baldovi, more than a few survivors of artillery attacks remember their
mixed response of religiosity and profanity. “I must have broken the record for saying the ‘Hail
Mary’ and, at the same time, the profanities that came from my mouth would have embarrassed
anyone.”101
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When the Chinese entered the conflict in October 1950, they brought few tactical
innovations to bear against American troops. Like the North Koreans before them, Chinese
volunteers “came straight at us, like a mob.”102 Even with mortars pouring down, the Chinese
attacked in formation and “kept coming with absolutely no regard for their lives. It was like
committing suicide.”103 And, short on technology, the Chinese seldom attacked quietly. The
eerie wailings of bugles, sharp calls of whistles, rattling cans, and directional orders yelled in
“sing-song” voices all alerted U.N. forces when an engagement was imminent.104 In Korea,
where the scrubby, barren hills provided little cover for would-be attackers, Chinese tactics
might have proved the undoing of the Peoples Volunteer Army, but the Chinese minimized their
losses by attacking after dark when possible, a fact that most Americans despised. 105 Nighttime
operations not only hampered the support efforts of American airpower, but also chipped away at
American morale. As one young soldier wrote home in 1951, “The Chinks never hit in the
daytime, that’s the hell of it. At night while I’m on watch…I shiver and shake whether it’s cold
or not.”106 Even after the war stalemated and both the Chinese and Americans holed up in
bunkers along the line, Chinese troops often withdrew to their foxholes at dawn, coming out
again at night to fight. With the “no man’s land” between the bunkers denuded, making daytime
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patrols and raids suicidal, Americans had no choice but to operate in the dark as well.
Ultimately, “It simply became a habit. We were quite comfortable in the dark.”107
Engagements rarely lasted more than a few hours and almost never more than a few days,
but once a battle got going combatants had little time for such mundane things as eating,
drinking, changing socks, sleeping, or even relieving themselves. 108 In the best of
circumstances, enemy fire had to be returned from afar and mortars and bullets had to be dodged.
The skyline overhead filled with flares, tracer bullets, and searchlights in various shades of
orange, red, and green. And, if American troops got lucky, further up planes whizzed by to
strafe ridges and unload deadly cargoes of napalm in much-appreciated support.109 Yet even
these anonymous, distant interactions with opposing forces made quite an impression on
participants. If shells landed near enough, they sucked the breath right out of a man, leaving
behind a blast of dust and gunpowder to remind him that at any moment his number might be up.
When the enemy made it behind the lines or when Americans pressed into communist-held
territory, the war had to be fought up close and personal. Soldiers, and even Marines, who
disliked the defensive nature of foxhole fighting, generally tried to shoot from the relative safety
of their fortified shelters, but not infrequently in this war there were “so god damn many” of the
enemy that they “just kept coming,” forcing Marines and doughboys alike to engage in hand-to-
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hand combat.110 Men used bayonets, gun butts, knives, fists, and even helmets to stave off
attackers. This close combat coupled with smaller squads than in previous wars and the need to
use teamwork to destroy targets ensured that most Korean War infantrymen would fight and that
a larger percentage of them would be willing to fire their weapons than in the last war.111
Not surprisingly, chaos sometimes prevailed on the battlefield. No matter how wellplanned an engagement, close combat and the nature of warfare in Korea fostered confusion. At
the Inchon Landing, one of the most carefully orchestrated actions of the Korean War, Marines
discovered too late that their Korean interpreters could not speak English, guide boats had not
arrived to lead them in, and their own boats had no compasses.112 Communications throughout
the war rested upon equipment salvaged from World War II and one location had to reach
another by being patched through by other places on the line.113 In some units, men did not
even speak the same language. KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to United States Army)
replacements frequently knew no English and the mixture of Koreans, Puerto Ricans, Hawaiians,
and white or black Americans in the same platoons or companies meant that language classes
had to be conducted when in reserve so that everyone could communicate on at least a basic
level in battle.114
Also, hungry, thirsty, dirty, exhausted, and terrified, men in the thick of battle got lost in
the moment, their attention “sharply focused on … [their] immediate surroundings, which
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nothing else gets into at all.”115 In such an atmosphere, things could and did happen. One new
platoon leader confessed that in his first Korean engagement he forgot his rank and began to
function as a rifleman.116 Another soldier recalls that when a North Korean tried to surrender
someone discharged a weapon causing everyone else to shoot in reaction.117 In July 1950, at a
small hamlet in South Korea called No Gun Ri, refugees allegedly first fell victim to misdirected
American-conducted air strikes and then to the fire of soldiers of the U.S. 7th Cavalry who got
spooked and mistook them for elements of the North Korean People’s Army.118 In other
instances, ground troops went temporarily berserk. In the bayonet charge which won him the
Congressional Medal of Honor, Lewis Millett “hit somebody in the throat with a bayonet,
another one in the head” and killed a bunch of Chinese but later had “no memory of that at
all.”119 During one firefight, a platoon mate of Vernon Warren determined he had to escape the
war and stuck his hand out of the foxhole until he got shot.120
Seldom knowing “the reason behind what we were doing, what the objective was, or
what was coming next,” men on the front lines could hardly view battle as anything more than a
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personal, “everyday affair of survival” and react accordingly.121 Desperate to survive, more than
a few men simply tried to run away from enemy fire, bugging out without orders to retreat. ROK
troops and the all-black 24th Infantry Regiment developed such reputations for this, perhaps
undeserved, that American G.I.s joked that the acronym KMAG (Korean Military Advisory
Group) stood for “Kiss My Ass Goodbye” and composed little ditties like “The Bug Out
Boogie.”122 But, meant as a derogatory comment on the nature of black soldiers and units, lines
like “When them Chinese mortars begin to thud/The old Deuce-Four begin to bug./When they
started falling ‘round the CP tent/Everybody wonder where the high brass went./They were
buggin’ out/Just movin’ on” as aptly described the behavior of many non-African Americans.123
Whether men broke ranks of their own accord or followed orders to retreat, their situation grew
only more precarious upon leaving the field. Alone or in small groups they lacked leadership
and direction.124 Throwing away weapons or canteens with no one to stop them, those fleeing
argued amongst themselves over which direction to take or what to do, greatly increasing their
chances of becoming casualties or prisoners of war.125
For men on the ground in Korea, combat could provide a source of exhilaration and pride
unlike anything that they had previously experienced. The adrenalin rush and self-confidence
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that came with performing well in firefights and escaping injury or death proved “enormously
satisfying.”126 But, battles also engendered great fear and anxiety in those who fought them. In
the heat of engagements with the enemy, participants “got the feeling that death was right around
the corner and the next shell had my name written on it” and they were “scared as hell.” “I
almost wished I would get hit so I could be sent to the rear area to get away from the nightmare I
found myself in.”127 Afterward, the lingering uncertainty of when the next attack would come
caused some men to nearly crack. At night they didn’t sleep because “there’s too much to worry
about; such as … are those little yellow bastards going to hit us tonight.” They got jumpy when
they heard gunfire, no matter how distant, and shook uncontrollably, cold with the fear that their
luck might finally have run out.128 With time enough to think, many G.I.s also became
consumed with guilt, saddened because they had taken another life, given orders that got men
killed, or survived while someone close to them perished in battle.129 A few turned to drugs like
phenol to quay their apprehensions while others developed strange and dangerous habits like
going around in their sleeping bags or trying to get “million dollar wounds” without being
killed.130
“Everyone has a limit” and in Korea some soldiers and Marines reached theirs,
succumbing to combat fatigue.131 In their foxholes, along the line, and even in reserve men
broke down. With teeth chattering they sobbed uncontrollably, shivered, sweated, called
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repeatedly for their mothers, and refused to take comfort. As Terry Addison says of one who
cracked, “The war had gotten into his guts and he could not get it out.”132 Over the course of the
Korean Conflict some 12% of American troops suffered combat stress reactions requiring
treatment.133 Acting on research begun in World War I, which suggested that evacuating a
person from the war zone intensified shell shock, doctors in Korea generally treated mental
health casualties just behind the lines with a few days rest, simple psychotherapy, and/or a
supply of barbiturates. As a result, a majority of patients returned to duty, sometimes in a matter
of days, ready again to face the rigors of living in a war zone.134 This is not to say that they went
back the same men they had been before their breakdowns. War, in which “things happen that
are worse than anything you’ve ever seen and maybe anything that you could imagine,” left
indelible imprints even on those well enough to rejoin their units.135
The shared experience of battle usually served to draw men involved in the ground war in
Korea closer together. As one veteran puts it, “These were my friends from combat, and no
other activity or environment forges stronger relationships.”136 In part, they realized that their
own survival depended upon the willingness of those around them to fight, risking their own
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lives on behalf of the group.137 When the bullets began to fly, a man could no longer count on
anything or anyone except for himself and his buddies. “You’re depending on them, and they’re
depending on you.”138 But, the connection ran deeper than this. Men who fought together
developed familial feelings for each other with the result that they struggled not just for their
own survival but with a willingness to die or suffer wounds for their comrades. Of a mortally
wounded radio operator in his unit, Martin Stephens remembers, “He did that for his pals. He
did that for us.”139 Similarly, Douglas Humphrey, twice hit and finally killed by a grenade,
refused to leave an attack because “he wanted to stay and help his friends as much as he
could.”140 These ties compelled men to remain in position during combat and made leaving the
war zone a difficult task for more than a few men when they rotated out.141 Instinctively they
knew that “there is something you get in battle that you get nowhere else. There is a camaraderie
that is unique.”142 In the years after the war, many battle buddies would remain in close contact
with one another, sharing an unbreakable bond forged decades earlier in the hills of Korea.
Just as combat in Korea cemented friendships among those who fought together, it
fostered a deep loathing among Americans for the North Koreans, Chinese, and sometimes for
Koreans in general. Saddened by their losses and terrified by the experience of battle, G.I.s
blamed the enemy for their misery. If the North Koreans had not invaded South Korea or if the
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Chinese had just stayed home, American soldiers would not be fighting and dying over Korea’s
worthless, barren hills. And, the North Koreans especially did not fight fair. Americans greatly
resented the atrocities perpetrated by North Koreans early in the war when they brutally
murdered Americans who by rights should have been treated as prisoners of war.143 They
concluded, “Those Gooks! They’re not even part human!”144 Unsurprisingly, “many men
fought with a visceral hatred of the enemy.”145 Sometimes that hatred transferred to all Koreans.
South Korean civilians looked so much like North Korean adversaries that it could be difficult to
tell the difference. How many times had a cloud of South Korean refugees shielded approaching
North Korean soldiers disguised as peasants? And, with a culture so perceptibly inferior to the
American way of life, many soldiers wondered what made any of them worth saving anyway,
especially if the price might be one’s own life.146 A few Americans, however, did find a measure
of compassion for their Asian adversaries. Fred Lawson felt sorry for Chinese soldiers sent in
tennis shoes to fight in the cold of North Korea and Uzal Ent acknowledged that the enemy “was
serving his country and following orders, just as I was doing for my country.”147 But, such
instances proved rare. Like most men in war, the soldiers and Marines in Korea contentedly and
perhaps necessarily vilified those whom they had to kill.
Generally stationed well away from the front lines and flying above much of the
pandemonium, men involved in the air war experienced combat differently than their infantry
counterparts. Unlike men on the ground, pilots and airmen often felt bulletproof. “There’s no
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thought of getting shot down yourself. It’s always the other guy who runs out of luck.”148 They
had flight schedules telling them when they would fly missions and engage in combat, giving
them the luxury of preparing both mentally and physically for the challenge ahead.149 Also,
many pilots, especially those dueling in the skies with MIGs, looked forward to facing the
enemy. Though American pilots realized that other humans operated hostile aircraft and lived in
the hillsides being bombed out, aerial warfare seemed impersonal to them. In general they did
not see the blood spilling or the bones shattering.150 They saw only puffs of smoke and flames
on the ground and hunks of metal falling from the sky. Machines, not people, engaged in combat
and suffered casualties.151 Like a giant video game, Korea afforded airmen the opportunity to
score points by shooting down enemy planes or destroying targets, and those points in the end
translated into rank and medals for those lucky or skillful enough to collect them.152 “Wrapped
inside the cocoon of a high-tech fighting machine,” aerial warfare in Korea definitely differed
from “crawling through the mud, gun or knife in hand” on the front lines.153 And, at the end of

148

Navy pilot Jim Service, in Tomedi, No Bugles, No Drums, 159.
Airmen did not always use their time to prepare for combat. All too often pilots drank heavily the night before a
mission, reporting for duty with a hangover. Some even had to throw up on the taxiway before take off. However,
almost all airmen did visit the latrines just before flying and with good reason. Planes afforded no restroom
facilities and word of frequent in-flight “problems” had caused flight suits to acquire the nickname “poopsuits.”
Sherwood, Officers in Flight Suits, 82.
150
Sherwood, Officers in Flight Suits, 90.
151
See Pasqualicchio in Chancey and Forstchen, Hot Shots, 79.
152
Pilots had to provide evidence of kills in order to get credit for them. Photographs would work, or confirmation
by a wingman. Sherwood, Officers in Flight Suits, 71-72 and 88-89. Also, Bob Ennis in Tomedi, No Bugles, No
Drums, 163.
153
Pasqualicchio in Chancey and Forstchen, Hot Shots, 79. F-86 pilots flew 3 missions a week and 100 missions per
tour of duty. After every 30 missions, pilots received an Air Medal. After 100, they got a Distinguished Flying
Cross. Ace status was awarded to men with a certain number of kills and silver stars to men with spectacular
service. In the Air Force, rank came as a direct result of performance in combat and number of missions flown.
Sherwood, Officers in Flight Suits, 85-86.
149

196

the day, pilots flew back to the base or aircraft carrier where they could cozy up with a nice shot
of whiskey while being debriefed and then hang out at the “O” Club until time for bed.154
All of this is not to say that pilots and their crews escaped the horrors of battle. Airmen,
regardless of branch of service, risked their lives every time they went on a mission. Many died
in the line of duty, “blown to bits as their shot-up planes exploded before they were able to reach
the runway or crushed to death because a parachute didn’t open when they bailed out,” many
more became prisoners of war, and some developed debilitating mental illnesses or the fear of
flying.155 Despite their belief in luck, almost none left Korea without a close call to remind them
of their own mortality. Like Bud Biteman, they had scars or bullets as mementos, reminding
them “how thin and fragile is the thread of ‘luck’ and just how close I came to using my entire
allotment.”156 Also, pulling the trigger on targets sometimes proved anything but impersonal.
After shooting a MIG, Harold Fischer pulled up alongside the burning, dying aircraft. Inside, the
trapped pilot had no power, no place to land, and no way out of the insufferable heat. All Fischer
could do was fire a few rounds behind the plane to try and shorten the pilot’s misery while
reflecting that the enemy consisted of only flesh and blood after all.157 Other pilots had orders to
fly low and strafe enemy troops, drop napalm in areas where both North Korean or Chinese and
American forces would be hit, and stop waves of refugees by shooting into the crowd. They
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discovered that talking about such missions in the “detached atmosphere of the Operations
Office” differed considerably from actually implementing the plans and seeing people killed
from a lower altitude.158 Still, unlike most infantrymen who could not wait to get out of the war
zone, many pilots lived for the missions. They extended their tours of duty, flew on holidays,
used sexual language to describe their aircraft and their kills, and feared any injury which might
keep them from flying again. “That’s all we wanted to do, all of us. To be able to get up the
next morning and fly an airplane.”159
In Korea, as in every war, whether one served on the line, in the cockpit, or aboard ship,
death lay at the heart of battle. In the name of country or in the interest of self-preservation, men
in combat killed other men, inflicting collateral damage in the process. For some American
servicemen, the transformation from civilian to combatant happened effortlessly. “It’s like
killing a rabbit if you’re a hunter…You look at the enemy in abstract terms…as a cobra
snake…it’s something that needs to be destroyed.”160 For a few the changes came too easily and
too completely. “We were highly successful killers and the greed to continue our trade was a
force that drove us on…All we wanted to do was kill gooks. Kill gooks this minute, kill gooks
by the thousand, kill them with hot lead, cold steel, or ripping explosives—but kill gooks.”161
But for most Americans, killing did not come naturally and the suffering and deaths they caused
or witnessed affected them profoundly. Half a century after the war, Walter Benton still
remembers with regret the ancient Korean woman he met on Christmas Eve 1950 while awaiting
evacuation from Hungnam, North Korea. Bringing her to the warmth of the fire where he fed
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her tomato soup, the 18 year old listened to the old woman’s tale of exhaustion and lost family
and then tried to convince her to leave for a safer place. While “White Christmas” played in the
background, Benton watched from the deck of the ship as charges set off to destroy abandoned
munitions eviscerated the old woman.162 Similarly, the memory of a Korean kid hit with napalm
still haunts Jessie Forrest whose captain forbade him to shoot the boy and end his pain.163 Facing
the deaths of North Korean or Chinese soldiers should have been easier, and at the time they
usually were, but pulling the trigger left men with loads of emotional baggage to carry long after
the end of the war. As James Appleton writes, “It is hard for a veteran to explain … what it is
like to line up an enemy soldier in the cross hairs of your sniper rifle, as this unassuming
individual walks along not knowing that in the next instance you are going to squeeze the trigger
of your rifle and take the top of his head off, and his mother will have lost a son and he will
never have children of his own.”164
Not all men in country or even in battle killed someone, but scarcely a combat survivor
rotated out of Korea without first tasting the bitter harvest of death that war produced in
abundance. In the last few months of 1950, soldiers not infrequently found their comrades
murdered by the North Koreans. Rather than taking prisoners, Inmun Gun troops often simply
beat and killed enemy soldiers that they happened across. As U.N. troops recovered South
Korean land, they found the bodies of Americans with skulls smashed in and with hands lashed
behind their backs and bullets in their heads.165 Aside from these, plenty of other deaths played
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out in the lives of men in Korea, too. Reluctantly leaving the safety of his foxhole to repair
communications wires, Bennie Gordon returned to find his foxhole mate dead and for three days
had to work around the body. In the aftermath of the enormous and chaotic Chinese offensive in
North Korea in the winter of 1950, Vernon Warren discovered a friend with his entire backside
blown off. Helpless, Warren bandaged the dying man and tried to calm him with reassurances
that “you’re going to make it.”166 Jim Dick radioed the field to inform Lieutenant Griffin that his
wife had given birth to a baby boy only to learn that Griffin’s head had just been blown off by a
mortar round.167 Jessie Forrest watched his buddy jump on a grenade. The man saved ten or
twelve lives but lost his own.168 After chasing a MIG all the way to China, Major Robinson
Risner and pal Joe Logan ran out of fuel. Risner made it to safety, but after Logan bailed out his
neck became entangled in his parachute and he drowned.169 Becoming an instrument of death,
Herman Lee Mingee relayed orders for his ship to open fire on a position where American
Marines would be killed alongside North Koreans.170 Crews aboard aircraft carriers celebrated
in high fashion when ejected pilots made it back safely because all too often rescue came too late
to save men from the enemy or the icy waters below.171 Ships got torpedoed and sailors died in
the line of duty.172 Such scenes played out tens of thousands of times in the three years that men
fought over real estate in Korea. Policymakers counted costs in terms of rounds of ammunition
or dollars spent, but on the line men paid for the war with blood. They understood what it was
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like “to see your buddy, with whom you were talking … about girlfriends or home cooking,
suddenly lying there in the trail with blood gushing out every orifice and he is trying to hold his
guts in from spilling out on the ground.”173 And, this “loss of close friends is indescribable.”174
Ever-present, the smell, sight, and pain of death pervaded the Korean War battle experience.
For most servicemen, the tally of American war dead and wounded grew longer and more
personal than they had imagined it would. As they watched comrades die, stumbled across
bloodied G.I.s, and experienced close calls themselves, men became reminded of their own
mortality and vulnerability. Not only were they not bulletproof, but their lives and those of the
men with whom they shared foxholes or cockpits and stories could be snuffed out unexpectedly
in an instant. Some, like Rolly Miller responded to such realizations by drawing closer to
comrades, remarking “It’s funny how a severe action kind of makes you feel like a family.”175
Others distanced themselves from those around them. Like Doug Michaud, they “no longer
wanted any buddies.” They stopped asking new men their names and kept to their own company
as much as possible. That way, “If you get killed, I don’t know you and I don’t care. You’re
just another number, another rifle.”176
Battle changed men on the inside. In order to survive, soldiers and airmen simply had to
put their emotions aside and “get on with what had to be done.”177 “One could not, must not, be
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upset by death.”178 Thus, instead of crying over fallen comrades, men in Korea learned to greet
the deaths around them calmly, matter-of-factly, perhaps even callously. In his diary, Raymond
Myers recorded that he “Drove the jeep all day. We had chicken for supper. Draper got killed.
A round hit right in his hole. All I could find was a piece of meat. Nothing else.”179 Similarly,
reporter Marguerite Higgins noticed that “When someone was killed they [the Marines] would
wearily, matter of factly, pick up the body and throw it in the nearest truck.”180 And, upon
seeing a dead friend, Private First Class Guy Robinson fixed his eyes on the man ahead and kept
walking.181 In the war zone, on the battlefield, a man could only take note of the losses, attend a
makeshift funeral if time allowed, and move on. Only later, when a man left the war, could he
begin to deal with the guilt, regret, and emptiness saved up from the tragedies of Korea. Only
then could he ask, “Could I have done better? If I’d done a better job, would fewer men have
died?”182 And only then could a man know if when he left the war, the war left him. Combat
did not stop for such questions, and, if one looked away for too long, he might run out of time for
answers. In battle, men necessarily had to focus their attention sharply on survival and if they
succeeded in surviving, they somehow had to learn to live within the war.

Living Within War
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Undoubtedly, combat produced the most poignant memories for those who fought and
made for some of the best stories later. And, in the years since the Korean War, moviemakers
and historians alike have almost exclusively memorialized battles like Pork Chop Hill or the
retreat from Chosin Reservoir. But, battles seldom lasted more than a week or so and never for
any given person’s entire tour of duty. Whether sheltered in foxholes or bunkers on the front
lines, stationed at hospitals or aboard ship, or harbored safely in reserve within the confines of
territory held tightly by the U. N., men and women lived within the war without constantly
participating in it. In reality, most, if not all, Americans spent far more time living in Korea than
fighting there. Their war was “one of long periods of great boredom with a few flashes of
intense terror.”183 As Thomas McLain wrote his parents in the spring of 1951, “Combat sure is
different than I figured. I thought you fought day and night but sometimes it’s days before I
even hear a shot fired….We seldom even see the Chinks.”184 Still, “nothing ever came easy in
Korea.”185
For men and women accustomed to luxuries like home-cooked meals, telephone service,
electricity, clean clothing and bedding, furnaces, and running water, the primitive living
conditions in country made them long for home. Except in places like Seoul, where modern
buildings existed, American military personnel lived in crude and simple dwellings. Where
practical, such as at airfields or mobile hospital sites behind the lines, tents surrounded by
sandbags became temporary or even permanent shelters. These had the distinct advantage of
being above ground, but often they lacked electricity, running water, adequate heating and
183

Arnoldo A. Muniz in Granfield, I Remember Korea, 33-35. Major James Kiser, an Air Force pilot, echoes this
same sentiment, talking about moments, not months, of terror. See Kiser in Chancey and Forstchen, Hot Shots, 85.
184
Thomas W. McLain (AFC 2001/001/256), Folder 1, “Remembering Korea, 28 June 1950-3 December 1951,” an
unpublished memoir, 60, VHPC, AFC, LOC.
185
Rudolph W. Stephens, Old Ugly Hill: A G.I.’s Fourteen Months in the Korean Trenches, 1952-1953 (Jefferson,
NC: McFarland and Company, 1995), 72.

203

ventilation, flooring other than dirt, and any semblance of privacy.186 Pilots, who below the rank
of major shared “hootch” space with 6 to 12 other men, piled up packing crates and debris inside
their tents to carve out private cubicles for themselves. Standard furnishings included small oil
burning stoves for heat, candles for light, and G.I. cots, but not much else.187
Intended for common use, showers and latrines could be found outside somewhere, an
unpleasant fact given the extreme winter temperatures in Korea, and these left little room for
secrets among those who shared them. At the “40-seater thunderbox” at one airbase, pilots sat
shoulder to shoulder on a long wooden bench with holes in it to do their business.188 Elsewhere
troops straddled shallow ditches, called slit trench latrines, or sat back to back when relieving
themselves.189 For all of their privations, however, those who lived in Korea’s tent cities had
many benefits unavailable to the men holed up in the country’s hills, including ready access to
cheap labor. Pilots and others often employed native laborers to clean the barracks and latrines,
do their laundry, shine their shoes, keep stoves burning all night, serve them in the mess hall, and
make life in country more pleasing and comfortable.190
In the field and at the front, accommodations afforded far fewer luxuries to occupants
than did the tents. There, men lived in dusty, moist holes shoveled into the ground or hillsides in
an attempt to protect themselves from enemy fire and attack. For months they slept on “nothing
better than the ground with some straw on it.”191 As the war stalemated, forcing men to live in
the same positions for many months, trenches eroded and some shelters collapsed in landslides
186
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or from the weight of wet sandbags, causing men to have to dig deeper.192 Over time,
conditions in these permanent bunkers grew increasingly grim. When men rotated out, they left
behind piles of garbage and, in some cases, towers of human waste. Not only did the number of
men outstrip the available space at latrines, but the potential danger of traversing the ground
between foxholes and bathrooms discouraged some from making any unnecessary trips to the pit
toilets. As a result, four inch “piss tubes” appeared outside of many dugouts, creating
stalagmites of frozen urine in the winter and puddles of filth in warmer weather.193 Unlike
latrines, nobody bothered to burn these makeshift urinals or police the mess men made using
them. Attracted by all the refuse, rats infested almost all living quarters, providing a constant
source of irritation and illness for the men inside.194
Soldiers and Marines stuck living in such places would have welcomed a bath or fresh
clothing, but field conditions left many with virtually no access to showers or laundry facilities.
When on the move, men might happen across places to bathe or wash, but they had little time to
spare for personal hygiene and could end up regretting any such efforts on their part. Trying to
keep clean, Harry Van Zandt washed his only two pairs of socks just before being ordered to
march. For six days he wore wet socks inside of his rubber shoe packs with the result that his
skin came off with the socks once he removed them and he developed a chronic case of athlete’s
foot.195 When troops did park somewhere along the front, showers were far enough behind the
lines to discourage men from frequenting them. Along the main line of resistance and on
outposts water had to be carried in, sometimes across “no-man’s land” in full view of the
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enemy.196 As a result, men made the most of every drop of water they had. On outposts, men
boiled coffee, drank some of it, and washed their faces and brushed their teeth with the
residue.197 Everywhere, soldiers and Marines got filthy quick and stayed that way.198 G.I.s
worked, dug holes, sweat, bled, fought, and slept in the same pair of fatigues until relieved by
another unit or sent into reserve. After three weeks in Korea, Harrison Lee realized “I still had
on the same set of fatigues that I was wearing when I landed at Pusan.”199 He was fortunate.
Elgen Fujimoto spent 63 days on the line before he finally got to take a hot shower and change
clothes.200 In wintertime, wearing the same uniforms could prove especially problematic.
Though warm, the bulk of winter garments made using the bathroom a real challenge and some
men couldn’t get out of them fast enough.201 Men smelled like the holes they lived in or worse,
suffered from dysentery and lice, and developed hacking coughs that never seemed to go
away.202
As an added burden, throughout the war troops had difficulty obtaining all of the supplies
and equipment that they needed or wanted. Early in the war, soldiers had trouble getting such
necessities as ammunition and anti-tank weapons. Caught in North Korea in the winter of 1950
when the Chinese entered the conflict, soldiers and Marines could still complain that they had to
deal with ammunition shortages, but they could add depleted provisions of food and an
inadequate supply of cold weather gear to their list of supply problems.203 By February 1951,
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servicemen fighting near Seoul began writing home asking for food and canned goods to
supplement the “gook rice” on which they had to survive.204 Once the war stalemated, it became
more difficult to fill requisitions as politicians and bureaucrats tried to limit war costs while
waiting for some kind of peace agreement. Fighting on an outpost, John Sullivan complained
that he had flamethrowers but couldn’t get the two dollar disks to ignite them. He, probably
accurately, placed the blame on a battalion commander who was “screwing around with some
idiotic cost-reduction program.”205 On a personal level, men in the outposts and along the main
line of resistance could seldom get little luxuries like candles or paper and pencils through the
regular channels. Unfortunately, as in most wars, troops in the rear echelons took many of these
items out of supply shipments long before they could reach the fighting war up front. If a soldier
were determined or clever enough, however, he might be able to get some things on his own,
much like Radar O’Reilly in the television sitcom M*A*S*H. In Korea, possession often
depended less upon official authorization than upon one’s ingenuity. Men secured the things
they wanted or needed by bargaining with other individuals or units. Arthur Kelly remembers
that his unit swapped lumber to the Marines for the use of a bulldozer so that they did not have to
hand-dig their artillery bunker.206 All too often, though, not even a good trade could produce the
necessary items. Ralph Parr, a pilot, had a pair of flying gloves and a flight suit only because he
brought them with him to Korea. Other pilots simply did without these essential pieces of
equipment early in the war. And, Parr had to wear a broken jet helmet held together by masking
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tape while other men donned plastic football helmets for flying because the Air Force had not yet
issued jet helmets to those in Korea.207 In all wars, supplying the troops presents logistical,
financial, and other problems. The nature of the Korean War as a limited war intensified these
issues, straining the resolve and commitment of people on the home front to the conflict and to
the men fighting it. Sadly, the Korean War proved too easy to ignore and men and women in
country often found the things which might have eased the stresses of Korea beyond their reach.
Despite occasional shortages, however, the military did usually manage to provide troops
with regular rations of food. Behind the lines, mess tents offered at least one hot meal a day, a
luxury that troops in reserve took advantage of and appreciated.208 Most combat soldiers,
though, even once the war turned static, found walking to the mess tent both dangerous and
impractical and so they subsisted on the food delivered to their positions. When possible,
Korean laborers brought warm meals in containers to soldiers, but more often these G.I.s ate cold
C-Rats straight from the cans.209 During the Korean War, C-Rats or combat rations consisted of
several little cans of food, including entrees like spaghetti and meatballs, chicken stew, beans
and franks (a favorite dish), ham and lima beans (an unpopular selection known widely as “ham
and motherfuckers”), and beef stew as well as items like canned fruit, tinned biscuits, candy bars
or chocolate, coffee, and beverage powders. Meant to supply a man for an entire day, C-Rat
boxes, shaped sort of like shoeboxes, also contained toilet paper, soap, cigarettes, gum, and little
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can openers.210 As long as men stayed put at their holes, most of the ration might be consumed,
but not uncommonly young Americans ended up pocketing and eating only the sweets—canned
peaches or candy—and either abandoning the remainder when they moved out or trading it for
local produce or someone else’s fruit or cigarettes . Not surprisingly, soldiers and Marines lost
weight while living on the line and many of them got cavities.211
A host of other things made life in Korea unpalatable for Americans. For those living in
the foxholes and trenches across from the North Koreans or Chinese, enemy propaganda made
life miserable. In its most innocuous form, such efforts consisted of scattered leaflets
admonishing the Americans to stop trying to grab Korea for themselves.212 But, the Communists
found other, more effective techniques to demoralize and terrorize American troops before the
war’s end. Sometimes they beat drums or blew “Taps” at dark to remind their captive audience
in the opposite trench line that Korea might offer them nothing but death.213 Other times they
played American music in an attempt to make soldiers homesick or produced eerie sounds to
frighten them.214 The North Koreans and Chinese also made nightly broadcasts over
loudspeakers or on the radio. These ranged from almost laughable attempts to convince G.I.s of
the righteousness of the communist cause to more haunting presentations given in flawless
English. At least one American woman, Anne Walker Suhr, dubbed “Seoul City Sue” by
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soldiers in Korea, lent her voice to the communist propaganda effort. Suhr, a onetime Methodist
missionary to Korea who had married a Korean national and adopted his communist beliefs,
aired a radio program during the war in which she read aloud the names of dead Americans
while jangling dog tags in the background.215 Frequently North Koreans and Chinese called out
the names of the men and units across from them, making soldiers aware that the enemy knew
who they were, and encouraging them to surrender or go home. Black soldiers especially found
themselves targets of psychological warfare. Grant Hauskins, an African American veteran,
remembers hearing, “Hey black soldier, what are you doing here, your war is not here but on the
streets of America, where they treat you like pigs and dogs.”216 Regardless of color, patriotism,
or corps, enemy propaganda had the effect of making young Americans living a world away
from home more lonely, frightened, homesick, and tired of war. And, in an environment where
sleep came only with difficulty anyway, these chilling messages from the enemy further ensured
a lack of rest for Americans on the front lines.217
Along with physical discomfort, troops living within the war zone faced mental
challenges. Even during periods of calm, the landscape of Korea provided ample reminder that
“the business of war is to kill.”218 At church services, men received communion with “rifles
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slung from their shoulders” and wondered if they would be “forgiven for breaking the
commandment, ‘Thou shall not kill.’”219 More conspicuously, American G.I.s frequently used
enemy bodies as protective barricades or simply left them where they had fallen. In winter, these
froze solid, but in warmer weather they rotted on the concertina wire below the trenches, an
unappetizing view for the men eating and living above.220 Arthur Kelly remembers walking past
a leg sticking up out of the ground and wondering who the man was and if his family knew he
was dead. For him, this symbolized “the reality of war…an inhumane, sad thing.”221 Others felt
a keen sense of tragedy or even guilt when confronted with the presence of refugees or orphans.
Having lost everything, including family, South Koreans survived by begging or living off of
American waste. As Major Dean Hess, who founded the first Air Force sponsored orphanage in
Korea, noted, “It was both heartbreaking and nauseating to see these ragged children lean over
and dip their swill with tin cans, trying to scoop up choice morsels from our garbage.”222 Many
Americans did what they could to alleviate the suffering around them. G.I.s shared their food,
donated time and money to relief projects, and provided medical assistance to civilians. Some
even advertised in stateside newspapers for shoes, clothing, candy, soap, and other things to be
distributed to needy Koreans on Christmas Day.223 In the end, though, most could not help but
feel haunted by the shattered lives and sad images all around them.
American troops might have coped better emotionally with the devastation they
witnessed if they believed the war had some larger purpose, but “very few of us involved in the
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war understood why we were there.”224 Of course, almost everyone heard the rhetoric, that the
U.S. had undertaken the defense of South Korea to protect the world against the spread of
communism and preserve democracy in however small a place. Many even accepted this as
worthwhile. “I was going to fight for a country against the aggression of North Korea and the
arms and weapons support from Red China as well as the USSR….at the time and even today the
fight was worth it!”225 In a similar vein, before he was killed in action, Rolly Miller wrote home,
“We are fighting a godless thought … we’re combating this ideology. If we accomplish nothing
more than proving to the world we’ll fight with the little guy to protect his dignity as a human
being, I feel we have done enough to justify the sacrifices we have made.”226 Stirred by
patriotism, others asserted, “I love America and always will, and I’m ready to give everything for
her—even life itself if that’s what God wants.”227
In light of ugly realities like bombed out villages and American casualties, vague
generalizations tended to ring hollow.228 As one G.I. put it, “We heard all the bullshit about
fighting the spread of communism to protect our land of liberty. What the hell did we know
about communism? Not a motherfuckin’ thing.”229 Reflecting upon democracy back in the
States and the segregation that it tolerated, black soldiers in particular wondered, “What the hell
am I doing over here” and “What had the commies ever done to us black people (that is, before
224
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we came to Korea)?”230 Furthermore, as the war dragged on, Americans in Korea sensed that
there existed no viable means of winning the war and no way of measuring victory anyway.231
They might fight forever and still not make a dent in the Chinese army much less drive it off the
Korean Peninsula. Eventually, some men found their own rationales for fighting the war—to
provide a more hopeful future for the children of South Korea, to ensure that communists would
never again try to subdue a free nation, to prove their loyalty to the Constitution and the United
States—and now, more than half a century later, most agree that their service meaningfully
contributed to American national security and endowed South Koreans with the freedoms they
presently enjoy. But at the time, a lot of American servicemen thought of Korea as nothing more
than “a miserable war … and a useless war” and their only goal was to survive it one day at a
time.232 In 1951 David Duncan, a photographer for Life, asked a Marine in Korea, “If I were
God and could give you anything you wanted, what would you ask for?” The Marine didn’t ask
for peace or freedom or even the chance to go home. He simply said, “Gimme tomorrow.”233
Whether or not they believed in their mission or in American involvement in Korea,
Americans living in country struggled with their feelings toward the home front. Certainly,
almost everyone suffered from homesickness and tried to keep in touch with what was happening
in the States. Millions of letters passed back and forth between men and women in Korea and
their loved ones back home. Newspapers printed servicemen’s advertisements imploring people
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to “Please Write this Lonely GI” or send homemade goodies like cakes and cookies to those
serving overseas.234 And, people responded to such pleas. In little towns and big cities all across
America, women formed circles to buy and ship familiar sundries like paper, soap, shaving
cream, razors, and candy to the war zone.235 A few young ladies even became romantically
invested in the pen pals they made, bringing men closer to home in mind if not in body.236 Men
also pumped new replacements for any sort of stateside news.237 They wanted to know what
bands or songs were being played back home, what hometown newspapers were saying about the
war, and who looked good for the World Series. Like Edgar Miller, they tuned in to “Voice of
America” on the radio. “Even though it wasn’t my hometown, it was America, and the station
brought ‘home’ to me as I listened.”238 Americans held tight to their memories and pictures and
from their tents and dugouts they dreamed about returning to hot ham and egg breakfasts, clean
sheets, cold beer, new cars, Sunday dinners, and all the other things about home and country that
they “so completely took for granted before I left.”239
But, while G.I.s often longed to rotate back to the States and worked to maintain
connections with the home front, interactions from the war zone could prove disheartening and
disappointing. On a personal level, many men found their relationships with girlfriends, wives,
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family, and friends strained by the long separation. Letters might keep them in touch, but mail
was at best a “poor substitute for conversation” and “woefully inadequate” at maintaining
feelings of closeness. Couples like Charles Bussey and his wife Thelma moved “further and
further apart” with each passing month, and many men’s marriages unraveled while they
remained stuck in Korea.240 Not uncommonly, men discovered that their spouses, unable to cope
with the lengthy deployment, had sought comfort with someone else back home.241 Others, like
Frank Bifulk, simply received “Dear John” letters which unexpectedly informed them that one
less person was awaiting their return from the war.242 With no way to lobby for themselves in
person, servicemen could do little but try to put the sadness behind them and focus on surviving
in country. Even when things seemed fine, soldiers and Marines worried about being forgotten
or forsaken by the ones they had left behind and letters home reflected a deep need for
reassurance. As Thomas McLain wrote, “I’m not worried about myself hon, I’m worried about
you. I want to be sure and have your love when I get back.”243 Songs like “Dear John Letter”
and “Korea Blues” revealed and perhaps deepened these fears of losing lovers or friends because
of duty in Korea.244
Under the best of circumstances, marriages and other relationships weathered the
challenges of distance and time, giving men the feeling that they had someone to live for and
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something to tie them to their old lives. These connections, however, did not always result in
complete satisfaction on the part of those who participated in the war. Men in country needed to
believe that they could rotate back to the States and be the husbands, brothers, sons, and friends
that they had been before this conflict. But, a great many feared that the things they had done or
seen in Korea had worked too many changes on them, changes that people back home would not
be able to accept.245 Combat veterans especially felt that “there was no way the folks at home
could understand any part of my life.”246 And, to a large extent, they were probably right. Back
on Main Street, old notions of appropriateness still ruled the day, but in the topsy turvy world of
the war where very little made sense anyway, different standards applied. Here, profanity
became the preferred, habitual means of expression and irreverence dominated the humor and
outlook of the average G.I.247 In medical units, doctors rushed to the bedsides of critical patients
who turned out to be skeletons outfitted with fake medical tags and diagnoses like diarrhea or
fractured skull.248 Infantrymen sang ballads with verses like “F*** ‘em all, f*** ‘em all,/The
Commies, the U.N. and all;/Those slant-eyed Chink Soldiers/Struck Hagaru-ri/And now we
know the meaning of USMC….”249 Men sewed stars on their fatigues and declared themselves
generals with the rationale that “Nobody in this chicken shit outfit promoted me, so I promoted
myself.”250 And soldiers composed poems like “Appropriateness” which demonstrated that in
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Korea few topics proved off limits for entertainment. “Mortar shrapnel ripped his canteen from
its web belt./We all laughed./Had it been his head/We would not have laughed ‘til later.”251
Obviously these behaviors could not be explained easily by a son to his mother or a boyfriend to
his sweetheart. Consequently, letters from Korea remained quite guarded.252 Instead of talking
about the brutal realities of battle, the loneliness and fear that permeated everyday life on the
front, or their somewhat unconventional ways of dealing with the stress, men (and women)
conveyed funny stories or dwelt on the mundane, generic topics that would find ready approval
among their friends and families.253 Unfortunately, while censoring and sanitizing their
correspondence helped G.I.s salvage their marriages and protect home ties, it also left them with
the uneasy feeling that perhaps when they returned home these relationships might yet become
casualties of the war and of the real, if unspoken, gulf that separated Korea from the home front.
Depressingly aware that they were paying the costs of the Korean War with divorces,
deaths, uncomfortable living conditions, moments of terror, and personal tragedies, many
Americans in country came to resent both the United States Government and the American
public. As Private First Class James Cardinal put it, “The troops over here are mad, mad at
America, Americans and America’s leaders. We all feel we’ve been let down by our
incompetent and blundering leadership, from the White House down.”254 Old enough to
remember the respect and gratitude accorded to World War II veterans and too young to recollect
their country’s treatment of veterans of earlier wars, service members in Korea felt entitled to
251
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something more than they were receiving for their troubles. On a basic level, men and women
serving in the war zone wanted recognition that Korea was as much of a war as any that the
United States had fought in the past, not merely a “police action” as President Truman and the
press persisted in calling it. They complained bitterly that “They may call this a police action,
but men are loseing [sic] their lives the same as in the last war” and “they should make that
comment to the parents or wives whose sons or husbands were killed in action.”255 They also
felt that their country owed them the same benefits that it had seen fit to grant to the veterans of
World War II. From the hillsides and battlefronts of Korea, servicemen angrily demanded a
comparable G.I. Bill. Asserting, “I would like to go to college if I live thru this damn police
action,” they asked “what is the government doing about us over here?”256 And, when the
answers failed to satisfy them, they persisted. “Why, sir,” one man wrote Senator Robert Taft,
“are we excluded from the rights, the hostilities were over for 2 years and fellows who enlisted
for a peacetime army for 18 months receive the benefits of the Bill of Rights, but those who are
now in Korea, even if only for a year are forgotten or seem to be by our government?”257
Eventually such lobbying paid off and Congress passed a Korean G. I. Bill of Rights, but for
many veterans the seeming reluctance and slowness with which this was done served only to
reinforce notions that America somehow regarded them differently than its sons and daughters of
the Second World War.
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Aside from a lack of political recognition, the troops in Korea had other reasons to feel
like the home front had abandoned and forgotten them. Every day Americans laid down their
lives in service to country on the Korean Peninsula, but back in the States people seemed
completely disinterested in the war. Front page headlines advertised “a growing shortage of
beef, graft scandals in the Government, strikes as usual, [and] prospects of a new-car scarcity.”258
The war just did not seem all that newsworthy after the early months and especially once it
stalemated. As Bill Mauldin noted of the Korean War infantryman, “He fights a battle in which
his best friends get killed and if an account of the action gets printed at all in his home town
paper, it appears on page 17 under a Lux ad.”259 And, more than not paying attention to the war,
people on the home front actually compromised the ability of men and women to carry out their
duties in Korea—at least from the perspective of those in the war zone. Strikes and the attention
paid them not only distracted Americans, but deprived men in the field of the supplies they
needed. Shortages at home meant the rationing of things like ammunition and equipment in the
war zone. Of one strike a frustrated G.I. in theater wrote, “We felt it very definitely in the
shortage of supplies and especially of equipment for several days. It woke me up to how closely
connected all the fronts we battle on are. You begin to wonder if the old country realizes there’s
a war going on over here.”260 Similarly, returning from Korea, another serviceman asserted,
“Strikes at home make the GI feel … that people are so preoccupied with their own self-interests
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that they seem to have forgotten that we are fighting a war. The shortages due to the shipping
strike in New York last autumn could be felt in Korea within two weeks.”261
Soldiers in country repeatedly complained that their country and countrymen left them to
fight the war with secondhand weapons, trucks, jeeps, and artillery.262 With a Marine platoon
somewhere in Korea, Richard Bevier pondered the fact that the warranty on his unit’s howitzers
had expired as the manufacturer only guaranteed them for three years or 10,000 rounds of
ammunition, whichever came first. Wryly he concluded that the guns were still more dependable
than the ammunition, much of which was dated 1940. “It had probably been to the Pacific and
back a couple of times.”263 More succinctly, James Boden observed, “Guns that would not work,
ammo that would not fire.”264 Men fighting in Korea wanted people in the United States to
“know and give a damn,” but believed that “they don’t know and don’t care. Because it doesn’t
touch them.”265 No wonder then, when they talked “about the old home country,” their
conversations contained both “sadness and even a little bit of bitterness.”266
If men or women felt unhappy about their situation in Korea, they could complain in
letters or to members of the press, but seldom could they express themselves at the ballot box.
With catchphrases like “If they are old enough to fight they are old enough to vote,” some
senators and congressmen during the conflict pushed to lower the minimum voting age from 21
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to 18. They did not want men to “feel they are being shanghaied into the Armed Forces without
having a voice in their own government.”267 Throughout the war, however, such efforts
invariably failed, leaving thousands of young draftees eligible to fight in Korea but ineligible to
vote in state or national elections.268 In the 1950s, color also excluded some of those in Korea
from voting. More than a decade before President Lyndon Johnson’s Voting Rights Act, many
Southern blacks could not participate in the political process regardless of age and some Native
Americans did not get the right to vote until the late 1950s.269 Finally, even if service members
met all the requirements for voting in their home states, they might not be able to vote from
Korea. Some states banned absentee voting outright. Restrictive voting laws barred as many as
a million G.I.s around the world from voting in elections like the presidential race of 1952.270
Other times, the process got so complicated that it discouraged Americans stationed overseas
from attempting to cast absentee ballots. In the 1952 presidential election, for instance, G.I.s had
to apply for a federal postcard from a voting officer, fill it out, and mail it to his/her home state.
When the ballot came, the G.I. had to go before the voting officer, mark the ballot, seal it in an
envelope, sign it, get it notarized, and then take it to the registered mail window at the post
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office.271 Needless to say, many found the procedure too cumbersome and many others could
not possibly fulfill the requirements from where they were stationed.
As a result, a few men settled for writing letters to their congressmen or hometown
newspapers, but with mixed results. In 1951 letters sent from an engineer detachment in Korea
to stateside papers questioning the purpose of the war prompted a discussion in the House of
Representatives as to whether or not the men should be investigated by the Army as possible
participants in a communist plot. Ultimately, Representative S. J. Crumpacker, Jr. from Indiana
defended the soldiers saying, “We cannot expect to draft men and send them to fight and
possibly die for us in Korea and then refuse to tell them why we are doing so and what our
purpose is in fighting such a war.”272 But, in the deepening Cold War climate and in the middle
of an unpopular and stalemated war the situation could have turned out far differently.
Congressmen and Americans might as easily have seen communists or collaborators as tired and
confused soldiers and these men might have faced courts martial for misconduct or worse as
happened to returning POWs after the conflict.
Perhaps G.I.s could not influence the government or public opinion back home, but a few
did manage to work the system and find a safe and legal way to leave Korea before their tours of
duty ended. In the early 1950s Army policy allowed soldiers, even those stationed in the war
zone, to apply to Officer Candidate School. If chosen, an applicant returned to the United States
271
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as soon as OCS could make room for him. Army regulations then barred those men from
reassignment overseas until they completed a minimum stateside tour. Sensing the possibilities,
infantrymen and artillerymen in Korea applied for OCS, shipped back to the States, and then
resigned from their respective programs after only a couple of weeks. They still had to finish
their 21 or 24 months with the Army, but most of them had so little time left that they knew they
would “sweat out” their release from the service in America and not in the deadly hills of Korea.
Eventually the Army did close off this avenue of escape from the war theater. By the spring of
1952, new policies designed to deal with the problem stated that men who voluntarily withdrew
from OCS before completion could be returned to the area from which they came without a
stateside waiting period. Men in Korea could still ask for OCS, but admission no longer
guaranteed them a final exit from the war. Still, dozens of men slipped out of the war zone and
back home before the Army put these new rules into effect.273
While in Korea, Marines, sailors, airmen, soldiers, doctors, and nurses, like young
Americans everywhere, found ways to entertain and distract themselves. Behind the lines,
service personnel played chess and checkers, set up volleyball and basketball courts, had
barbecues and beer busts, and formed poker clubs.274 They attended USO events when possible
and indulged in drinking alcohol rations or black market booze.275 Early in the war, the military
supplied enlisted troops with two cans of beer a day and officers with a bottle of whiskey a
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month, just enough to fend off boredom and help one temporarily forget about the war.276 Even
tea-totalers sometimes became drinkers in Korea, but perhaps nobody in country enjoyed liquor
more than airmen. Alcohol flowed freely in the various “O Clubs” and this fact, coupled with
the availability of cheap liquor at base exchanges, helped make drinking the “primary
recreational activity” of many of those stationed at or around airfields. So common was overdrinking among pilots that they learned to adjust the oxygen levels in their planes to cure
hangovers.277 On the front lines and in the outposts, where drinking was usually prohibited, men
made their own home-brew, called “apple jack,” secured liquor from foreign troops or the black
market, and brought back beer or whiskey when they returned from R & R.278 Still, combat
soldiers had little time for drinking and more commonly used cigarettes to fill their hours and
days. Stuffed into combat rations, cigarettes came cheap and easy in the war zone, a ready-made
and nearly irresistible de-stressor.279 Like the soldiers of World War II, many veterans of the
Korean War remember first smoking when in the Army or in the war.280
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In addition to cigarettes and liquor, some men in the war theater found love or something
like it.281 Especially for gay men, who faced persecution and suspicion back in the States, Korea
and Japan provided the opportunity for both openness and fulfillment.282 Occupied with the
business of war and survival and concerned primarily about the competence of their crews,
commanders had little time to waste ferreting out the sexual orientations of those under their
commands regardless of regulations. Indeed, most homosexuals found commanders more than
willing to look the other way so long as they performed well on the job.283 In the zone, one
“could be as open as you wanted to be” and there existed little pressure to act straight.284 Gay
men stationed in Japan frequented gay bars there, but willing partners turned up elsewhere as
well. Straight men in Korea, Japan, and aboard ship courted homosexuals when women were in
short supply or likely to be infected with venereal diseases and when they needed sex but could
not endure the thought of being unfaithful to their wives with another woman.285 In general,
gays found serving overseas a refreshing experience, free of some of the fear and repression they
suffered at home. Even so, homosexuals did well to bear in mind that no matter how liberated
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they felt in the war zone, homosexual acts still violated the military’s code of conduct and one
who engaged in them could be punished accordingly. Just one week before his three year
commitment ended, the Navy brought Tony Lankford up on charges of homosexuality. With “no
representation, no rights, no nothing,” Lankford ended his tour of duty with a dishonorable
discharge.286
For straight men, local girls in both Korea and Japan could be had as prostitutes or longterm “girlfriends” for a low price and, despite the admonitions of the military, many Americans
hired them. Concerned about the spread of venereal disease, at least one air base instituted
“pussy patrols” to prevent airmen from having sex with Korean women, but undoubtedly
clandestine relationships and the transmission of diseases continued in country. Additionally,
men in all branches of the military found action with no less willing and no less diseased
Japanese partners when on leave or R & R in Japan.287 Such liaisons held consequences, both
physical and emotional, for those who engaged in them.
Many men did contract sexually transmitted diseases. By January 1952, the VD rate of
the 51st Wing soared to 8.12% and in the summer of 1953 a wave of gonorrhea and genital warts
in the 45th Infantry Division forced many to undergo treatment before returning home.288
Infection caused real problems in the field where men had trouble getting penicillin. Richard
Bevier remembers a man in his platoon having to treat his “affected area” by soaking it for two
hours twice a day in a solution of potassium permangate mixed up in a sawed off beer can.
286
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Seeking privacy, the man sat in one of the tractors, at least until the time when his crew got
orders to fire while he was soaking and the unexpected recoil from the gun “not only splattered
our friend from head to toe with purple stuff,” but “almost circumcised him in the process.”289
Japanese and Korean women sometimes became pregnant, forcing G.I.s to either abandon
their children when they rotated out or to begin the long, wrenching, and often unsuccessful
process of trying to get their families to the United States. Inevitably, even without the pressure
of fatherhood, more than a few men either mistook their “business deals for real relationships” or
actually fell in love with the women they employed, leading them to try and marry their Asian
paramours.290 The US military did not ban such unions, but did discourage them with plenty of
red tape.291 Many Japanese and Korean women did get to take their turn as war brides, but many
others found this avenue to happiness a dead end. Given the nature of the war zone and the
slowness of the process, soldiers and Marines not infrequently died, rotated back to the States, or
simply lost interest before they could obtain approval to marry their girlfriends.292 Aside from
one-time lovers American servicemen left behind thousands of illegitimate sons and daughters,
unrecognized by the United States and shunned by the Japanese and Koreans.293 Love affairs
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blossomed in the war zone, quelling for a little while the loneliness and sadness of war, but all
too often they ended disastrously for everyone involved.
The military treated men and women who remained in Korea long enough to a turn at
Rest and Recuperation, or R & R. Early in the war this might be nothing more than a day or two
of rest somewhere behind the lines where a frontline soldier or Marine could eat a hot breakfast
and lunch, shower, get clean clothes, and maybe see a movie.294 By the spring of 1951, though,
R & R had become a formal program in which men left the war zone for a five day rest in
Japan.295 Men so looked forward to R & R that they were willing to take considerable risks in
order to get it. Harold DeVries remembers that when his turn came to go to Japan, his unit was
pinned down by the enemy, but rather than lose the opportunity he left by crawling “down a road
ditch with artillery hitting all around me.”296 Designed as a way to give men a break from the
constant danger and stress of the battlefield, R & R proved a mixed blessing for participants.
Men coming from hard fighting certainly needed the time to rest and relax, but not all of them
could do this away from their units and buddies. They worried about friends in the war zone and
felt guilty every time they “took a hot bath, ate a hot meal, and slept on a nice bed.”297 Many
also realized that after months of remaining on guard their bodies simply would not accept the
sleep that they craved.298 Later in the war R & R took on a different flavor. Men still tried to
catch up on some much needed rest, but they also spent a good portion of their time drinking and
chasing women, thus earning R & R the unenviable nickname “I & I” or “intercourse and

294

In his book, Terry Addison recalls being taken to the Pea Patch for a bit of rest in 1950. See Addison, Battle for
Pusan, 134-135.
295
Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 347-348.
296
Harold DeVries, , Interview by Kirk Mathis, in Havard, By Word of Mouth, 8.
297
Nick Nishimoto in Baldovi, A Foxhole View, 63.
298
Matthias, The Korean War, 131.

228

intoxication.”299 One female veteran stationed at a hospital on Okinawa during the war recalls,
“I felt very disappointed in our guys’ actions away from home” and “to this day feel disgust at
things I know of and have seen.”300
Eventually, if one lived within the war long enough, his or her time to return home would
come. Doctors, nurses, and sailors ticked off the months and completed their tours of duty.
Pilots finished the requisite number of missions. Infantrymen and support personnel in Korea
earned enough points to rotate out. In an effort to be equitable, to allow service members who
had risked the most or spent the most time in Korea to leave first, the military set up a rotation
system for individual soldiers and Marines.301 For each month spent in theater, American troops
received a certain number of points, ranging from four awarded to men stationed on the front
lines to two given to men in the rear echelon. Once a person accumulated thirty-six points he
became eligible to rotate out of the war zone.302
On the one hand, rotation, or the “Big R,” boosted the morale of those serving in country.
With or without an end to the war, “every man would ship out of Korea for discharge or other
duty station” when his year or eighteen months was up.303 But, rotation created many problems
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for American service members in theater as well.304 With the military “mobilizing,
demobilizing, and fighting a war, all at the same time,” troop commanders reflected that “we
were creating real units until rotation.”305 For those trying to survive combat, it became
increasingly clear that the loss of seasoned infantrymen and artillerymen and resulting influx of
inexperienced replacements broke down unit effectiveness and integrity.306 Some career officers
careened into the war zone just long enough to get their tickets punched, to put combat on their
records, and then moved on to something more lucrative and perhaps less dangerous, leaving
units in Korea without adequate or consistent leadership.307 Veterans in the ranks only
reluctantly and slowly accepted replacements, adopting a “wait and see” attitude until new men
proved their worth. Non-commissioned officers sweat bullets before engagements, knowing half
of their troops were green, fresh from basic training.308 Replacements had to make buddies and
learn the ropes fast or risk finding themselves even more alone in the unfamiliar and unforgiving
terrain of the war. Unfortunately, too many of these replacements became casualties within
hours or days of their arrival. Gary Hashimoto relates how one young replacement arrived at
dusk, dug in, and then was found stabbed to death the next morning.309
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Men with little time left before rotation developed “short-timers syndrome.” Worried
about dying only weeks or days before their tours of duty ended, short-timers became
increasingly reluctant to volunteer for dangerous duty, fight, or even stray far from their
foxholes. Some took to wearing their flak jackets and helmets round the clock and at least a few
determined to “never, ever leave his bunker again” until time to go home.310 Generally soldiers
tried to help short-timers out, but this meant the early loss of seasoned and competent soldiers
from the field.311 Rotation did not provide a real end to the conflict and it hindered the war effort
in almost as many ways as it helped, but for those lucky enough to sail back to the States before
July 1953 it provided a most welcome exit from living within war.

Leaving the War

Begun June 25, 1950, the Korean War lasted until the ceasefire went into effect at 2200
hours on July 27, 1953. Until that appointed time the shooting continued. Then, men on both
sides of the line celebrated, setting off live ammunition and waving at each other across the hills,
“happy the war was over and we would be going home.” But, except for prisoners of war (some
900 of whom the Chinese would be unable to account for at the prisoner exchange), 8100
Americans missing in action, 24 or so Navy and Air Force pilots detained by China as political
prisoners, and those Americans still on duty in theater at the time of the armistice, the conflict
had ended days, months, or even years earlier.312 In Korea, the American Armed Forces waged a
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new kind of limited war, one designed to prevent a direct confrontation between the Soviet
Union and the United States, preserve manpower resources in case of a wider conflict, and avoid
overly taxing the patience of the American public. Not a total war, Americans rotated out of the
war zone individually after completing a certain length of service there rather than staying with
their units and coming back as a group after hostilities ceased.
Strangely enough, the United States during the Korean War shipped not only survivors
back home, but also the remains of G.I.s who had given their lives in duty to country.313 In both
World Wars I and II, Americans killed in action were buried in temporary gravesites until after
the fighting stopped, sometimes long after, when the wishes of the next of kin determined
whether the bodies would be interred in permanent overseas cemeteries or returned to the
States.314 At first, Korean War dead were treated the same way. Around the Pusan Perimeter,
members of Graves Registration companies, part of the Quartermaster Corps, collected bodies,
identified them by comparing teeth to dental charts, cleaned out pockets, re-pinned any live
grenades they happened across, shipped personal effects (except for pornographic pictures which
by orders were to be thrown away) to family members back home, and arranged for a proper
burial complete with a memorial service if time allowed.315 As early as mid-July 1950 a
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temporary cemetery existed at Taejon and soon others sprung up at places like Kwan-ui,
Sindong, Kum-chon, Miryang, Masan, and Taegu.316
As the war progressed, however, American troops retreated, losing control of many of
these cemeteries. Perhaps uncertain that any territory in Korea could be permanently held by
United Nations forces, Major General K. L. Hastings, the Quartermaster of the Far East
Command, recommended the evacuation of all remains from temporary gravesites.317 Acting on
this, the United States made the unprecedented decision to return deceased Americans to their
homeland while still engaged in combat in Korea. Graves Registration companies in country
now had the double task of disinterring previously buried bodies for shipment and preparing
casualties fresh from the battlefield for the trip home. Most American dead passed through the
Zone Headquarters of the American Graves Registration Unit at Camp Kokura, Japan for final
identification. There, staff members collected fingerprints and recorded information about “hair
color, skin pigmentation, height, shoe size,…tattoos, scars, physical abnormalities,…bone
malformations and peculiar tooth and cranial formations” and prepared reports and case histories
to establish “beyond all doubt the identity of each individual.”318 Remains then passed through
the mortuary to be embalmed, placed in caskets, and finally processed out. At the mausoleum
area, chaplains held weekly memorial services in which a symbolic flag-draped casket escorted
by an Honor Guard was placed by the flagpole and treated to religious rites, the firing of three
volleys, the sounding of Taps, and the lowering of colors. From March 22, 1951 to September
1953, most American war dead—except for a few unidentified soldiers buried as token
representatives of the United States at the permanent United Nations cemetery and bodies
316
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unrecovered in both North and South Korea—were loaded onto ships to begin their final journey
back to the country for which they had given their lives.319 This at least gave some small
measure of comfort and solace to men like the young sergeant who wrote home in July 1950, “I
have one request. If I don’t survive, please don’t leave me to rot in Korea. When the Army
permits, let me come home to rest.”320
Receiving permission to rotate out, survivors left the war zone with far less ceremony
than their fallen comrades. If they served in a unit short of men, the Army or Marines might
offer them promotions in exchange for a few extra months of Korean duty, but other than that
they simply said their farewells and left with little more than their well-worn fatigues and combat
boots.321 Most men and women, after initial processing at battalion, regimental, or divisional
headquarters and perhaps a delousing, once again passed through Japan to await the troopship
which would ferry them home.322 Some went wild, buying clothing or trinkets with the money
saved up from unspent paychecks, reveling in dozens of pairs of clean, white underwear and
tailor-fitted dress uniforms.323 Others thought about America, “where people are free to vote and
just plain old free. Where the sound of guns and the sight of blood are in the past, where you get
hot dogs, hamburgers, banana splits, and hot rods, where American women don’t bend over and
kiss your ass…and damn a thousand other things that I left behind.”324 They looked forward to
“getting home to the wife I had married two days before shipping out to Korea” or to the children
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growing up in their absence.325 Men who had served on the line wondered “whether I was more
homesick for Decatur or for Love Company” and “couldn’t stop thinking about my buddies. I
loved them so.”326 Feeling a great loss they asked, “Sure, I was out of it, but what about all my
friends who were still fighting?” Still, those exiting the war theater “knew how a man on death
row must feel when he gets a reprieve.”327 They were safe at last and “happier than hell.”328
Eventually it came their turn to board the homebound ships, yelling “You’ll be sorreee!” to new
replacements entering the zone.329 After just a few more weeks of military food, fire or guard
duty, gambling, and waiting, they would be home, “back to the greatest country on the earth.”330
Although crowded together aboard transport vessels or planes, men and women, leaving
the Korean theater left the war alone.331 Instead of unit members shipping in and out together,
most individuals moved into outfits where needed and left at different times as their tours of duty
expired or as they accumulated enough points to earn a final rotation back to the States. Instead
of benefitting emotionally from making the long trip home with men made close through the
shared experience of combat or service, Korean War veterans had only the hard goodbyes “with
guys you’ve shared so much with” and then close quarters with unfamiliar faces, “all strangers, /
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like me, on their way home.”332 En route, men talked about the war, “the only subject we could
discuss intelligently,” and thought about the Americans still fighting.333 “Remembering was one
way of keeping people alive, and the least I could do.”334 They also tried to prepare themselves
for the transition from war to the safer, slower life they would soon enjoy. Reminiscing with
others who had experienced the same things or “endured situations which made my own seem
like a picnic,” some men found that “by the time we reached the United States after three weeks
at sea, most of us had been drained of any meaningful hang-ups.”335 “Thirty-three days from
Inchon to San Francisco. The transformation is / complete. By the time we re-enter / society,
society has re-entered us.”336 Some, though, had more difficulty putting the war behind them as
they passed from one life to another. This time around they traveled “with baggage I can’t just
check through.”337 They “had adjusted to being in the war zone and could not figure out how
they were going to react when they got out of the…combat zone and back into civilian life.”338
To those leaving, rotation meant “it wasn’t my war anymore; it belonged to other men,”
but it also “wasn’t a real end to the war.”339 And because the calendar rather than victory
brought them home, veterans of the Korean War had no meaningful way to measure what they
had accomplished during their time in country. The losses, of course, seemed evident. The tugof-war over real estate left the Korean countryside broken and cities devastated. A 1951 Time
Magazine article declared, “Peace if it comes will find Korea’s cities dead. In Seoul the gutted,
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white-domed capitol of the Republic of Korea stands like a skeleton among the city’s ruins.
Suwon’s huge, half-destroyed gate, once a monument to Korea’s kings, guards only rubble
now.”340 By the end of the conflict, virtually every village and city on the peninsula had been
damaged, which in human terms translated into many millions of Koreans killed or rendered
homeless.341 The United States pumped billions of dollars into the effort, but casualties
skyrocketed, numbering almost 34,000 dead by the end of the war.342
And what had they won? Even when peace finally came, “no land had been occupied, no
grand goals had been reached, no clear victory had established a winner, no surrender received to
mark the end of the war.”343 American troops held the same line they might have had in the fall
of 1950. An October 1953 Gallup Poll revealed what the American public thought about this
achievement; they would not support renewed hostilities even to hold the territory already
purchased at so dear a price.344 As they rotated out, men “didn’t feel like you accomplished a
hell of a lot” and they “carried around a feeling that somehow we hadn’t given it [Korea] the
same effort [as in World War II].”345 “I remember coming back from Korea…I was almost
embarrassed being in Korea because we didn’t win. We cut a deal. We got a draw. We failed
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where our older brothers had won.”346 They contemplated that, “We should have used our arms
the way they were intended to be used…Because you hold and cradle guys in your arms that die
right there talking about their wives and wishing they could see their kids again.”347
In light of the Vietnam War, the end of the Cold War, and the rise of North Korea as a
potential nuclear threat, most veterans of the war in Korea now, fifty years later, recognize that
their victory lay in preventing North Korea and China from imposing communism on the
Republic of South Korea, as well as possibly deterring communist efforts elsewhere.348 They
agree that, “One forgotten war may eventually turn out to have been the decisive conflict that
started the collapse of communism.”349 But, at the time, men and women often felt that success
had to be gauged in smaller, more personal terms. “I’d made mistakes. But I’d done things that
had merit…I hadn’t lost any men through stupidity or from fear. If you summed it up, that was
the real achievement, what you had to keep with you. I was going home whole, that was
something pretty important too.”350 In surviving, they had learned lessons like “it’s okay to
cry… [and] there are no winners in war and…we must learn to live in harmony with this
world.”351 And, dropped into the war zone and left to experience fear, compassion, and the sting
of death, the men and women serving in the Korean Theater grew up. Leaving “youth and
immaturity behind,” they “returned, still young but no longer innocent.”352
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CHAPTER 5: OUR FIGHT? WOMEN, RACE,
AND THE WAR ZONE
“They came in unshaven, dirty, looking about forty years old. And most of them are still in their teens.”—
Commander Haire serving on a hospital ship in theater.1
“When I first went to Korea, each soldier that came in the operating room seemed like my brother. It took a
little while to get over that. We did a little crying, then got back to work.”—Julia Baxter, Army veteran.2
“We could not let ourselves down…We couldn’t let our race down. We couldn’t afford to fail.”—James
Monte, African American veteran.3
“Would they trust us if they were in our place?”—Curtis Morrow, African American veteran.4
“I hate white people. Now if all white people were like the boys in this company, it wouldn’t take long before
everybody would get along swell.”—African American soldier.5
“Black man shot Chinese who was about to shoot me in back. Need I say more?”—white veteran.6

When North Korean troops fired the opening shots of the Korean War, an American
servicewoman, not a Marine or soldier, first answered the country’s call to duty. Stationed in
Korea at the time, Army nurse Viola McConnell suddenly found herself in charge of evacuating
not only the wives and children of Americans assigned to KMAG, but also foreigners
desperately trying to get out of the country. Fearful of the “international incident” which might
occur were the communists to shoot down a plane full of refugees, Ambassador John J. Muccio,
who opposed any evacuation on the grounds that if the North Koreans captured Seoul they would
certainly grant Americans diplomatic immunity, refused to allow air transportation. Instead,
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McConnell shepherded some 643 people, including babies, pregnant women, alcoholics
suffering withdrawal, and at least one senile woman to a Norwegian fertilizer ship built to hold
twelve passengers. Aided by an Army wife and several missionary nurses and one female
missionary doctor, McConnell saw to it that the nearly 300 infants on board received rations of
formula, that sick people got tended to, and that passengers made it safely to Japan in two days
only a little worse for the wear. 7
Not long after McConnell’s ordeal ended, General Douglas MacArthur called upon Major
Mildred I. Clark, director of nurses for the Far East Command in Tokyo, to put together two
Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH) for Korea. Though nearing completion of her tour of
duty, Clark readied volunteers for this new assignment. Part of an advance party, Major
Genevieve Smith became one of the first American Army casualties of the war when the aircraft
transporting her party to Korea exploded.8
Clearly, from the onset of hostilities in Korea the United States military had a place for
women in this new war just as they had in the last one. But, not until after June 1950 would it
become clear where that place would be. A limited war in a small, distant, and seemingly
insignificant country, the Korean War not only failed to capture the imaginations of Americans,
but also did not require the same wholehearted effort which had characterized World War II. In
the early months of the conflict the Armed Forces needed women to fill positions stateside to
free men for combat. Later, as manpower levels increased, there simply appeared little reason to
send most servicewomen into harm’s way. Thus far fewer female military personnel would end
up serving overseas in the Korean War than in the Second World War. Still, nurses and other
7

Narratives of these events can be found in Mary T. Sarnecky, A History of the U.S. Army Nurse Corps
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 301-303 and T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1963), 40-41.
8
Sarnecky, A History of the U.S. Army Nurse Corps, 303.

240

personnel did complete tours of duty in the war theater, many of them quite close to the action.
Serving in MASH units near the front lines, on hospital ships, and on evacuation planes carrying
out wounded infantrymen, most servicewomen realized their value to the effort and few doubted
that Korea was their fight as much as it was any American’s fight. But, would they experience
this war the same as the men in the foxholes? And would their participation in this war somehow
change them or transform their lives?
Allowed into the military in greater numbers than ever before, African Americans had
these same questions. Being black, they had others as well. Not every African American soldier
or Marine called the South home, but all had at least heard about segregation and its injustices.
Also, even up north one still encountered pockets of old Jim Crowism. How could a country
allow such a discriminatory system to remain intact and yet think nothing of asking the very
victims of that system to lay down their lives on the field of battle in the name of liberty? Why
should African Americans risk their lives in Korea when home promised nothing more than
second-class citizenship? Yet, most African American servicemen, regardless of whether or not
they came to believe that their real fight remained the struggle at home for equality, did not
abandon their duty stations in Korea. Historians, then, are left to ask the questions. Did service
in the war theater alter the views of African Americans serving there on race, country, or
comradeship? In the end, was Korea also the black soldier’s fight?

Women in the War

Despite the efforts of General Mark Clark and others to pressure the various Armed
Forces into sending more women, especially nurses, to the war zone, relatively few women
241

served in Korea or even in the Far East during the Korean War.9 Back in the States, the military
still suffered from the shortage of nurses that began with the end of World War II and female
recruitment remained a particularly challenging task.10 Many of the fathers, brothers, and
boyfriends who had served in the last war most assuredly did not want their daughters, sisters,
and girlfriends to don uniforms and serve in this one. And, many women just wanted to begin
their lives as wives or mothers without the bother of a service commitment. Moreover, all
branches of the military primarily used women to replace men in either the United States or
Europe so that male service members could be sent to Korea as soldiers, corpsmen, sailors, or
support personnel.11 Units on the line, especially in the early months of the war, needed men to
replace casualties more than they needed nurses to help save them. After all, without someone to
man the guns and fight, the entire war effort would simply collapse. Thus servicewomen
available for duty in the Far East tended to be in short supply and putting women there remained
a low priority for all the services. In the end, though, hundreds of servicewomen did complete
tours of duty in Korea and thousands more supported the troops in theater.12
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In early July 1950, Army nurse volunteers sent to Pusan to help set up a hospital became
the first American servicewomen to enter the Korean War. In less than a month, almost fifty
more nurses joined them, bringing the total number of American military women in Korea to
nearly a hundred.13 By the spring of 1951, more than 300 Army nurses were scattered across the
peninsula “at field, station, evacuation, and MASH hospitals.”14 Army nurses traveled with the
troops, waited for them behind the lines, and went to pick up casualties aboard hospital trains.15
Not to be outdone, Air Force and Navy nurses also contributed their share to the war effort,
becoming flight nurses with air evacuation units and staffing hospital ships.16 Countless other
servicewomen in all branches of the military lived and worked at hospitals and installations in
Japan, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and the Philippines in direct support of the Americans fighting in
Korea. 17 In addition to nursing, women staffed commands throughout Japan, including the Far
East Command Headquarters, and performed administrative, communications, intelligence and
other duties.18
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Because of the fluid nature of the war and the desperate need for medical personnel, most
women who served in theater did so as nurses.19 Just as at any hospital back home, they got
patients cleaned up and settled in and made them as comfortable as possible wherever they
happened to be.20 Nurses also kept up with supplies and ordered replacements when necessary.21
But, particularly in the war zone where the number of casualties quickly became overwhelming,
nurses took on greatly increased responsibilities. They learned to triage patients independently,
begin blood transfusions, suture wounds, and initiate courses of antibiotics, and they frequently
performed these tasks and more without the direct supervision of a doctor. At MASH units,
nurses worked with male corpsmen, teaching them the procedures necessary in combat
medicine.22 As doctors could seldom be spared for a long trip, nurses generally ran the show as
the highest ranking officers aboard hospital trains and they did everything from disinfecting the
cars with DDT to managing medical aid men and treating patients.23 Even in Japan WACs could
count on being assigned as ward masters, a position traditionally given to male NCOs.24 A
member of the U. S. Navy, Captain Katherine Keating became the first woman officer to relieve
a man at sea when ordered to the U.S.S. Haven as a pharmacist.25 In contrast to stateside service,
which offered comfort and predictability but also little room for advancement as women were
19
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herded into “pink collar” jobs, duty in the war theater tendered military women many more
opportunities to learn new skills and to act in supervisory roles.26
Though never stationed right on the front lines like combat troops or corpsmen and
medics, servicewomen in the Far East during the Korean War served under difficult and stressful
conditions.27 In Korea, nurses with field and MASH hospitals followed behind the troops, living
and working in “tents, barns, schoolhouses, rice mills, churches,” and whatever other structures
seemed practical under the circumstances. So close to the lines, they sometimes suddenly found
themselves in the thick of the action. Nurses on their way to Pusan in October 1950 had to take
cover in ditches for fourteen hours while an engagement unfolded around them. Later that year,
servicewomen in North Korea had to be evacuated to ASCOM City when Chinese volunteers
overran American positions.28 In country, women suffered many of the same deprivations as
men. They traveled in “flea-ridden conveyances,” went to the bathroom in slit trench latrines,
showered outdoors, washed their clothes in tin pans and hung them to dry in the corners of their
tents or Quonset huts, and suffered from shortages in supplies and gear. Uniforms, if they could
be procured despite their scarcity, made summers even more unbearably hot and provided little
comfort from the cold. Catherine Neville remembers sending boots to a friend hastily shipped

26

“No Longer Forgotten: African American Servicewomen During the Korean War Era” (online at
http://www.womensmemorial.org/H&C/Exhibits/afamkoreaexhibit/afamkoreasplash.html). At a May 1951 WAC
Staff Advisors Conference, Lt. Colonel Marie Clark, the advisor for the Far East, reported that “WACS in the Far
East Command are being efficiently utilized in assignments heretofore believed by some could only be performed
by male personnel.” Quoted in Morden, The Women’s Army Corps, 107.
27
At least one Army nurse, Major Genevieve Smith, died as a result of her service in theater when the plane
carrying her to Korea crashed. Sarnecky, A History of the U.S. Army Nurse Corps, 303.
28
Sarnecky, A History of the U.S. Army Nurse Corps, 307 and “With the Army Nurse Corps in Korea,” American
Journal of Nursing 51:6 (June 1951), 387.

245

over to Korea without warm enough clothing for the frigid winter temperatures.29 Life for
women in Korea “was kind of rough.”30
Even in outlying parts of the theater of operations, servicewomen ran into unexpected,
even life altering difficulties. Though many servicemen, especially those who had become
wounded, revered military nurses and other female G.I.s, some did not. Recalling her wartime
service, Audrey Reid recounted that while overseas she was attacked twice by male members of
the U.S. Armed Forces. On Okinawa a soldier Reid knew sexually assaulted her and in Japan an
Air Force enlisted man who offered her a ride from the airport after a delayed flight attacked her.
Fearing she would be blamed, Reid reported neither incident. Only twenty years later did Reid
find the resolve to file a claim with the V.A., receiving a disability pension for post traumatic
stress disorder.31
Whether in Korea or elsewhere in the Far East, servicewomen faced long days and heavy
workloads. To accommodate the huge numbers of casualties, hospitals expanded almost beyond
their capacities. Hospital ships with room for about a hundred patients began stacking bunk beds
two and three tiers high to make room for five thousand patients and sixty-bed MASH units
somehow managed to service two hundred wounded and sick persons when the necessity arose.32
G.I.s from the battlefield came by ship, train, helicopter, bus, and ambulance and “they just kept
coming.”33 In some places, the civilians came too, infected with worms and tuberculosis or
29
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somehow injured as a result of the war.34 Without rest and sometimes without nourishment,
nurses stayed on duty for shifts lasting twelve, eighteen, or even more hours—however many it
took to care for those depending upon them.35 No matter how much time women put in, though,
they found it “just isn’t possible to get everything done.”36 When nurses finally laid down to
rest, they slept in their long johns, half ready for another wave of casualties or an early flight into
the zone to pick up medical evacuees. They hoped that the ambulances rumbling in or the
artillery in the background would rock them “to sleep in my Army cot from the
reverberations.”37
Caring for wounded and dying American G.I.s had a profound effect on servicewomen in
theater. In the field and in operating rooms and wards they witnessed scenes that would haunt
them for life. Commander Emery of the U.S.S. Repose wrote a letter home describing her
patients, “eyes shot, legs shot off. And others half dead with abdominal wounds.” She went on
to tell about a soldier who had been taken prisoner, “tied to a tree and had both eyes shot out.”38
Commander Haire took note of the appearance of Marine casualties brought out of combat.
“They came in unshaven, dirty, looking about forty years old. And most of them are still in their
teens.”39 For Anita Bean, the image of “burnt bodies” would be the one she could not shake and
carried with her out of Korea.40 At the time, most nurses felt like they could “just sit down and
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cry for them [American G.I.s], if I had the time.”41 Many women, like Julia Baxter, did allow
themselves a few tears. “When I first went to Korea, each soldier that came in the operating
room seemed like my brother. It took a little while to get over that. We did a little crying, then
got back to work.”42 As much witnesses to the carnage of the battlefield and the “vivid
inhumanity of war” as the men who fought it, servicewomen stationed in the Far East wondered
“what people in America would do if they had to go through some of the things that you would
see in the war.”43 As they well knew, the experience was nearly impossible to forget. Time
might dull some of the feelings of fear and remorse, but “the smell and sights do not leave
you.”44
Despite the hardships of working or living in the war zone, American servicewomen
frequently ended their tours of duty with a great sense of personal satisfaction.45 In country they
had met successfully the challenges set before them, saved lives, learned new skills, and fulfilled
their duty to country. They discovered “where some of my weaknesses were, where some of my
strengths were … and grew from that experience, both as a nurse and as a person.”46 Also, just
like men who forged deep bonds in the midst of battle, women in Korea formed lasting and
binding friendships unlike any they would “have again in your life.” As war veterans, they
became aware that “you can never fully share these things with civilians as they can’t possibly
understand where you’ve been or what you have done or what it all feels like.” But, they joined
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an exclusive and special sisterhood of veterans in which others unequivocally “know how you
feel and who you are.”47

Race and the War

For the most part, the United States Armed Forces began the Korean War just as they had
begun every war since the American Revolution, racially segregated. Despite Truman’s 1948
Executive Order 9981 mandating an end to discrimination in the military, segregation remained
rampant. Prior to the Korean War, the Air Force had begun phasing out segregated units, the
Marine Corps and Army had flirted with integrating some types of training, and racial
restrictions barring African Americans from certain jobs and technical schools within the Army
had been eliminated.48 But, especially in the Marine Corps and Army, racial prejudices in both
the upper echelons and lower ranks resulted in the continuance of all-black or in some instances
all-Puerto Rican units. Thus at the outset of the war, black men, whether or not they had trained
in mixed outfits, often ended up serving in segregated units overseas.49
In theater, as at home, life in all-black units proved anything but “separate but equal” for
the men stuck in them. First, there existed the matter of reputation. The American military and
press generally accepted the belief that blacks could not perform as well in combat as whites,
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writing them off as unreliable and cowardly. Early reports of the all-black 24th Infantry
Regiment in Korea reinforced these stereotypes, alleging that black soldiers “melt into the night”
only to return the next day with tales of getting lost.50 White troops fighting alongside the
regiment disgustedly recounted how “blacks bugged out and left their artillery in place” and
“made the black soldiers targets of racist remarks and actions.”51 Though less than exemplary
behavior characterized both black and white units sent into the war zone in July or August of
1950 before adequately prepared and equipped, derision fell disproportionately upon African
Americans.52 Keenly aware of this, many blacks in Korea tried “to prove ourselves as equal to—
or better than—the white soldiers.” They decided that, “We could not let ourselves down…We
couldn’t let our race down. We couldn’t afford to fail.”53 And, many believed that they
succeeded. They “had gone into combat and had fought well” and “given an even chance, we
could out-soldier and out-fight any white soldier.”54 Occasionally, as in May 1951 when a white
captain brought the men under his command to see an all-black Ranger unit, telling them “This is
what happens when men don’t panic,” black troops received the praise that they craved.55 But,
even long after Yechon, the earliest victory of the war and one for which courageous black
troops deserved most of the credit, blacks had reason to complain that “Whitey would never
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acknowledge all our deeds of honor” and point out their discouragement “that no other papers
outside of our own have been willing to give them [black troops] credit.”56
Given prevailing prejudices, few whites relished the idea of commanding all-black
troops. Not only did they assume African American soldiers or Marines to be less competent
than white ones, but they viewed such an assignment as “the worst thing that can happen to him
in the military,” a “dead end” for their careers.57 Consequently, segregated units too often
became a “dumping ground” for officers unwanted in white units but less than committed to their
new black ones.58 Also, despite Samuel Stouffer’s landmark study on American soldiers in
World War II, which showed that blacks unequivocally preferred to serve under northern rather
than southern whites, the Korean War military continued to assign white Southerners to
leadership positions in units like the 24th Infantry Regiment with the idea that they had more
experience dealing with people of color.59 Southern-born or not, many of the white officers
assigned to black units served diligently and faithfully, but more than a few went into the job
with a “patronizing expectation of failure” and others were simply “outright racist sons of
bitches.”60 One commander in the 24th decided to make the men “mad enough to fight” by
telling them how bad they were and other officers in the regiment routinely ridiculed the men in
their charge rather than encouraging them.61 In a similar vein, appointed to replace Colonel Juan
Cesar Cordero Davila as the regimental commander of the all-Puerto Rican 65th Infantry
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Regiment after the Battle for Outpost Kelly, Colonel Chester B. DeGavre, a white West Point
graduate, ordered all the men under him to “shave their moustaches ‘until such a time as they
gave proof of their manhood’” and made some of them wear signs reading “I am a coward.”62 It
certainly crossed the minds of black soldiers that the same officer leading them in Korea “could
be the very one that put a rope around one of our necks next year someplace in the States” or
might be “the very one to deny us the very rights that we are here fighting for the South Koreans
to enjoy.” At least amongst themselves, black troops asked, “How can they wonder why we
don’t trust them? Would they trust us if they were in our place?”63
Making matters worse, African Americans found it difficult to rise in rank. In segregated
units, the Armed Forces tended to appoint white officers and pass over blacks when it came time
for promotions, giving men the impression, “If you were black, to occupy the position of platoon
sergeant or first sergeant it was mission impossible.”64 After integration, the problem persisted.
“While Blacks and whites fought, slept, and ate together in Korea there was not a corresponding
sharing of parity in terms of promotions and quality of MOS’s.”65 Despite some breakthroughs,
most blacks found themselves trapped on the lower rungs of the military ladder in infantry,
service, or supply outfits rather than climbing up in personnel services, intelligence, or the
officer corps. Now willing to allow African Americans to fight, the military exposed a slightly
higher percentage of them to combat than their white counterparts.66 Blacks drew the worst
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assignments and found little redress despite complaints.67 And, entering the officer corps did not
provide any guarantees of equal treatment anyway. In Dan Grimes’ platoon, the first lieutenant
was a black medical doctor whom the Army had assigned as an infantry platoon leader.68 Still,
when African Americans managed to secure promotions, they felt that they had beaten the odds
and rejoiced that they had won “a battle in the continuing war against Jim Crow.”69
Hindered by ineffective leadership, a lack of trust between officers and enlisted men,
poor morale, and the general unpreparedness typical of all American units in the early months of
the war, black troops perhaps did not perform as well in combat as they might otherwise have
done, and many individuals suffered grave consequences because of it. By the end of 1950,
officers of the 24th had made complaints against 118 G.I.s in their care. Of the 82 which led to
courts-martial, 54 accused African Americans of displaying misbehavior before the enemy,
namely cowardice. With only 8 white soldiers charged with the same offense, African
Americans concluded that “the Army’s policy was to punish Negroes more harshly than white
soldiers. … It was common knowledge that Negroes went to trial for offenses that were only
winked about when perpetrated by white soldiers.”70 The findings of the all-white investigating
officers and the all-white Inspector-General Judge Advocate’s Office staff seemed to bear out
these suspicions. Thirty-two blacks were convicted and sentenced to death, life, or 5 to 50 years
hard labor. At the same time, courts-martial found only 2 of the 8 whites guilty as charged.
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Convinced that they had been railroaded, several of the accused appealed to the NAACP for
assistance with their defense. As chief legal counsel of the NAACP, Thurgood Marshall arrived
in Tokyo to conduct his own investigation and represent the men on appeal. Initially denied
entrance by General MacArthur’s office, Marshall ultimately concluded that “the condemned
men had been the victims of deep-seated racial prejudice.”71 Eventually the NAACP succeeded
in getting “reduced sentences or reversed convictions for most of the men it defended, but these
cases illuminated the discrepancies between ideals and practice in a society plagued by
racism.”72
Stateside, the black press followed stories of the condemned men closely, especially the
case of Leon Gilbert whose death sentence President Truman commuted, and a lively discourse
played out in the editorials. Some wanted to know, “Was Gilbert the only soldier or officer to
crack under the strain? What happened to the whites who broke and ran?”73 Others hit home the
point that “the treatment of the Negro troops in Korea is serving as a highlight of the oppression
of the whole Negro people in America.”74 A few, though, decided that it would have been better
for Gilbert if he’d just died instead of living to lower the morale of other soldiers “who
erroneously believe that he was mistreated.”75 All in all, however, most black readers, no matter
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how they felt about the individuals involved in the courts-martial, wanted the stigma of poor
service “removed from their sons.”76 So did the men serving in Korea and Japan, whether or not
they read the articles published in their absence.
In theater, the perception that African Americans were being unfairly targeted by officers
for courts-martial merely added to the discontent of black servicemen which continued to fester
throughout the conflict. Serving America overseas, blacks reflected that “colored Americans are
dying in Korea today for less than a square deal.”77 Back home, especially in the South, the
same country that now expected them to make grave sacrifices for it relegated them to second
class citizenship. William Weathersbee recalled that “We were ‘boys.’ No one ever referred to
us as ‘men.’” And when his all-black Airborne Ranger Company, the 2nd, left for Korea, they had
to enter through the back door of the Columbia, Georgia train depot while the all-white 4th
strolled through the front. “We were going to Korea together, but we couldn’t go through the
train station together. … We couldn’t travel together in the civilian world.”78 Similarly, with
orders for Korea in his pocket, a Kansas restaurant refused to serve Air Force officer John Smith
and his fiancée, telling them, “We’ll fix you some sandwiches and you can pick them up in a
brown bag at the back door.”79
News from home confirmed that nothing had changed since they left.80 Along with a
clipping about his meritorious service in Korea, Charles Dryden’s wife included a letter detailing
how their four year old daughter had been separated from other children and given different food
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at nursery school because of her color.81 Wives and mothers of men fighting in Korea had to
band together in Milwaukee, Wisconsin to overcome discrimination in hiring at factories and
businesses, their advocates pointing out that blacks “are doing a good job of fighting for
democracy, but these women are denied a chance to work.”82 In Carthage, North Carolina, three
men who raped a soldier’s nineteen year old wife while he fought in Korea got off with a
sentence of 16-24 months in what the black press termed “Dixie justice.”83 And, as always,
African Americans continued to be lynched back in the States, a sharp and painful reminder to
men on the battlefield of “the racist attitudes of some of our fellow Americans back home.” As
one veteran points out, “It always left a bitter taste in my mouth, especially after viewing the torn
bodies of comrades who maybe an hour or so earlier had been fighting at my side but now lay
dead all around me.”84
Even in the military and in the war zone, plenty of things reminded black soldiers and
Marines of their status. In a 1951 scandal involving Confederate flags hanging from Army
tanks, Hunt Clement, Jr., the spokesman for the Secretary of Defense, ignored U.S. Army
regulations forbidding the private use of “official, personal, or organizational flags” and asserted
that “There is no policy on the display of that particular flag.”85 Almost a year later the Army
gave permission to the 31st Infantry Division band to wear Confederate uniforms because the
rebel gray “represents the regional origin of the division which enjoys all the heritage of the
‘Deep South’ from which the division comes.”86 Worse yet, rebel flags fluttered in abundance in
Korea and the Red Cross continued to label blood by race until faced with protests by United
81
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Nations employees.87 In Japan, General Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters sported a plethora of
Jim Crow signs and “the ‘great man’ did absolutely nothing to clean up his command.”88 In the
zone of operations, black men regardless of training and expertise often ended up unloading
munitions in Pusan or working at some other “job beneath my training and intelligence.”89
Symbolic of the low esteem in which the American military and society held “tan soldiers,” the
all-black 24th Infantry Regiment and the all-Puerto Rican 65th Infantry Regiment became the first
and only units to be disbanded and have their colors rolled while members continued to fight on
the battleground.
Confronted with such harsh realities, black troops suffered from low morale and
questioned their role in America’s latest fight for democracy. On a personal level they
wondered, “Why should the black man fight when he’s not free?”90 And they “felt they were
stupid to risk their lives unduly because when they got home they didn’t have the rewards
citizenship should have provided.”91 They were “supposedly fighting to protect the freedom of
American society, even as that freedom was denied us in our own country.”92 About the war,
African Americans in uniform asked, “Can we as leaders of the ‘free world’ tell anyone about
democracy when we have organizations like the Ku Klux Klan running people out of certain
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places because of their color?”93 Undoubtedly a few agreed with activists back home who
suggested that Korea “is not the Negro war” and that the Army integrated only so it could
continue to use African Americans in its “fight to reduce other colored people to the same status
as Negroes.”94 Contrasting the enemy with fellow Americans, black soldiers did not always find
common cause with their countrymen. “Have the communists ever enslaved our people? Have
they ever raped our women? Have they ever castrated our fathers, grandfathers, uncles, or
cousins?”95 Blacks had “had to fight for the right to fight,” but now many pondered just where
and against whom that struggle should be—in Korea against the North Koreans and Chinese or
back in the United States against Jim Crow and second class citizenship.96
Even so, manpower needs on the Korean front pushed the military to integrate units in
country, chipping away at some of the walls separating Americans of different colors.
Commanders of all-white units on the line, faced with heavy casualties and in dire need of
replacements, began to grab men to fill their ranks without regard to race. In August 1950, the 9th
Infantry of the 2nd Infantry Division already had two black officers and 89 black enlisted men
and by December the division had absorbed so many African Americans that they composed
roughly 11% of its troops.97 Convinced of the practicality of this ad hoc, unauthorized
integration, other outfits followed suit so that by the time General Matthew Ridgway replaced
Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander he could see firsthand the smooth transition to
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mixed units in the field and the underlying potential for greater efficiency in the use of
manpower. On May 14, 1951, Ridgway requested permission to abolish segregation in the Far
East Command and shortly thereafter it became policy to assign men individually to
understrength units based on nothing more than military occupational specialty.98
As early as the fall of 1951, changes could be felt. Not only did the Army deactivate the
24th, but the Marine Corps cancelled its last all-black unit designation. Almost 20% of blacks in
the war zone were serving in units experiencing integration and a fair number of whites had been
assigned to predominantly black units with black officers and NCOs.99 Also, National Guard
units like the Oklahoma 45th, initially exempted from integration, began accepting African
American replacements while in theater.100 With desegregation proving a great success on the
battleground, raising morale among black troops and streamlining the channels delivering men to
the field, officials in the Armed Forces began to lean toward full integration worldwide.101 That
would take some time, however. Not until September 1953 could the Army announce that 90%
of its black strength was serving in integrated units and the Secretary of Defense could not
proclaim the abolition of the last segregated unit of the Armed Forces until October 30, 1954.
As late as 1955 the Navy continued to shuttle more than half of its African Americans into the
Stewards’ Branch, prompting Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. of the Committee on
Education and Labor to inform the Assistant Secretary to the Navy for Air that “No one is
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interested in today’s world in fighting communism with a frying pan or shoe polish.”102
Although the Korean War did not turn out to be a fully integrated war as did Vietnam later, it
provided a testing ground for integration, bringing thousands of Americans of different colors
and ethnicities into close contact with one another for the first time. From the President to the
top brass to the lowliest privates to the loved ones back home, everyone watched with the same
questions in their eyes: How would this experiment work and what changes, if any, would it
bring?
Both hope and apprehension surrounded decisions to integrate the military. Officials
optimistically recalled the end of World War II when black and white infantrymen fought side by
side in Germany and “such a policy is working.”103 Soldiers had accepted the situation quickly.
As one white platoon sergeant from South Carolina admitted, “When I heard about it, I said I’d
be damned if I’d wear the same shoulder patch they did. After that first day when we saw how
they fought, I changed my mind. They’re just like any of the other boys to us.”104 It had not
mattered then who was “firing next to you when you’re both killing Krauts,” and the military had
every expectation that the same would prove true for Americans fighting the communists in this
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war.105 Many African Americans viewed desegregation in country as a stepping stone on the
path to respect or even equality. If they fought well and whites saw them fight well then there
would be “no way they could justify their racist attitudes toward their fellow American comrades
in war or peace.”106 Blacks expected that “When the white boys get back and tell of their
experience with the colored over here…that will help some.”107 Then, “our struggles and
sacrifices for freedom in Korea would result correspondingly in a larger measure of freedom,
dignity, and opportunity for our loved ones at home.”108 On the line in Korea, weary soldiers
and Marines were ready to welcome more men and “didn’t care who, what, or where they came
from—we needed help.”109 “We could use all the men we could get. The overriding thought
was that, white or Negro, a Marine was a Marine.”110 They saw “no reason why the white boys
should be fighting and the others not doing their share.”111 And, the more troops that flowed into
the war zone, the better chance one had of surviving and rotating out when the time came.
Still, members of both races had misgivings. General Mark Clark believed that all-white
units were the most effective and accepted desegregation only because “Negroes…demonstrably,
cannot or will not fight effectively as all-Negro units, [so] there is really no choice…except to
insert small percentages of them into white units.”112 Similarly, many white soldiers presumed
that “black soldiers were not reliable and [in] many cases [were] a liability” and they “did not
105

White NCO quoted by Truman K. Gibson, Jr., at a press conference, 9 April 1945, Box 1, “Desegregation of the
Armed Forces,” folder 4, CFSOKW.
106
Morrow, What’s a Commie Ever Done to Black People?, 35.
107
Negro Infantryman in Bogart, Project Clear, 129.
108
Banks, “The Korean Conflict,” 132.
109
Richard W. Bass, Army Service (Korean War) Questionnaire, 5, 23rd Regiment, Alphabetical Box 1, Department
of the Army, Carlisle Barracks.
110
Owen, Colder Than Hell, 6.
111
A regimental executive officer in Leo Bogart, ed., Project Clear: Social Research and the Desegregation of the
United States Army (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992), 33.
112
Mark W. Clark, “Negro Battalions ‘Weakened Battle Line,’” U. S. News and World Report XL (May 11, 1956),
55. Clark also remarked after the war that he did not believe “we should integrate then (1950) and I do not think so
now.” “Pentagon Aide Refutes Clark on Negro GIs,” New York Post, 30 April 1956, 4.

261

trust them to stay and fight.”113 If the rumors were true, more soldiers did not mean an
improvement in their situation and they would be better off waiting for white replacements,
however long it took. For their part, African Americans sometimes feared joining white units
where they might suffer from discrimination or lose the comfortable positions that they had held
in segregated units.114 As one enlisted man said, “I would rather be in a colored unit for the
simple reason I don’t like them (white people). I would rather be with colored people all the
time. You can’t always trust a white man.”115 And, many African Americans thought that even
if integration functioned smoothly in the war zone, the gains in race relations would not last. “It
might work in Korea. White man is your friend as long as you’re protecting his ass. In the States
and over here it’s different. When the white man think he out of danger then he will act
different.”116 In the end, though, it did not really matter how men felt about the idea of serving
in a mixed outfit. Like most decisions since they mustered into the service, the military would
make this one for them. Trained to obey orders, Government Issue in black, brown, yellow,
white, red, or olive drab would do as told.
Once a unit integrated, things could be tense for a while. Having been raised on opposite
sides of the color line, real differences existed between African American and white troops and
both possessed deep-seated prejudices. In general, whites objected to the way that blacks used
the word “motherfucker” in a “freewheeling manner,” noticed uncomfortable dissimilarities “like
the way they think about women, like their education and bringing up,” and had little regard for
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black culture or capability.117 Influenced by the reputation of all-black units in Korea, they
shunned the idea of incorporating non-white elements into their ranks. Who wanted to be
saddled with men who would simply bug out at the first hint of trouble?118 Furthermore, many
whites strongly objected to serving under black officers, declaring, “We ain’t letting those
niggers run us!”119 In instances where white Southerners made up a large percentage of an
outfit, officers had to be particularly careful in making command and bunker assignments
because “the distrust between the Southerner and the black man was still evident.”120 African
Americans put into previously all-white units understandably often felt uncomfortable at first.
Beverly Scott remembers the cool reception he received when transferring from the 24th.
Although a communications officer, badly needed everywhere along the line, each unit he came
to claimed to have no vacancies for his specialty. Finally accepted by a primarily Hispanic
outfit, Scott found other officers unfriendly and was passed over for the position of company
executive officer although he outranked the other lieutenants.121 The first black in his unit,
Ronald Johnson remembers, “I caught hell. Constant fights, verbal abuse and did not feel that I
belonged.”122 Others observed that “a few of the regulars were still a little too ‘cracker’”123 Put
into mostly black units, whites did not fare much better. They “had a sort of funny feeling, kind
of out of place” and got “trouble from a few belligerent people.”124 Occasionally when blacks
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and whites were shuffled together, riots erupted, such as in Tokyo in 1953 where a scuffle
between different colored soldiers “over the merits of their respective combat units” led to a
brawl in which several men were injured.125 Such incidents proved rare, however. On balance
most integrating units in country could claim, “We had not one racial difficulty.”126 At most,
troops of different races tended to congregate separately when possible instead of mixing
unnecessarily.127
Given time, men in mixed units usually came to look beyond race when judging their
comrades. In civilian life, people of a different color “were an unknown equation and subject to
what we observed and heard from our parents and neighbors.”128 But, jumbled together aboard
ship or in foxholes, men (and women) in the war zone “got to know each other” as individuals
and their attitudes changed.129 Whites “found that the more time I spent with them [blacks] the
less prejudice I had” and discovered “that a colored man is just as good as a white.”130 Blacks
saw that “these ‘fay [white] boys ain’t so bad to get along with. I find them no different from
other folks.” Even men with more deeply rooted racial biases came to respect the men with
whom they served. One white infantryman declared, “I didn’t like niggers nohow, but now I
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think there are some exceptions who are good as white men.” Similarly, a black enlisted man
noted, “I hate white people. Now if all white people were like the boys in this company, it
wouldn’t take long before everybody would get along swell.”131 The familiarity with persons of
different races fostered by military service in the Korean War helped many Americans
understand that a person’s worth and character depended more upon “what their background is”
than on the pigmentation of their skin and they came to believe, “If men would get used to each
other as we do here, there’d be no trouble anywhere about race.132
On the fighting front, transformations happened even more quickly and completely than
behind the lines. With a real enemy just across no-man’s land or over the next ridge, time simply
did not exist for racism. Men “were too busy…to entertain race problems.”133 “When you
jumped into a foxhole for cover, you weren’t thinking about the color of the fellow next to you.
That was the least of your concerns.”134 Also, combat forced men to depend upon one another
for survival, ensuring that “one’s main concern [with another] was how well he could do the job
assigned….Whether a guy was black or white was way down on any list, if at all.”135 Whites
might have harbored fears that blacks would perform poorly when it mattered most, but in reality
they proved “no better—or worse—than the rest of us” and most men in integrated units decided,
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“I don’t think there is any difference between white and colored in combat.” 136 As Gilbert
Pfleger puts it, “Black man shot Chinese who was about to shoot me in back. Need I say
more?”137 Sharing the experience of the battlefield, African Americans and whites formed the
same kinds of unbreakable bonds that men of the same color did. They became family. “We
were like real brothers.”138 As such, they wrote letters to each other’s mothers, stood up for each
other when outsiders seemed to be dishing out unfair or unequal treatment, and risked their own
lives to protect each other.139 In perhaps the most famous example of interracial camaraderie
during the Korean War, Lt. Thomas J. Hudner, Jr., a white pilot, deliberately crashed his own
plane in an effort to rescue Ensign Jesse L. Brown, the first African American to fly a carrier
combat mission. Brown died where he had landed, but the men of the Leyte did not forget him.
They donated $3000 of their own money to a trust to provide Brown’s infant daughter Pamela
with an education.140 Such friendships promised a new future not just for the men involved but
for the country which sent them together into the furnace of war.
Whether in integrated detachments or not, service in the Korean War Theater provided
many African Americans with their first taste of life untainted by Jim Crow laws and customs.
Segregation did exist in some places in Japan, but, particularly in Korea, G.I.s of every color
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“were free to utilize all public facilities and accommodations.”141 They socialized with white
friends, knocking back a few beers, killing time playing poker, or sitting down and shooting “the
shit…for three or four hours.”142 At Yokota Air Base, blacks and whites not only flew and
worked together, but they frequented the same “O” Clubs and visited socially in one another’s
homes.143 In Gifu, Japan blacks readily mixed with a willing local population without arousing
racial tensions.144 With such liberties available to them, blacks “felt freer in a foreign land than
in the land of our birth.”145 Some felt so free in fact that they did not want to leave when it came
their turn. A few passed up rotation because “we are not sure…that we want to be reassigned to
the United States.”146 And, in the exchange of prisoners of war, several black Americans chose
to stay with the Chinese, at least until such time as conditions improved for African Americans
back home.147 More often, though, African American troops, like their white counterparts,
eagerly returned to the United States, many with a newfound determination to secure changes
back home.
After the war, James C. Evans, the Assistant on Racial Matters to the Secretary of the
Army, pronounced “The greatest victory we had in Korea was the integrated use of our
manpower.”148 Militarily, Evans was right. Desegregation not only deepened the pool of
replacements from which battered front line units could draw men, but resulted in “significant
141
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improvements in the performance of Negro soldiers.”149 In integrated units, blacks often had
better leadership, more supplies, and the feeling that maybe their service to the United States
would result in something more than disappointment when they returned home. As a result they
fought better. Also, African American participation proved something of a psychological coup
in a war that the enemy would have liked to have cast in racial terms.150
Socially, however, Korean War efforts at integration produced a mixed legacy.
Certainly, close contact led individuals to develop intimate relationships with people of different
skin tones and the memory of wartime interracial friendships translated into a shared willingness
to tolerate or even support attempts at achieving racial equality back in the States.151 Passing
through the Dallas, Texas airport on his way back from Korea, Sidney Berry remembers seeing
separate water fountains for blacks and whites. Having had a very close African American
friend in Korea “that dramatically brought home to me that I was going back to my native South
with its goddamned injustice… [and that experience] solidified my resentment of racial
injustice.”152 Even if they couldn’t support social integration entirely, cracks in the proscriptions
against the social mixture of the races could be seen among troops who served in integrated units
in Korea. Asked if he would take a black man home, one white enlisted soldier replied that he
would not, except for his friend in the tent. “Oh, that’s different. He’s just like any of the other
boys. I’d take him home. I wouldn’t think of treating him any different. He’s a buddy of mine.”
Similarly, a white infantryman resisted the idea that he would hang out with blacks back home
because “No girl’d go out with me if I hung around with the black boys.” But, he clarified that
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with regard to his African American friends from Korea, “That’s different. I owe them
something for sticking with me. They’re swell guys and I wouldn’t let them down. I’d do
anything for them….But even so, maybe, I’d have to be careful.”153
Despite such shifts in thinking, the camaraderie among men of different races fell far
short of a revolution in American race relations. Sometimes men went back to their old ways
even before they reached America’s shores. One African American remembers how on the ship
home he came across a white G.I. whom he had carried injured off the battlefield. When he tried
to remind the man of their encounter, the soldier insultingly cut him short, saying “I know who
you are boy.”154 When G.I.s returned to Georgia or Mississippi, they found that old habits
remained the accepted ones among friends and family who continued to see the world in the
same terms as before the war, in black and white. And, returning after a long and emotionally
exhausting tour of duty in the war zone, many Americans simply wanted to fit back into their old
lives somehow, even if that meant leaving the fight for social justice in America for another time
or another generation. The Korean War softened men and women to the notion of racial
equality, making them more likely to accept the goals of the coming Civil Rights Movement, but
it did not necessarily bring that movement into being.
Long after 1953, military service continued to offer African Americans their best shot at
equality. Unlike American society at large, the Armed Forces during and after the war began a
steady process of desegregating the various aspects of life, including housing and schools. In the
end, that perhaps proved the most enduring legacy of the Korean War era. The rewarding nature
of military service encouraged blacks to make the Army, Air Force, Navy, or Marines a career
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and as they did so their expectations and the expectations of those with whom they worked
changed.155 Accustomed to working together, it became difficult for soldiers of different races or
nationalities to envision living in a segregated world. As veterans rejoined the ranks of civilians
they brought with them a new vision of what America could and should become.
While integration and the resulting mixture of black and white troops in Korea consumes
most of the literature on race, it should be noted that the same sorts of interactions took place
between white and black Americans and Hawaiians, Chinese-Americans, Native Americans,
Puerto Ricans, South Koreans, Turks, Japanese, and many other peoples throughout the war.
And, just as with relations between blacks and whites, sometimes interactions went well and
sometimes they did not. For example, American G.I.s generally considered South Korean troops
undependable and tended to show little respect for them. They put KATUSA replacements to
work carrying heavy loads of ammunition or supplies, doing laundry, polishing boots, or
cleaning rifles.156 This lack of regard sometimes caused problems for anyone who appeared
Korean. The American driver of a truck, mistaking Bertram Sebresos for a South Korean,
refused to give him a ride until told, “I’m a GI too” and a white soldier tried to make Harrison
Lee, a G.I. from Hawaii, do his laundry. Back at his unit after being treated at a battalion aid
station where a doctor thought he was a “yobo,” an ROK soldier, and made him wait six hours
for assistance, two G.I.s assaulted Sergeant Clarence Young, trying to steal his jacket until he
fired his M-1 in their direction and the captain set them straight on his status as an American
soldier.157
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But, just as white and black men had grown familiar with one another, so too they learned
to live amongst people seldom encountered before the war. Those who served with KATUSA
units became impressed with the diligence and dedication of ROK soldiers and men in outfits
with different nationalities came to look beyond the features of one’s skin or face. As Ben
Nighthorse Campbell, a Native American senator from Colorado, remarked long after his Korean
War service, “There was a camaraderie [in the Air Force] that transcends ethnicity when you
serve your country overseas in wartime.”158 In Korea, men learned “to understand people who
are different from you….By working and fighting alongside these peoples of different colors,
creeds, and backgrounds we are, at the same time I hope, beginning to learn how we may better
live with them.”159 Imbued with the ability to generate such feelings in participants, perhaps the
Korean War was for all Americans, black or white, male or female, their fight after all.
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CHAPTER 6: COMING HOME
“We returned from battle, picked up our lives, went back to work, raised our families, and melted into the
mainstream of society.”—Harold Mulhausen, veteran.1
“We melted into society and did our best to get on with our lives. We were a different breed of American
fighting man. …We kept our war stories to ourselves unless we were with another veteran, or had a loving
wife to comfort us if the memories got too rough.”—Rudolph Stephens, veteran.2
“After my war/Nobody asked me what I felt—/Regret, mostly.”—From a poem by Ronald Landry, veteran.”3
“On the train from San Francisco to San Diego, I thought, I survived, I’m alive. What more could I want?”—
Floyd Baxter, veteran.4

When 2nd Lieutenant Edmund Krekorian returned home from Korea, the city of Seattle
welcomed him and others aboard the troopship in grand style. Marine Corsairs escorted the ship
to the harbor, flying off in victory rolls as a happy chorus of boat horns and whistles joined the
shouts of hundreds of people gathered on the pier. There, Miss Seattle waited with a bouquet of
flowers to meet the men as a band played “The Star Spangled Banner.”5 Also returning by way
of Seattle, Russell Rodda recalls most vividly the beautiful girls in bathing suits sent to greet the
returnees. As he walked down the gangplank, one of them hugged and kissed him and thanked
him for doing his duty.6 Treated to “dancing girls, in net stockings and 12-inch skirts,” 185
Thunderbirds of the Oklahoma 45th could scarcely turn their attention to the crowds tossing
confetti and streamers and shouting “They’re home, they’re home, they’re home!”7 In San
Francisco, Anthony De Angelis enjoyed a similar reception. Tug boats came out to greet the
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veterans with water salutes and once they had docked, civilians tossed beer up to the men while
WACs boarded to carry their duffle bags off the ship.8 Greeted in World War II fashion, these
men of Korea “felt good for the first time in a year!”9 “You just can’t imagine how excited and
how happy, and the tears and the laughter and the, you know, you’re home! H-O-M-E, home!”10
Unfortunately, as the war in Korea progressed and as troopships brought men and women
back with more regularity, the nation’s interest soon waned and homecomings became a matter
of routine rather than cause for celebration.11 Most of those who fought and served in the Far
East do not remember grandiose displays of gratitude upon reentering the country, but instead
passing under the Golden Gate Bridge or pulling into the harbor to find “no bands, no cheering
crowds, and no tickertape parade.”12 Like Floyd Baxter, they wondered, “Where are all the
people?”13 Remembering the heroes’ welcomes given many World War II veterans, they had
expected something more than a few scattered relatives and maybe a Red Cross worker or two on
the dock. They were “in for a rude awakening.”14 Stationed on the hospital ship Haven, one
nurse recalls the excitement of the wounded men on board. Those “who could wear shoes were
shining them up to a brightness that dazzled the eyes” in anticipation of impressing the onlookers
whom they assumed to be awaiting their arrival. Lined up in stretchers for the landing, they
looked eagerly for well-wishers. Sadly, “only a handful of apprehensive relatives and somber
8
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ambulances” had turned out to see them home after their “many long, pain-ridden months”
away.15 Thousands of others suffered the same disappointment. “When we arrived, after all we
had been through, all we had seen, all we had done in the line of duty, we were met only by the
Red Cross. They gave us donuts and coffee. And, that was our homecoming.”16
Whether received warmly or not at all by the country that had shipped them off to war,
one relative always awaited returnees as they disembarked—Uncle Sam. Men and women might
have completed their tours of duty overseas, but often they still owed the military days or months
of service before they could officially muster out of the ranks.17 In any event, they had to
process out before heading home on a thirty day furlough to visit their families and friends.18
Like in-processing, out-processing required much patience on the part of servicemen and
women. Sent by train, bus, or convertible car convoy to places like Treasure Island, Camp
Stoneman, and Camp Kilmer, “everyone was forced to stand in long lines.” Moving from station
to station over three or four days, they received physical examinations, blood and urine tests,
“short arm” inspections, and shots and completed all the necessary paperwork.19 In some places,
everything was merely a formality, prompting complaints that “I was just turned loose…I didn’t
even know how to act around other people” and “The doctors did not give us real examinations.
I came home with damage[d] eyes due to a steam explosion and a tremendous ears sound, due to

15

Mrs. Lee in Frances Omori, Quiet Heroes: Navy Nurses of the Korean War, 1950-1953, Far East Command (St.
Paul, MN: Smith House Press, 2000), 135.
16
Roy T. Gray, “Sniper Duty,” 14, Box MMM, Folder A2202, CFSOKW.
17
Draftees, serving 21 to 24 months active duty entered the Reserves for five or six years and instead of getting a
discharge, they got a Certificate of Service and a reservist identification card. Carl Peterson, “Difference,” New
York Times, 23 August 1953, SM4.
18
Some National Guard troops got a few days home before processing. Officers of the Oklahoma 45th flew to
Rogers Field in Oklahoma and had 8 days to report to Ft. Sill where they would either be processed and returned to
inactive status or separated (if leaving the military) or receive a 30 day leave before their next duty station (if staying
in the military). “No Band, But Happy Families Are Plenty for 45th Arrivals,” Daily Oklahoman, 15 April 1952, 1.
19
Jack Right in Knox and Coppel, The Korean War: Uncertain Victory, 355 and Seymour Bernstein, Monsters and
Angels: Surviving a Career in Music (U.S.: Hal Leonard, 2002), 333.

274

the noise from firing my gun.”20 Bitterly, one POW asserts, “Those Americans interviewing us
after we were liberated never seemed to be that interested in our wounds or diseases. They really
weren’t interested in a damn thing except did we collaborate?”21
But, some processors took the job more seriously. Concerned that men who refused to
speak about their wartime experiences would end up with mental problems, the staff at Treasure
Island pulled “about every twentieth man…out of the line and told [him] to go to the talking
doctor.” They instructed veterans that “When we got home we should not be afraid to talk. If
someone asked us what happened overseas, we should go ahead and tell him.”22 Thomas Shay
had to attend classes for two weeks “just to know how to act, how to talk to people … [and] the
words to say….They told you how...it’s going to be eating supper…how to pass the potatoes
[and] how to treat a lady and the words you used.”23 The military made available to men who
had been held as prisoners of war booklets like “Welcome Back!” and “What Has Happened
Since 1950” to explain their responsibilities upon returning and catch them up on events that
they had missed.24 The services offered little else by way of debriefing or therapy to those just
returned from the war zone, instead reminding returnees at the various processing centers that at
least for the time being they were still Government Issue. In addition to dealing with red tape
and submitting to physical examinations, men and women once again began policing the area,
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serving on K.P. duty, picking up trash, and even drilling.25 Finally, though, unless doctors
determined that one needed further evaluation at a hospital or rehabilitation center, these new
veterans of the Korean War received their discharge or leave, their pay, and a ticket home.26
Once released, most returnees felt elated and could not wait to celebrate the end of their
war. On their way to the train station or airport, they stopped off at bars and restaurants, ready to
treat themselves to a first class meal or cocktail. If they got lucky, some civilian would slap
them on the back and say “We’re glad you’re back” and “Let me buy you a drink.” Ordering
steak, martinis, ice cream, and whatever else they fancied, veterans lived it up until time to
depart for home.27 A few even continued the festivities along the way. Changing trains in
Chicago, Frank Almy and a few pals stopped by a bar where the owner told the servicemen “our
money wasn’t any good there. We had all we could eat and drink on the house.”28 Men aboard a
seven car troop train headed for Ft. Sill began drinking heavily at the outset and then stopped the
train en route to purchase more liquor.29 For a while, excited returnees just wanted to say, “Hey,
here I am. Come on America, here I am, ready or not.” They didn’t “think about the incidentals”
that came with being back in the States because “for right now I’m home! ... There is no place
like home.”30
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However, even before reaching one’s hometown, jubilance could turn to uncertainty.
Very quickly it became apparent just how little thought ordinary Americans had given the war in
their absence. At a restaurant near Camp Carson, Colorado, Robert Baken told the waitress he
had been in Korea. Bewildered, she asked, “Korea, where’s that at?” He realized then that “half
the civilians in the United States didn’t know [where] Korea was at, and the other half didn’t care
where it was at.”31 Rotating out of a MASH in Korea, one nurse had reason to recall the words
of a friend stationed stateside, “The saddest part of this for you is nobody knows you’ve been
away or where you’ve been. You’ll know that when you get home. Nobody will notice it.”
Back in the United States she “just went back to duty someplace.”32 Indeed, a surprising number
of people seemed completely apathetic not just about the conflict but about those who had done
their patriotic duty and served in it. Guards unceremoniously tossed Peter Soderbergh out of the
Royal Hawaiian when he tried to see a show after his return and a bartender refused to serve
Curtis Morrow when he went for drinks with some white friends. Upon hearing “that the
bartender had refused to serve a black Korean War veteran,” MPs wrecked the place, but that
didn’t alter the fact that outside of the military a man’s service in Korea counted for little to
nothing.33 As one veteran reflects, “You expect that the people would be more concerned about
your service in Korea, but people showed indifference and were more concerned about their own
interests.”34 Not surprisingly, a few returnees came to think “that all the true Americans were in
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the service—that the outside was loaded with draft dodgers … [and] politicians who didn’t give
a damn about the people.”35
Recently removed from the war zone, men and women also came to a few unsettling
realizations about themselves before reaching their final destinations. While still entering the
straits of Seattle, one veteran had a “wave of uncontrolled grief and depression” wash over him
and he “felt overwhelming guilt that I had survived.”36 Thinking of Korea, another noted that he
had lost his best friend and nearly his life and “I know I lost myself, but no one cares. I am not
the same person who left here.”37 Using lots of cusswords in an interview, Jack Wright realized,
“My language wasn’t the type you spoke around your mom, but I forgot where I was.”38 Jack
Davis knew exactly how Wright felt. He was scared “to open my mouth for fear of what foul
language might come out.” In fact, Davis felt uncomfortable around “polite and civil” people
altogether regardless of their age or gender and he made them uncomfortable—a problem that
would continue for quite some time.39 On a plane with other soldiers, Edmund Krekorian felt
fine, but once civilians filled the seats around him he suddenly noticed “I had so very little in
common with these people whose primary conversation was limited to baseball and the movies.
They seemed to know very little about the war and cared less. … I was no longer secure or
comfortable. I fell asleep trying to imagine what my wife looked like.”40 Hoping for the best,
some veterans took comfort in the knowledge that “I was still myself and when I got home
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would fall back into patterns of behavior, maybe even be civilized again. War changed you but
you remained the same person.”41 Less sure, others wondered about their lives and thought, “I
survived, I’m alive. What more could I want?”42 Only time would tell.

Home

Returning to their home towns from the war zone, many service members, especially
servicemen, would have agreed with Dorothy in The Wizard of Oz that “There’s no place like
home.” Small towns in particular warmly welcomed their native sons and daughters. Even if
they did not host parades for the veterans, who often trickled home one or two at a time, there
might be welcome home dinners, invitations to speak at the local high school, press coverage, an
honorary police escort from the airport, the presentation of the key to the city by the mayor, or
something more tangible like a state bonus to mark their completion of duty.43 Some, like
Thomas Gaylets of Old Forge, Pennsylvania, relished the attention. “It was a great feeling to be
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home.”44 Others felt uncomfortable with all the fuss. Having seen too many comrades die and
too much misery, men who had served in combat often did not feel like conquering heroes and
POWs most assuredly felt out of place around hometown folk.45 “For the first time I was
someone else other than an EX POW or someone else from the military.”46 In such
circumstances, how was one supposed to act? A few men simply fled when friends or neighbors
stopped by to see them or made it known that they did not want any big to-dos to be given in
their honor.47
In many places, though, especially larger communities and metropolitan areas, returnees
did not have to worry about unwanted attention. “It was kind of like glad you’re home. That
was it. … I felt lonely.”48 All too often nobody other than wives or parents had even taken note
of their departures. As Harlee Lassiter puts it, “No one else seemed to have missed me very
much.”49 Seeing them again on the street or at the store, old acquaintances asked, “Where’ve
you been? I haven’t seen you around.”50 And, girlfriends quite plainly had moved on, getting
engaged or even married. Finding his old flame Elaine now married and pregnant, Barnett
Wilson concluded, “Not only didn’t she want to wait for me, she didn’t miss me, either!”51 The
same could be said of some spouses. As contemporary newspaper accounts reveal, more than a
44
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few men discovered that in their absence wives had sought comfort elsewhere.52 Believing their
husbands dead, the wives of some POWs had even remarried, creating a sticky and unpleasant
situation for men who had spent their captivity dreaming of nothing but home. Daniel Schmidt’s
wife, now married to Alfred Fine, suggested through a magazine reporter that Schmidt and Fine
should both woo her again so she could decide between them. Astonishingly, she also insisted
that Schmidt was lucky since “It’s better to come home and find your wife happily married than
running around with everybody.”53 Although perhaps more rare than instances of marital
infidelity, some veterans found relatives little interested in their return. Floyd Baxter’s brother
briefly met him at the train station but then quickly announced that he and his girlfriend had
“some place else to go.” Baxter reflected “that things would never be the same again.”54 Even if
they had not desired parades or parties, this was hardly the homecoming that most veterans
expected or wanted.
Except in a few cases, such as Baxter’s, those returning from the war at least could count
on members of their immediate family to provide some measure of reassurance that they had not
been forgotten completely. Mothers, fathers, wives, sons, daughters, sisters, and brothers all
turned out at train and bus depots to lovingly greet their own. Met at the station in Springfield by
his wife and kids, Arthur Kelly decided, “That’s all I needed. I didn’t need anybody else.”55
Once home, the signs that they had been missed proved unmistakable. Walking past all the
neighbors lined up on their front porches to stare and smile at him, former POW William Allen
finally reached his house, finding it almost unchanged. His mother had kept his room exactly as
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he left it. She also went to great lengths to make all of his favorite meals and, along with his
father, worked hard to not “say something wrong.”56 Jack Wright’s stepfather offered him
unlimited use of the family’s new Studebaker, saying nothing though Wright nearly tore it
apart.57 Numerous wives, having kept the faith for almost two years, cried real tears of joy upon
seeing their husbands again for the first time and did everything in their power to provide solace
and warmth.
Although most family members tried hard to make their husbands or sons and daughters
feel comfortable at home again, it quickly became apparent to almost everyone that adjustments
needed to be made. At first, fathers and mothers had difficulty accepting that the men before
them could no longer be viewed or treated as “their ‘high school boys’ who left home” and that
created problems. 58 Though their children might still appear young, their experiences had made
them no longer youthful. With his mind “drift[ing] back to my buddies still in Korea,” one
veteran “broke down and cried,” angrily rejecting his mother’s attempts at comfort by saying,
“No! You, or anyone else who was not there, can never understand what it was like.”59
Married just before soldiers shipped out for training or the war zone, some wives had to
learn to handle the problems and moodiness of unfamiliar husbands, uncertain whether this was
the man they married or the man the war made. Such was the case of one wife who expressed
horror when her soldier-husband used a new gun to kill a porcupine without reason. Unable to
feel guilt, he asked her, “What in the hell did you think I was doing for the last nine months?”
The incident marked the beginning of failure for the marriage.60 Relations could also be strained
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between husbands and wives who had been married longer. When John Pitre came home, he
noticed, “Life at home had changed. My wife was different.”61 Like couples who hardly knew
each other at all before a soldier’s deployment, they had to find ways to reconnect after months
or years of separation.62 Regrettably, many couples failed to piece their marriages back together,
eventually divorcing. Not able to deal with the guilt he felt about “the killings that I did during
the Korean War” or communicate with his family, Tony Velasquez endured a “tragic divorce
from my loving wife.”63 Korean War veterans, in fact, divorced at about twice the rate of men
who served in World War II and were 26% more likely to divorce than men of their generation
who didn’t serve at all.64 Some, like Gilbert Towner, a Marine who saw heavy combat in Korea,
divorced more than once, finding marital bliss only decades after the war or not at all.65
Men might have envisioned coming home and picking up their lives right where they had
left off, but that was seldom possible. Women, so recently expected to take care of the home and
make all the important decisions, found it difficult to relinquish control to a returning spouse.66
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They enjoyed managing the money, setting the rules, and doing as they pleased. Even wives
who wished for a return to the way things had been before the war could not always make that
happen. This proved especially true with regard to the care and discipline of children. For a
wife, two years was not a short while, but to children it was an eternity and many initially
refused to accept their fathers. Arthur Kelly’s three year old daughter ran and jumped into his
arms almost immediately, but his son ran halfway down the sidewalk toward him and then
doubled back to the house. Later, after having been chided by his father for flipping soup out
onto the table, Kelly’s son slammed the door in his face saying, “I told you to go back to
Korea.”67 Only eight months old when her father left, Charles Bussey’s two year old daughter
“didn’t know me” when he came back, referring to him as “that man.”68 Frightened of the father
she hadn’t seen since she was six weeks old, Lee Philmon’s two year old daughter didn’t stop
crying until he bought her a Coke.69 Before men could reestablish their position within the
family, they would have to mend relationships with spouses or children that barely knew them or
with aging parents, a daunting task requiring a more subtle and patient approach than some of
those who had survived the war zone could muster.70
Regardless, even if home no longer felt quite like home anymore, most men and women
returning from the war theater tried to make the best of things and get on with their lives. As
after World War II, many got married almost immediately. Ronald Ransom didn’t even wait for
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his 30-day leave to end before tying the knot and James Becker got hitched just two months after
his return. Harvey Moore, carried home from the war with only one leg, went A.W.O.L. from
Walter Reed Hospital to wed the 16-year old sister of his overseas service buddy in Camden,
New Jersey.71 Others worked on starting or enlarging their families. In addition to
accomplishing this in the old-fashioned way, a few remembered promises made in Korea or
Japan and adopted orphaned children that they had known and grown fond of there.72
Buying their way into the consumerism of the 1950s, returnees also made major
purchases after their return. Younger than the veterans who marched home from the Second
World War, and perhaps not yet ready to commit to anything as significant as a spouse, a
multitude of Korean War veterans spent savings and back pay on new cars to drive them through
bachelorhood or readjustment. And, thanks to the 1952 Veterans’ Readjustment Act which
guaranteed loans to veterans for real estate, about one third of Korean War era veterans had
somewhere to park their wheels as they purchased their first home before program benefits
expired in the 1960s.73 Others used the funds to buy businesses or farms. Like many
government programs, this one was laden with red tape and G.I.s complained of the difficulty of
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finding willing lenders and of the loan origination and other fees attached once they did.74 Black
veterans in particular had difficulty getting loans, being refused “for the most irrelevant reasons,”
such as speaking “to the wrong individual.”75 African Americans found it difficult to find places
to buy as well. Neighborhoods geared toward G.I. Bill customers, such as those built by the
Levitts, often enforced segregation.76 For those who managed to obtain loans, the government
financed 60% of a home up to $7500 and 50% of a business up to $2000 and sometimes offered
incentives.77 Before September 1, 1953, veterans could qualify for a gratuity payment of 4% of
the guaranteed portion of their loan up to $160.78 As after World War II, the housing market
took off once Korean War veterans returned and started snatching up real estate.79 In some
places, lenders and sellers even “newly discovered” a “Negro market.”80
Ultimately, as back and mustering-out pay ran out returnees had to look for a way to
support themselves. Some clever G.I.s turned their wartime skills or contacts into careers.
Robert Wilkins, a salesman at Hanson Chevrolet in Detroit before Korea, took down the names
and addresses of other POWs while in captivity and after his release sent out letters offering
them a $300 “Wilkins Discount.” With 500 replies and 21 sales in just a few months, Wilkins
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“did not have to worry about getting his old job back.”81 But, other veterans had less ingenuity
or maybe less luck. With jobs in rather short supply, they had to turn to benevolent
organizations or to their Uncle Sam for help. Groups like “The 52 Association,” first formed
during World War II, targeted wounded veterans for assistance, offering hand-holding in
addition to a job placement program.82 Meanwhile, the government resurrected such staples as
job reinstatement and veterans’ preference.
Reemployment rights, begun with the 1940 Selective Service Act and revived in 1951,
dictated that employers give returning veterans their old jobs back so long as circumstances had
not changed to make that impossible.83 To be entitled to their former positions, though, veterans,
both male and female, had to apply for reinstatement within 90 days of their discharge and have
a certificate of satisfactory military service. And, employers were under no obligation to pay
returnees any more after their return than they had been receiving when they left. Like Samuel
Woodham and Barnett Wilson, veterans did go back to their former employers, sometimes
pushing for raises or better positions. But, regardless of the law, others discovered that old bosses
would not rehire them or simply decided that they wanted to do something else.84 These would
have to look for work elsewhere.
In addition to using the Veteran’s Employment Service (USES) to obtain job counseling,
vocational guidance, and assistance in locating a suitable position, those returning from Korea
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could invoke veterans’ preference laws to better their chances of finding employment.85 Under
veterans’ preference laws, honorably discharged veterans who served active duty with any
branch of the Armed Forces got points added onto federal competitive exam scores, moved to the
top of certification lists, had preference in appointment to federal government and civilian
positions, received waivers of age/height/weight requirements, had certain jobs like elevator
operator reserved for them, and secured retention rights protecting them from reductions in the
work force.86 No small amount of public resentment and resistance developed in response to
veterans’ preference laws in the years after the Korean War, but the courts consistently upheld
the statutes, giving Korean War veterans the same veterans’ preference benefits enjoyed by other
veterans before them.87
Of course, even with assistance, not all veterans of the Korean War could land a desirable
job or, in some cases, any job. As in World War II, these less fortunate veterans qualified for
unemployment if they could not find work after separating from the military. Less generous than
World War II’s 52-20 Club (fifty-two weeks of $20 unemployment checks), the Korean War
unemployment program allowed unemployed veterans $26 a week for 26 weeks.88 Also in
contrast to World War II provisions, men first collected unemployment from their home state
and then applied for federal unemployment compensation to make up any differences in
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benefits.89 Although Korean War veterans usually had a waiting period of several months before
they could collect, the money, when it finally came, certainly made a huge difference to the 20%
unable to find a position in the slowing economy.90 In all, about one million veterans of Korea
took advantage of the unemployment offered them, but, according to government reports, they
did not “milk” the system.91 Over half of the Korean War veterans getting unemployment
received no more than $300 total and only 15% collected $600 or more.92
Whether actively seeking work or not, some veterans ultimately decided to delay their
reentry into the civilian work force for a while. Many, especially after the passage of the Korean
G.I. Bill in 1952, marched back to school to earn a degree or learn a new trade.93 Many others,

89

Regulations forbade those seeking unemployment from collecting from more than one state and federal benefits
ended after payments reached $676. Public Law 550, Title IV, Section 408, 82nd Congress, 2nd sess., United States
Statutes at Large (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953), 687-688 and Congress, House,
President’s Commission on Veterans’ Pensions, Readjustment Benefits: General Survey and Appraisal: A Report
on Veterans’ Benefits in the United States, 156-157, 84th Congress, 2nd sess., Committee Print 289, Staff Report No.
IX Part A, 11 September 1956 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956).
90
The waiting period was created because the government expected veterans to live off of their mustering out pay
until they could find employment. “The New GI Bill: Who Gets What?,” Changing Times (May 1953), 22;
“Readjustment Pay or Bonus” in “Defense Department on Effect of GI Bill,” 12, (Bradley Commission): Records
1954-1958, A69-22 and 79-6, Box 67, DDE Library; and Congress, House, Committee on Veterans Affairs, The
Historical Development of Veterans’ Benefits in the United States, report prepared by the President’s Commission
on Veterans’ Pensions, 160, 84th Congress, 2nd sess., House Committee Print 244, Staff Report No. 1, 9 May 1956
(Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956). Korean War veterans had a higher rate of
unemployment (20.3%) than World War II veterans (17.1%) had after that war, but they had an easier time holding
onto the jobs they got. Once employed, only 18.9% of Korean War veterans versus 29.9% of World War II veterans
subsequently lost their jobs. Harvey J. Tompkins, “Korean Veterans with Psychiatric Disabilities,” Military
Medicine 17:1 (July 1955), 36.
91
The one million who received unemployment figures out to be about 25% of the Korean War veterans returned to
civilian life. Congress, House, Committee on Veterans Affairs, The Historical Development of Veterans’ Benefits in
the United States, report prepared by the President’s Commission on Veterans’ Pensions, 160, 84th Congress, 2nd
sess., House Committee Print 244, Staff Report No. 1, 9 May 1956 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1956). In their first year home, 17.8% of Korean War veterans used unemployment benefits as compared to
37.5% of World War II veterans. As in World War II, younger veterans more readily used unemployment benefits
after their Korean service than older veterans. Congress, House, President’s Commission on Veterans’ Pensions,
Readjustment Benefits: General Survey and Appraisal: A Report on Veterans’ Benefits in the United States, 82,
84th Congress, 2nd sess., Committee Print 289, Staff Report No. IX Part A, 11 September 1956 (Washington, D.C.:
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956).
92
Congress, House, Committee on Veterans Affairs, “Limitation on Application for Unemployment Compensation,”
report prepared by Congressman Olin E. Teague of Texas, 84th Congress, 1st sess., House Reports, Volume 3:
Miscellaneous Reports on Public Bills, II (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955).
93
See discussion of G. I. Bill below.

289

despite the low esteem in which the public held military service as a career, decided to re-up or
enlist in a different branch of the Armed Forces.94 As Shorty Estabrook puts it, “I didn’t have
much else going for me.”95 Compared with veterans of other American wars in the 20th Century,
those returning from Korea were most likely to choose a military career. Perhaps because so
many already had accumulated years of service from World War II or from time spent in the
Reserves or National Guard, they decided after Korea to sign up for regular duty and “never
looked back and never gave it a second thought.”96 While only 5.9% of World War II veterans
and 12.3% of Vietnam veterans were discharged with a military retirement after twenty or more
years of service, 16.7% of Korean War veterans earned this manner of separation.97 This is all
the more remarkable given that in the years after Korea and before the build-up in Vietnam the
Army began to muster out “marginal soldiers,” flushing 100,000s of men from the ranks, Korean
War veterans included.98 In the clean up, men like Major John Walker, an African American ex-
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Korean War POW with only six years left before an Army retirement, found themselves out on
the streets at the behest of a Department of Army Board.99
Over time, as veterans discharged the last of their wartime obligations, such as visiting
the relatives of dead comrades or working off the last days of active duty, they tried to settle into
their new cars, houses, marriages, and jobs. Many hoped that memories of not only the war but
of military service in general would soon recede, replaced in their minds with the normalcy of
Sunday sermons, weekend matinees, regular work schedules, clean linens, and family. But,
looking around them, veterans, especially those who separated from the military, could not help
but sense that maybe they hadn’t so much left Oz as ended up in some other corner of it. Two
years or more of military service had carried men and women further from home than they had
ever traveled before and worked to change their outlook on a great many things. In their
absence, the world kept turning, too, but somehow it had revolved in different directions.

Returnees, Race, and America

By the time Korean War-era service members began filtering back into civilian life, the
American military had truly become a world all its own. Manpower pressures in Korea finally
breathed life into Harry S Truman’s Executive Order 9981, breaking down segregation if not
eliminating it in the various branches of the Armed Forces. Along with increased integration in
the field came changes on bases around the country. Under President Eisenhower, the
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Department of Defense carried forward an initiative to integrate schools on military installations,
some before the 1954 Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. the Board of Education.100 Despite
local resistance, especially in Southern schools with long-term leases and in states with laws
forbidding educational integration, by August 1955 only schools at Pine Bluff Army Arsenal in
Arkansas, where there were no school-aged black children, and Fort Meade, Maryland had not
complied.101 Also in the mid-1950s, the V. A. eliminated segregation in all of its hospitals and
homes.102 As returning African American veterans rotated back from the war to find that they
would have to wait for a hospital bed, they and the black press wanted to know, “What excuse is
there for penalizing the sick while integrating the well?” In response, Harvey Higley, the
Veterans’ Administrator, announced the move of his agency toward “wiping out segregation.”103
So quickly did veterans’ hospitals accomplish this task that in 1956 one white patient complained
that he “was denied treatment for a serious stomach disorder by the Shreveport Veterans Hospital
unless he agreed to submit to integration with Negro patients.” The incident triggered a
resolution by the American Legion Red River Post No. 118 against this infringement of the
100
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“cherished rights of those who were disabled in the service of their country,” but to no avail.104
As for life on post, the military worked toward abolishing even the appearance of discrimination.
When a black dentist at Chanute Air Base complained about separate barber shops for blacks and
whites, the Air Force moved quickly to consolidate the shops.105 On installations around the
country, service clubs, swimming pools, movie theaters, athletics, and other recreational venues
widely opened to all regardless of color during and immediately after the Korean War.106
This is not to say that integration always went smoothly in the military. Jumping into the
Officers’ Club pool at Maxwell Airbase, Charles Dryden, an African American veteran of World
War II and Korea, “was amazed how quickly I became the sole occupant.” And when Dryden
invited a comrade to stay with his family, the man declined saying, “Where I come from, white
people just don’t even socialize with colored people.”107 Overseas, a note left on the mess hall
door of the 61st Artillery Battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division warned, “No n—s and dogs
allowed, white only.”108 Black Korean War veterans at Camp Polk in 1952 complained that the
Army located them so far from everything that they had to pay cab or bus fare even to reach
places on base.109 At Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, the Army fired Juanita Lewis, a black hostess,
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after she made it clear she would no longer officiate at dances with Jim Crow rules forcing
African American troops to “sit in the corners and the rear and look on [while whites dance], or
trudge slinkingly over to the line for refreshments.”110 At Fort Benning, Georgia, Grant
Hauskin’s commander told him that he would never be promoted as long as he stayed married to
his white wife.111 And, throughout the 1950s the military encouraged everyone from privates to
generals to accommodate the discriminatory practices of local communities, even refusing to
interfere when soldiers got into trouble with civilian law enforcement officials over segregation
issues. The Air Force reprimanded one black pilot for refusing to move to the rear of a city bus
in Alabama, noting “Your open violation of the segregation policy is indicative of poor judgment
on your part and reflects unfavorably on your qualifications as a commissioned officer.”112
Still, the U. S. military establishment in the 1950s far surpassed civilian society in racial
progressivism, so much so that sometimes servicemen and women almost forgot that the
communities around them lived differently. To the embarrassment of all, one colonel at a
southern base unthinkingly sent black soldiers along with whites to a picnic held by a local
organization.113 Although not until a decade after Korea, this apparent color-blindness instilled
by Army life and regulations led many within the military and government to push for an end to
discrimination in cities and towns dependent upon the bases for economic support. In an effort
to better the lives of those under them, some commanders in the South pressured movie theaters,
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restaurants, and stores off post to accommodate all G.I.s regardless of race by making all
segregated establishments off-limits to military personnel thus cutting off potential revenues.114
Similarly, in an effort to deal with the inadequacy of off-base housing available to non-white
servicemen, the Department of Defense in 1968 forbade military personnel from living in
segregated housing. Not surprisingly, with their livelihoods in jeopardy, locals soon integrated
recreational facilities and rental properties.115 The Department of Defense also targeted off-base
public schools attended by military dependents for integration, threatening to cut off public
funding or use eminent domain as a justification for seizing them. Eventually, many schools
built on land outside of military posts but with federal funds integrated as a result of this pressure
brought to bear on them.116 Military communities became islands of racial parity floating in an
American sea of inequality and segregation.
Certainly, those separating from the military soon after their tour of duty in Korea did not
experience the full impact of military integration. But, regardless of when one mustered out, the
rebaptism into civilian life proved an awakening after living in the increasingly integrated
society of the Armed Forces. While home front attitudes had shifted a little bit with regard to
race, leading more than half of Americans polled in 1958 to agree that at some point in the future
blacks and whites would share schools, restaurants, and public accommodations, the realities of
life had stayed much the same.117 As one black lieutenant put it, “When you get into town, it is
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the same old pattern that most know about. We have complete mixing on the post, but when you
go into the city, it’s just the same old story.”118
After several Oakland, California restaurants refused entrance to one soldier in uniform,
his wife asked, “Why did he serve thirty one years and nine months in the Army? Why did he
fight for his country? Where is the country that he fought for?”119 America as it existed in the
1950s had few adequate answers to those questions. In the South especially, time seemed to
have stood still. Nearly a decade after the racial violence that accompanied African American
soldiers home from World War II, southern towns remained relatively unsafe for blacks in
uniform as well as in general. Just trying to vote, arguing over racial epithets, driving a car, or
walking down the street made blacks the targets of police and civilian brutality in places like
Alabama and Mississippi.120 In Rupert, Georgia, Private Macy Yost Snipes defied the local
white establishment by casting his vote in 1956 and paid with his life. Whites in the county
would not even let Snipes’ body be buried in the family plot and underscored their resistance to
black voting by running Snipes’ family out of town.121 As late as 1960, the Marine Corps
refrained from assigning black Marines to certain duty stations because of concerns for their
welfare or the unavailability of off-post housing.122
Widespread discrimination in employment continued to limit opportunities for black
veterans. Southern communities, for example, restricted blacks, even veterans, to certain
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occupations. In one Mississippi city black ex-G.I.s could only use their veterans’ preference to
become letter carriers and in the Montgomery, Alabama V. A. office they could only be
employed as custodians. At Maxwell Air Base in Montgomery, all black workers started in the
mess hall regardless their skills or qualifications.123 After the war Vernon Warren went back to
school to become a certified public accountant, but when he tried to land a job in his field, he
“found the doors shut tight….He was still a black man. The war had changed him, but it had not
changed that.”124
Outside of the South inequalities existed as well. Motels and eateries across the country
routinely refused service to black patrons, making it necessary for African American servicemen
and women traveling to their hometowns or next duty stations to either obtain a copy of the
“Green Book,” a travelers’ guide listing places where blacks could stay, or risk having to sleep in
the train station, their car, or on the street.125 Neighborhoods in several California cities refused
to admit or accept non-white homeowners or occupants. Real estate operators in Garden Grove
refused to sell a home to Dr. Sammy Lee, an Olympic diving champion who toured Asian
countries for the State Department in an effort to fight communist claims of racial prejudice in
the U.S., because of his Korean ancestry.126 White residents in Los Angeles set off a bomb at
black war veteran William Bailey’s home and left a note declaring, “We will bomb Negroes
out.”127 Elsewhere, whites formed mobs, planted crosses in the yards of blacks, and threw
stones at the homes of people they wanted out. Sometimes, as in the case of black World War II
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veteran Wilbur Gary, the law supported one’s right as an American to live where they chose, but
undoubtedly scare tactics forced more than a few families to simply move on.128 In Phoenix,
Arizona, the veterans’ cemetery allowed whites killed in action to be buried without clearance,
but African American Thomas Reed’s body was kept on ice after shipment back from Korea
because rules stipulated that blacks could only be buried after the receipt of three notarized
letters from veterans’ organizations.129 Similarly, a Sioux City, Iowa cemetery refused to allow
the burial of John Rice, a Winnebago veteran of World War II killed in Korea, because he was
not of the “Caucasian race.”130 Asked to join a fraternity at Boston University, former Marine
Jack Orth learned, much to his disgust, that the organization had rejected fellow ex-Marines
because of their race.131
Confronted with Jim Crow segregation and bigotry, the unsavory hallmarks of American
life outside of the U. S. military, many returnees felt confused, even angry. Having marched to
war armed with the belief that their wartime service would result somehow in a “larger measure
of freedom, dignity, and opportunity for our loved ones at home,” black and other non-white
veterans wondered, “Who was my worst enemy, really?”132 Were communists abroad as bad as
racists at home? And, white veterans, possessing intimate friendships across the color line from
their service in the Army or Marines, felt “deeply perplexed about the racial discrimination”
leveled against their comrades.133 But what would they do about it?
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In light of the activism and controversy stirred up by the Vietnam War and veterans of
that conflict, historians have tended to view Korean War veterans as passive, easily accepting the
status quo and peacefully melting back into society after returning from the war. Indeed, raised
during the Great Depression and World War II, most veterans of Korea early learned and
internalized the lesson that no matter the circumstances one had no other choice but to
uncomplainingly forget personal preferences and get on with the tasks at hand. The culture of
conformity which rose with the Soviet threat in the years after World War II reinforced the
inclination to subvert one’s own desires for the security of the country. Consequently, Korean
War veterans, whatever their ideas on the matter, did not launch any great crusades to win equal
civil rights for Americans of all colors.
However, Korean War veterans individually did protest Jim Crowism and contribute to
the quest for social justice in invaluable ways. One black non-commissioned officer, frustrated
at having to move to the back of the bus when it left the base, made a point while on post of
sitting “right behind the driver, just to watch the cracker burn up.”134 During the Vietnam War,
Clarence Adams, who had originally gone to the People’s Republic of China at the end of the
Korean War but then returned to the United States, made radio broadcasts telling African
Americans, “If you are going to fight, you need to go home and fight for your own cause.
You’re being wasted for a cause that isn’t even yours.”135 Others joined the N.A.A.C.P. and
contributed to its “Freedom Fund” to “help improve our democracy.”136 So many blacks at some

134

Quoted in Bogart, Project Clear, 261.
Adams is an interesting case. A POW during the Korean War, he chose to go to the People’s Republic of China
rather than return home when given the choice. He did later return to the U.S., though, explaining to HUAC that he
chose China because “I’m black” and he wanted to improve his life. Carlson, Remembered Prisoners of a Forgotten
War, 211.
136
“Ex-POW Donates to NAACP ‘Freedom Fund,’” Baltimore Afro-American, 12 September 1953, 3 and “Veteran
Takes Out 2nd NAACP Life Membership in Ind.,” Baltimore Afro-American, 7 November 1953, 5. Also see Selika
135

299

American Legion posts joined the N.A.A.C.P. that two white posts unsuccessfully tried to get
these kicked out of the organization on grounds that they were “dabbling in partisan politics.”137
Additionally, Black veterans risked their lives to register to vote and turned out at the polls.138
Korean War veterans also joined veterans’ organizations which made it their business to
make a difference. The American Veterans Committee (AVC) attracted some Korean War
veterans as members and this socially progressive veterans’ organization fought against Orville
Faubus in Little Rock, Arkansas, demanded an end to racial segregation at the federally funded
and supervised Columbia Institution for the Deaf in Washington D.C., called on the District of
Columbia to pass and enforce a law banning discrimination in public recreational places,
petitioned President Eisenhower to intervene in Prince Edward County, Virginia where the
Board of Supervisors decided to cut off all funding to public schools after required to integrate
them, and worked tirelessly to tear down the walls of segregation.139 Representatives of the
Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America presented the Platform Committees of the
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Democratic and Republican National Conventions with a call for further “programs of education
and legislation to wipe out racial and religious discrimination.”140
More aggressively, some Korean War veterans, especially African Americans,
“contributed to the increasing use of armed self-defense in the postwar decades.”141 In 1964,
World War II and Korean veterans came together to found the Deacons for Defense and Justice
to protect people involved in the burgeoning Civil Rights Movement, deter white violence in the
South, and fight the Ku Klux Klan.142 Veterans brought to the table not only a new sort of
militancy, but also technical expertise and the kind of courage learned on the battlefield.
Protected by the Deacons of Defense, Civil Rights worker Robert Lewis notes, “We had veterans
that have been to Korea and place like that knew how to make stuff, just like the Molotov
Cocktails. So we knew how to make the time bombs, too.”143 Similarly, Albert Turner, thinking
back to the summer of 1965 when he worked in Crenshaw County, Alabama registering voters,
remembers that the local leader accompanying and watching over them was a Korean War
veteran.144 Generally working within the system, Korean War veteran activists did not seek or
achieve the sort of visibility that their sons and daughters of the next war would, but in many
small ways they did make lasting contributions to the movements that reshaped American life
with regard to race. In part because of the vision instilled in servicemen and women by the
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military in the 1950s and 1960s, Americans of all races and nationalities came to live together in
an integrated, if not yet color blind society.

Old Wounds and New Lives

Whether they knew it or not, many veterans of the Korean War “had more problems than
anyone realized when I first came home.”145 They might have exited the war but it most
certainly had not yet left them. As a result, many veterans did strange things after their return.
Accustomed to living in a prisoner of war camp, William Allen left burning cigarettes all over
the house, throwing them on the floor without realizing it.146 Another veteran, eating breakfast
with his parents, unconsciously asked them to “pass the f—king sugar.”147 Irwin Crockett dove
for cover when a truck backfired.148 Kenneth Dixon trembled and shook until he could not hold
a cup of coffee and knew of men who returned unable to talk.149 While loving the smell and feel
of clean sheets, some slept on the ground just as they had in Korea. Others showered multiple
times a day or soaked in the tub for hours. After months spent in cold and filth, they could not
get enough hot water and they wanted to be clean again. “The dirt and grime of Korea was still
in my pores and embedded under my fingernails. I had to soak it away.”150 Used to having to
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remain on guard in the foxholes, David Van Leeuwen almost killed his brother when he came to
wake him up and Arthur Smith narrowly missed hitting his mother when she entered the room
while he was sleeping.151 Charles Bussey awoke frequently to “check security” and Jack Wright
took to roaming the streets at night.152 Some slept with guns under their pillows, making for a
few close calls when someone inadvertently woke them up or startled them.153 More
astoundingly, some veterans lashed out with tremendous violence. Anderson Williams, a combat
veteran, prowled around at night throwing rocks at women drivers, a habit which ultimately cost
him $3000 in fines and his driver’s license.154 Samuel Fikes choked his wife to death in a “jilted
lover’s quarrel” and Thomas Howell allegedly beat a ten year old boy after asking him, “Are you
Jewish.”155 To varying degrees, these nervous and jumpy returnees had trouble acting normal.
“After all, who or what did I have to compare normal living with?”156
Odd behaviors usually subsided with the passage of time, but mental issues stemming
from veterans’ overseas experiences often continued. From the trenches or hospitals in Korea
and Japan, it had seemed that all would be well if only a person could return safely to family and
friends. Once home, returning veterans wanted to “wallow in all this happiness [at returning],
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but somehow I just couldn’t.”157 For a great many, the war wouldn’t go away. When awake,
they worried about friends still caught on the battleground and “could not stop thinking about all
the buddies I’d lost in Korea. … Like me, they’d been looking forward to a future; one that
would never happen for them.”158 They felt guilty “because I had survived and all my friends
didn’t” or because after they left friends died or got wounded and “I still felt responsible.”159
Sleep brought little respite from feelings of guilt or memories of the war as nightmares made
everything real again. In Charles Bussey’s dreams, “Chinese soldiers trampled over my shallow
grave and double-timed over me” and in Leonard Korgie’s he begged an officer not to send him
back to Korea despite orders.160 More terrifying, Hoppy Harris dreamed that “the decomposed
bodies of the enemies I have killed come rising from their graves, and I rush madly about trying
to push them back into their graves, but they will not stay there. They keep popping back as if
trying to get at me, seeking revenge for my having sent them to an early grave.”161 As months
and years passed, some men found their lives less frequently interrupted by sad or intrusive
thoughts or frightening nightmares, but for many these never completely went away. As one
veteran writes, “My long ago war, so hauntingly remote/Still rings in my ears like an exploding
shell,/Shattering this cozy peace surrounding me/And shouting old memories.”162 Over half a
century since the conflict ended, Gilbert Towner “grieve[s] for the men that are still in the
ground around Chosin Resevoir” and William Dannenmaier wonders if the dreams that trouble
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his sleep will end when he dies or “as I have sometimes thought, I died as a young soldier. Then,
those dreams are my eternity.”163
After participating in the great life and death drama of the war, no matter how terrible,
many veterans found civilian life boring and inconsequential and had great trouble settling down
and becoming civilians again. Keyed up from Korea, Jack Wright was “restless as hell.” To
take the edge off while on leave, he “spent every dime I made,” including his back pay.164
Others developed a “crazy longing to return to the front.”165 Of more significance, many felt
“like an alien when I came home” and developed negative attitudes toward regular life or toward
themselves.166 To Seymour Bernstein, “all seemed temporal and unreal” and, after witnessing so
many tragedies in Korea, the worries of the people around him seemed petty.167 Similarly,
William Dannenmaier believed, “Life was transient, ludicrous, and I was meaningless in it.”
Seeing people gathered to talk and laugh, he wanted to scream, “Why are you laughing? They
didn’t know what the world was like. They had no knowledge of the pain and anguish in the
world.”168 Numb to the new realities around them, returnees had difficulty talking to nonveterans, “enjoying the things I once did,” trusting people, making the most basic decisions, and
expressing emotions.169 Sensing their own blandness toward death, believing they “could kill
anyone, stranger or friend, and walk away without concern,” and frightened by their “tendency to
163
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look at those who annoyed me and consider the best way to get rid of them,” they had reason to
question whether they would ever really live again.170 Unmistakably the war aged and
transformed those who experienced it. As one veteran puts it, “I lost something in Korea.”171
Eventually, veterans tried to come to terms with what they had experienced in the Far
East and find ways to readjust to life at home. Initially, many sought out old friends in hopes of
finding a place to fit in again. Frequently, these encounters proved counterproductive. Not only
did old high school or college chums know little about the war, they expected returnees to “be
again the person I was before I went overseas,” but “it was too late for that.”172 Elmer Payne
nearly got into a fist fight when his old high school classmates insisted that he was “‘lucky’ not
having to face the draft.” Deciding he’d better stay away from them in the future, Payne avoided
them even at his fifty year reunion in 1998.173 In any case, those who had remained behind
seemed so inexperienced and naive compared to the men and women who had served in the war.
“Somehow I felt I had nothing in common anymore with these guys; I couldn’t relate to them.
We were the same age, but they seemed younger than me.”174 Veterans just had “experiences
that they could never relate to, whereas they had had life experiences that I would someday be
able to relate to, but did not yet have. Theirs was college, mine combat, face to face with the
chance of death, all day, every day for over a year.”175 Worse yet, “time had moved on for them
whereas it was just starting for me.”176 Men and women at home had married and started
170
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families, gone to college, gotten good jobs, and purchased homes. Veterans couldn’t help feeling
that they “had a time gap in my life that could never be filled” and consider “myself hopelessly
behind everyone else.”177 Thus efforts to reconnect sometimes ended only in bitterness and a
simmering anger that people at home had gone on to live comfortable, undisturbed lives while
other Americans had suffered the pain and sadness of Korea.178
Realizing that “no one wanted to hear about where I had been, what I had done, and what
I had seen,” many veterans tried to repress their memories and “forget most of the bad
experiences.179 They seldom talked about the demons haunting them, the “killing, maiming,
frostbite, barbed wire, fear, trembling, doubt, arson, exhaustion, death, or blood” that had entered
their psyches in Korea and remained to punish them after coming home.180 POWs especially
kept quiet and guarded about their experiences. Almost as soon as they had been freed, the
military began warning them not to speak about what had happened to them in the camps and to
be careful not to reveal any secrets.181 Also, by the time POWs finally reached the States, the
U.S. Army and others had begun a witch hunt, looking for “collaborators” and making the public
suspicious of anyone who had been captured by the Koreans or Chinese.182 At a parade hosted
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for returning POW Jack Flanary in Benham, Kentucky officials from the VFW barged in to
announce “‘rumors’ that the sergeant had been ‘responsive to communist indoctrination.’”183
The FBI and CIA badgered and investigated almost all POWs for years after their return.184
Caught in the repressive social climate of the deepening Cold War, many veterans, whether
POW or not, decided, “This is not good. I’d better just keep my mouth shut.”185
Men or women desperate or brave enough to try and talk about their experiences right
after the war found most Americans ill-equipped or unwilling to help them. As Paula Schnurr,
an official at the Veteran Administration’s National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in
2000 admitted, both the government and research scientists ignored the post-combat emotional
problems of Korean War veterans.186 And, even when returnees got to what should have been
the right places, the staff and personnel didn’t know what to do with them. Visiting physicians
and psychiatrists, Charles Bussey determined that they “had no idea of appropriate treatment for
my problems,” forcing him to try and cope on his own. Similarly, checked into a veteran’s
hospital, Walter Adelmann received a diagnosis of battle fatigue but was released without any
effective treatment.187 Furthermore, government budget cuts in the mid-1950s resulted in the
curtailment of psychiatric services for veterans, even for those already approved for and engaged
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in treatment, making the likelihood of finding a professional to talk to about wartime experiences
more unlikely.188
Sharing with other veterans might have provided relief for men still stinging from combat
or captivity, but not all veterans’ groups welcomed Korean War veterans. Not legally recognized
as war veterans by the government until the late 1950s, Korean War veterans occasionally found
themselves turned away by organizations like the VFW and American Legion, created and
controlled by World War I or World War II veterans.189 Both the American Legion and VFW
refused to allow Verlin Rogers to join until years later, claiming that the “Korean War was ‘not a
war’ and I did not qualify.”190 Some veterans claim that the American Legion took rejection a
step further. In To Acknowledge a War Paul Edwards asserts that the American Legion blamed
American servicemen for the stalemate in Korea and “supported a smear campaign” which
painted these new veterans as not only soft on communism but morally weaker than the veterans
of other wars.191 Unsurprisingly, even many years after the conflict, Korean War veterans who
had not properly readjusted tended to believe that their problems “were my fault, some weakness
in me.”192
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“Screwed up mentally and … not ready for our world,” returnees, especially men,
commonly turned to alcohol or drugs to drown their troubles.193 “I drank an awful lot. I tried to
use alcohol to overcome my problems.”194 Walter Adelmann drank for two months after his
return and for Jack Orth “drinking became the order of the day, and that became more and more
of a problem.”195 For many veterans of the Korean War, trying to do “the best I could” and
unable to put the conflict behind them, early months of drinking spiraled into years or lifetimes
of alcoholism or substance abuse.196 Ted Hofsiss drank heavily through part of another
reenlistment and Vernon Warren came home drunk nearly every day throughout his career as a
postal carrier because “there was nothing he could do to push the war out of his mind.” Bennie
Gordon used alcohol to “numb the pain, and keep the nightmares away” for decades until put on
medication and now “tries not to leave his house, unless he has to.”197 Not simply an illness of
veterans, alcoholism did plague Korean War veterans, particularly those who participated in
combat, at rates somewhat elevated above those of their contemporaries. And, because these
returnees were trying to cover one problem, the inability to forget the past and get on with their
lives, with another, substance abuse, they often failed to recognize the “severity of their
problems and … [did] not avail themselves of the opportunity for treatment.”198 Consequently,
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many veterans of the “police action” in Korea still struggle with the bottle, their failed marriages,
lost careers, and shattered dreams trailing behind them.199
In retrospect, many veterans realize that PTSD, or post-traumatic stress disorder, lay at
the heart of their difficulty in readjusting when they rotated home, but, at the time, the
servicemen and women returning from the war zone knew nothing “about post combat stress or
anything like it.”200 Born into a generation reared to show the same can-do spirit exhibited by
Americans during the Great Depression and the Second World War, most internalized and
accepted the lesson that they were “to solve our own problems.”201 To do otherwise
demonstrated not just a lack of resolve, but revealed unacceptable and embarrassing personal and
moral weaknesses.202 This, coupled with a lack of programs designed to assist veterans in
resuming a normal life, meant that only rarely did Korean War veterans find their way in the
1950s or even the 1960s or 1970s to specialists at the Veterans Administration or elsewhere who
could explain to them what was wrong.203 One doctor noted that even once treatment became
available, Korean War veterans stubbornly resisted regular psychotherapy until “satisfied that
their problems will not be solved through their own resources, such as by an educational or
occupational adjustment; working with non-psychiatric physicians … or utilization of some other
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external means.”204 Instead, they suffered silently and alone. Severe headaches crippled
returnees as did flashbacks, irritability, nerve problems, restlessness, depression, nightmares,
feelings of insufficiency, fatigue, and difficulties in concentration.205 One man had recurring
bouts of painful hives caused by “post anxiety reaction.”206 Some were such “a mess” that they
could not raise their own children or hold down any type of job.
POWs and men who endured heavy combat fared less well than the typical veteran.207
As a result of the extreme conditions under which they had been held, POWs became mistrustful
of people, uncomfortable in crowds or social settings, emotionally detached from loved ones, and
unable to focus.208 As Charley Davis noted, “I still size people up as soon as I meet them. I
listen to the way they talk, and I watch how they act and react. I want to see if they are real or
pretending to be something they are not … In the camps you had to make sure someone wasn’t
going to get you in trouble over something you said.”209 Robert Maclean could not even take
advantage of the G. I. Bill to go to college because being in the classroom “felt like I was back in
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prison camp again. I couldn’t concentrate on anything they were trying to teach me.”210 As exPOW Shorty Estabrook wrote, “Life has been cruel for many of us and we are time bombs
ticking. We never did adjust properly.”211
On a day to day basis, men affected with PTSD tried to forget the war, but “the memories
of that horrifying time” never completely went away. As Rudolph Stephens notes, “Somewhere
in the recesses of my mind will always be a place that will haunt me for the rest of my life. A
place called Korea.”212 Without professional help, many remained mired in mental issues caused
by the war.213 Not until some twenty or thirty years after the armistice did therapy become
readily available to Korean War veterans afflicted with PTSD, and then only by accident. In the
wake of the Vietnam War and the return of that conflict’s battered veterans, the V.A. began to
train therapists and offer and advertise counseling for men and women adversely affected by
their wartime service.214 At the about the same time, public awareness increased and Korean
War veterans saw advertisements for therapy sessions on billboards at veteran’s hospitals, read
about PTSD in newspapers and magazines, and watched television programs dedicated to the
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topic.215 In response, Korean War veterans followed the lead of their sons and daughters of the
Vietnam generation and began to attend meetings and address the problems that for so long they
had tried to face alone. Suddenly, the government as well as doctors and researchers began to
take a real interest, funding and conducting studies of Korean War veterans and the incidence of
PTSD. These efforts showed that in sharp contrast to previous assumptions, Korean War
veterans not only had symptoms of PTSD right after the war, but that these older veterans were
still feeling the effects.216 By the late 1980s, V.A. hospitals, like the one in Tampa, Florida, were
accepting Korean War veterans at their PTSD clinics and actively sending out letters to find
others in need of medical help or assistance in getting compensation. Many of those contacted
had not dealt with the V.A. for years, if ever, and had no knowledge of the services or benefits
available to them. “They are angry with the VA to begin with, and they’re angry with the public.
A lot of them have drinking problems, and they have a hell of a divorce rate. There’s lots bottled
up inside us because of what we went through, but nobody cares but us,” or so they thought.217
Thirty, forty, even fifty years after the battles that left them scarred and hurting, Korean War
veterans suffering from PTSD finally began to reclaim their lives as civilians and heal.218
Visiting the V. A. hospital in Fresno and attending sessions with a V. A. psychiatrist and PTSD
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counselor, Tony Velasquez writes, “The nightmares, the flashbacks, the anger, depression and
the guilt about the people I killed in Korea will never go away, but I am learning to control and
to cope with my memories of the Forgotten War and my survival guilt.”219 As another veteran
says, “The more you talk about it, the more you get rid of it.”220 Unfortunately, some men did
not live to see the improvement that outside aid might have worked on their lives. In addition to
the thousands who died of natural causes in the intervening decades, some veterans chose to
commit suicide, often soon after coming home, or engaged in risky behaviors that ended with
their untimely deaths.221 Parents and friends were left to explain that their son “had returned
from the wars much the worse for his experience” or that “he had been highly nervous since he
was discharged from the Army more than a year ago.”222
While many veterans languished after coming home, other returnees ultimately did find
effective strategies for melting back into regular life and overcoming the trauma of war. After
only three days home, Jack Jackson took a job driving a dump truck where his language and
mannerisms would not offend anyone and where co-workers helped him acclimate to his new,
old life. Within about a year he felt comfortable in polite society, unafraid that he would
219
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embarrass himself or someone else.223 Gilbert Towner eventually “began reimmersing myself
back in my culture, sweathouse, religion (Indian) and cultural events.” Although still awakening
“back in the war” at three each morning, Towner managed to create a lasting marriage and quit
drinking.224 Harold Mulhausen became a workaholic, a habit that created some other problems
but kept his mind off the war.225 His life “messed up” for several years, Clyde Queen got “the
help of good people” and “got my life back and I turned out to be a good, and productive
citizen.”226 Queen joined various veterans’ organizations and made a career in federal law
enforcement. Drinking heavily after his return, Douglas Anderson went to work on a remote
ranch for a year where he began to heal, losing much of his bitterness.227
Perhaps no one single activity helped as many veterans recover from their wartime
experiences when they first came home, though, as continuing to serve in the Armed Forces.
Men who mustered out soon found themselves adrift in an unfamiliar and unwelcoming world
full of strangers. “After being stateside for a total of 4 days, you no longer have the security of
belonging to a known society of like persons, and you have been cast free into an unknown
environment that seems alien for a long while.”228 Back home, “everything had changed
including myself … [I] no longer fit in.”229 Also, no matter how much one had hated the rigor
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and discipline of their particular service, military life proved a hard habit to break and those who
did not stay in for a while had some degree of trouble ordering their own lives. “At first it
seemed I couldn’t make a decision for myself. I missed having some one tell me what to do.”230
But, the only way these new civilians could reclaim some part of what they felt they had lost was
to make visits to nearby installations, “just to be in a military environment.”231 Returnees who
re-upped or who had time left on their enlistments in general had an easier time adjusting after
their return. They just “went to a new duty station and continued my career” without having to
give much thought to the war they left behind.232 And, they reentered a community where “we
didn’t need to say much to each other. Didn’t need to, we both understood.”233 As Ralph Cutro
observes, “It was nice to get back among Marines. We helped one another to adjust.”234
Similarly, Jack Wright found “when I got back with other Marines I settled down and began to
feel comfortable around people again.”235 This sense of belonging, the unspoken acceptance of
their peers, and the structure that continued military service provided all greatly aided in the
successful transition from war to “normal” life for many Korean War veterans.236
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Just as returnees had to deal with the emotional trauma of war after coming home,
Korean War veterans often had to struggle with physical impairments and injuries. New medical
techniques and modes of transportation pioneered in Korea ensured that men returned from this
war with wounds that would have proven fatal in World War I or even World War II.237 Doctors
in the field perfected the use of type O blood and plasma, experimented with antibiotics, and
began substituting arterial repair for amputation when treating severed arteries.238 The military
moved medical detachments closer to the front lines and began to use helicopters to transport the
wounded more quickly.239 As a result, only 2.5% of men wounded in Korea died compared to
4.5% in World War II.240 Ironically, in some cases the lower mortality rate meant that instead of
dying, Korea’s wounded came home to live with more serious and unusual injuries than
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anticipated.241 Even if that were not the case, many of those who survived returned with medical
conditions that would affect their health and well-being for life.
Among other things, returning Korean War veterans suffered from such obvious
disabilities as amputated limbs, shrapnel buried in their body tissue, lost eyesight, diminished
hearing, ruined teeth, paralysis, tuberculosis, bleeding ulcers, and the loss of fingers or toes from
frostbite. After arriving home, many more became afflicted with bouts of malaria or other
diseases, discovered that they had intestinal parasites, or simply realized that physically they
were not the person they had been before going to Korea.242 Those in the worst condition went
immediately to Army or Navy hospitals where military staff members generally provided
competent and compassionate care. Frank Muetzel, an amputee, remembers that nurses wined
and dined patients at one base, welcoming them home with joyful, if unauthorized parties, and
allowing them to use the Navy Officers’ Club.243 After mid-April 1953, some hospitalized
returnees received an even bigger and more unexpected treat. President Eisenhower decided to
deactivate the U.S.S. Williamsburg, giving it over to the Red Cross to provide one day cruises on
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the Potomac River for wounded veterans. On board, the Red Cross entertained their special
guests with movies, music, guided tours, sun-bathing, lunch, and a picnic supper.244
Despite good medical care or special treatment, the spirits of wounded men could swing
low. Muetzel felt shattered that his injuries signaled the end of his military career. A Marine
since 1944 with little training other than as rifle platoon leader, “the separation from old friends
and the life I’d chosen and loved came as a tremendous blow.” Similarly, having lost a leg,
Richard Newman found his “will to live was down to about zero.”245 Once men left the hospital,
they faced more hardship as they discovered what men who returned home right after the war
already knew—that the American public and government had little interest in the Korean War or
in those who had fought it. Muetzel found a Silver Star on his bed after returning to the hospital
from a party with nothing but a cover letter attached saying that it had been “delivered with
appropriate ceremony” and, at the Bank of America, a loan officer who saw Muetzel hobble in
on crutches wearing his uniform and ribbons denied him a new car loan, saying, “I see you want
to go back to school. You won’t need a car there, anyway.”246
For those healthy enough to process out without directly entering a hospital or
rehabilitation center, healing could take longer and come at far greater cost. The V.A. remained
the “best kept secret” from veterans who received little information about it at discharge.247
And, even those with service-connected wounds or disabilities who knew where to go didn’t
always receive the kind of care to which they were entitled. Developed during World War I and
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later expanded to care for veterans with service-related medical problems, the veterans’ hospital
system proved woefully inadequate at ministering to the needs of veterans in the 1950s.248 Cost
cutting measures and administrative wrangling during and after Korea led to the closure of
various hospitals and the resignations of many V.A. doctors just as more of both were needed
handle the influx of casualties coming out of the Far East.249 As a result, would-be patients had
to wait for service.250 Arriving home in September, former POW Shorty Estabrook, who now
considers himself “medically dumped,” did not get de-wormed until November.251 Richard
Curtis, a veteran of both World War II and the Korean War, could not get a hospital bed for the
treatment of alcoholism and mental illness until his brother obtained the intervention of James C.
Hagerty, President Eisenhower’s press secretary, in 1959.252 Edward McAllister’s wait finally
ended when he collapsed and died at a construction site where he was working during a twoweek delay in admittance by the Veterans’ Administration for service-connected hypertension
and heart disease.253
Other veterans of Korea would wait far longer, years or decades more, before receiving
V.A. treatment. Although recruiters had promised many volunteers “in no uncertain terms, free
medical care for the rest of our lives,” such guarantees went unfulfilled once a person separated
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from the Armed Forces after Korea.254 At least initially, V.A. hospitals required that men and
women, except service-disabled and impoverished veterans, give proof that the condition they
were seeking treatment for was service-connected. Not infrequently that turned out to be an
impossible task. Thousands of men suffered cold injuries at Chosin Reservoir, but at the time
there were too many casualties of a more immediate nature for doctors or corpsmen to document
frostbite cases.255 Similarly, by the end of a battle in which one sustained injuries, there might be
no one left able to verify the combat-related nature of their wounds. The V.A. x-rayed Gilbert
Towner, finding shrapnel residue in each place where he was wounded, but without four people
to sign an affidavit that he had been shot in the war, Towner was left to fight the V.A. for the
next 27 years to “get almost what I think I deserve.”256 Frostbite victims fared worse. Men
whose toes or fingers peeled off with their boots or gloves as a result of exposure to the bitter
cold of Korea did receive medical care at the time, but the V.A. denied that cold injury problems
did not end there. As men whose feet or hands had frozen in the war came forward later as aging
veterans with throbbing feet, phlebitis, skin cancer, tingling fingers and toes, peeling skin, fungal
infections, night pains, arthritis, misshapen toenails, joint deterioration, and other long-term
conditions stemming from frostbite, the V.A. declined to help them. Too often, veterans of the
war in Korea simply accepted the denial of their claims. Instead of exploding and declaring that
“no chair-bound jerk in Washington is going to pull that stuff on him”—as World War II
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veterans would have done—Korean War veterans left the V. A. office with a “Yes, Sir” and little
by way of questions.257
Ultimately, though, the V.A. did make hospitals and doctors available to more Korean
War veterans. In May 1951, the V. A. hospital in Tucson, Arizona refused to treat David
Arellano, a former Marine who served five months in combat in Korea as a bazooka-squad
gunner, for a throat infection because it was not service-connected. The hospital manager noted
that he had seen several similar cases and while sympathetic could do nothing to help because
the United States is “not at war in Korea, so these men are not eligible for treatment” as war
veterans.258 Widely circulated, Arellano’s story outraged the public and prompted President
Truman to call a press conference and urge Congress to remedy the technicality in the law.
Within a week, a new bill signed by Truman guaranteed Korean War veterans “all benefits of
hospital and domiciliary care, compensation or pensions, and burial benefits for themselves and
their dependents as provided for persons who served during the period of World War II.”259
Much later, those who sustained frostbite in Korea finally got satisfaction. After intense
lobbying on the part of the veterans themselves, the government finally conceded the long-term
health effects of exposure to cold and in the late 1990s began to offer free medical care and
monthly checks to veterans of both World War II and Korea who served at places like Chosin
Reservoir in the winter of 1950. V. A. sources conceded “I don’t know how anyone could have
been there and not had frostbite given the conditions: the bitter cold, the lack of protective gear,
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the constant combat. Half the casualties were due to the cold. Frozen Chosen is right.”260
Furthermore, these would not need further evidence that their problems were serviceconnected.261 Such changes opened up V.A. medical care to thousands of Korean War veterans,
but even so not everyone benefited. Some died before becoming eligible for treatment, the V. A.
continued to deny the claims of others, and many Korean War veterans simply chose not to use
available V. A. resources.262 Perhaps because of early difficulties in getting V. A. assistance, the
widespread feeling that American troops had “lost” the war in Korea, or the upbringing of men
and women raised to shoulder their own problems and not take “handouts,” Korean War
veterans, unique among American war veterans, did not flock to use V. A. care after serving in
the war zone or in combat.263
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Whether or not one managed to get V. A. or other medical care, not all wounds and
injuries could be fixed, leaving a number of veterans to cope with altered bodies and altered
lives. Arms, legs, fingers, toes, and whatever else had been lost in the war zone could not just be
glued back on and a host of other things would never mend either. Processing out, officials told
Arthur Smith to just sign the papers and list everything that was wrong with him and “we’ll take
care of it.” Three years later, at age 22, Smith had a lingering back problem, frostbitten feet,
shrapnel coming out of his skin, false teeth, and cuts on his face which prevented him from
shaving. Nobody could make Smith like he had been before the war or stop the grief these
changes brought to him on a daily basis.264 His feet blasted off by a mortar in Korea, Ted
Hofsiss, still a teenager, would never run again, instead enduring pain for the rest of his life from
his wounds whenever he tried to walk.265 Afflicted with bleeding ulcers from his turn in Korea,
another veteran would almost die from his service-related ailment and eventually have to quit
working altogether because of it.266 William Dannenmaier never entirely recovered his hearing
and fifty years after the war noted that he still had problems with his teeth.267 Robert Casella,
who stayed on in Korea after the truce, developed an eating disorder which continues to cause
him to awaken late at night and rush to the kitchen to eat, allaying feelings of starvation.268
Perhaps unaware of the extent of their injuries when they returned home, other veterans fell
victim in the years after Korea to cancer caused by the DDT used to delouse them, smokingrelated cancers rooted in the addiction to cigarettes they started smoking while in service, and
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age related problems due to exposure and frostbite.269 At the 1985 first meeting of the Chosin
Few, a veterans’ group composed of Army and Marine veterans who survived the Chinese attack
at Chosin Reservoir, men noticed that “everybody was having problems walking, getting up.”
They marveled that they shared symptoms like excessive sweating, infected tissue, skin cancer,
oddly shaped toenails, sore legs, swollen feet, and sensitivity to cold.270 Despite the V.A.’s
reluctance to recognize late onset cold injury symptoms as service-related, these men “had their
lives compromised by this injury.”271 Before help became available in the 1990s, they used
Krazy Glue to fill cracks in their feet and stuffed maxi-pads in their shoes to absorb the weeping
fluid.272 Similarly, POWs, who had survived unimaginable privations in North Korean or
Chinese camps, often never fully recovered from the effects of malnutrition, diseases like
beriberi and pellagra, cold injury, long marches, and primitive wound care. In fact, follow-up
studies show that even 12 years after their release Korean POWs exhibited excess morbidity,
disability, and adjustment problems when compared to civilians, non-POW veterans, and the
POWs of other wars.273 Undeniably and irreversibly, the Korean War etched its mark on the
minds, bodies, and lives of those who participated in it.
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Public Law 550, Compensation, and the Korean Veteran

Living with the aftereffects of war and enjoying little by way of acknowledgment for
their sacrifices, many Korean War veterans wanted some sort of compensation for what they had
lost performing their duty to country.274 Remembering World War II’s G.I. Bill, 81% of those
who had served overseas felt entitled to the same educational opportunities afforded earlier
veterans and another 78% believed that the government should offer their generation low-cost
home loans.275 Even veterans who thought that Uncle Sam owed nothing to the able-bodied or
able-minded believed that service-disabled veterans should receive compensation in addition to
medical care. Congressmen and senators seemed to agree that veterans of the war in Korea, like
their World War II predecessors, were due something from the government in gratitude for their
service. Asking the House of Representatives in 1952 to extend all the benefits of the original
G.I. Bill to Korean veterans, Congressman Thomas J. Lane of Massachusetts argued, “They
fought for us and are coming home to us. Only a year and a half has been taken from their lives
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according to the calendar … however, we can not reckon the extent of their displacement, or the
rehabilitation that may be required.”276
However, though agitation and efforts to pass G.I. Bill-type legislation for Korean War
veterans began almost as soon as the war, just who should receive benefits and what benefits
should be granted remained a source of contention for years both in Congress and in the public
arena.277 Almost everyone conceded that “adequate benefits should be provided for those who
have disabilities which are related to their military service” and that men and women who
continued to serve in the Armed Forces beyond the Korean War era should not be eligible for
participation in “readjustment” programs. 278 Beyond that, a wide range of opinions existed.
Some people argued the unfairness of giving assistance to veterans not possessed of any special
physical or financial hardship since this created a favored class of citizens who would be better
off in their old age than other Americans.279 Others suggested that only those men and women
who “bled and suffered in Korea, in the waters around it, or in the air over it” should receive
government aid. Still more pointed out that “servicemen and women are “subject to orders” and
insisted that all Korean-War era veterans be the beneficiaries of legislation related to veteran
readjustment no matter where they completed their tours of duty.280
Ideas about what benefits Korean War veterans should receive ran the gamut from
offering an extension of the World War II G.I. Bill in its entirety to Korean veterans to providing
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them with a pared down version of it to offering them no special programs at all. Only two
weeks after the start of hostilities in Korea, the chairman of the House Committee on Veterans’
Affairs began to solicit advice from veterans’ organizations, federal agencies, and educational
associations “on the desirability of extending readjustment benefits to veterans of the Korean
Conflict.” With most responses favorable to offering Korean veterans something, the House of
Representatives on August 19, 1950 established a Select Committee to Investigate the
Educational Program under the G.I. Bill to better inform their debate on what these new veterans
should receive.281 Known as the Teague Committee, after its chairman Congressman Olin E.
Teague of Texas, this group found that while “legions of veterans availed themselves of the
educational and training benefits under the G.I. Bill,” the program had been “marked by errors,
abuses, waste, managerial inefficiency, and in some instances, corruption and larceny.”282 The
Teague Committee recommended that a new G.I. Bill be written for veterans of the Korean
Conflict and that it include various safeguards to protect against some of the troubles
encountered in the administration of the World War II G.I. Bill.283
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On July 14, 1952, the Korean G.I. Bill emerged as Public Law 550 “to provide vocational
readjustment and to restore lost educational opportunities to” men and women who served in the
Armed Forces after June 27, 1950 and separated from the military under other than dishonorable
conditions after at least 90 days active service.284 Less generous in terms of time and money
than the World War II G.I. Bill, Public Law 550 did make educational and training benefits,
unemployment compensation, mustering-out pay, and free assistance in finding jobs available to
Korean War veterans. With regard to education, Korean veterans earned 1.5 months of
assistance for each month spent on active duty not to exceed 36 months. Rather than splitting
monthly payments between schools and veterans, as had been the case for World War II
veterans, the government directly paid this new wave of G.I. students monthly stipends meant to
cover tuition and living expenses. Those returning to school full time received between $110
and $160 a month depending upon the number of their dependents and on-the-job and farm
trainees got from $70 to $130 a month. Regulations allowed veterans to use Korean G.I. Bill
funds to pursue college or high school degrees or to obtain farm or other institutional or on-thejob training, but not to pay for bartending, dancing, photography, music, athletic, or public
speaking courses except as part of an approved degree program. Forced to declare an
educational goal to the V.A. before embarking on any sort of training through the G.I. Bill,
Korean veterans could only change their course of study once and enroll at schools which had
been in operation at least two years and which had no more than 85% of students receiving G.I.
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Bill money.285 Under these new restrictions, the Korean veteran found that the “field [was]
narrower than his brother had after World War II.”286
Still, Americans anticipated that Korean War veterans would flock to college campuses
and other schools after the passage of their G.I. Bill just as those returning from the Second
World War had done. But, despite rumors in the summer of 1953 of high numbers of
enrollments and predictions that “their numbers will swell before the approaching fall semester,”
the expected deluge of Korean War G.I. students did not materialize.287 When the fall semester
of 1953 opened, journalists marveled that “Korean War veterans are not taking advantage of the
Korean G.I. Bill of Rights with nearly the alacrity that veterans of World War II showed in
respect to the original G.I. bill of rights.”288 Returning to school, thinking that “Korean War
veterans would soon flood college campuses and that we would reprise roles played in 1946-50
by returning World War II veterans,” veterans discovered the same thing. Throughout their
training or schooling, Korean veterans found that they did not attend “in large enough numbers
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to know and recognize each other” and did not get “the same feeling of respect from students or
faculty accorded to the World War II veteran.”289
Certainly, the 5.7 million Korean War veterans eligible for G.I. Bill benefits could not
have the numerical impact on schools that 15.6 million World War II veterans had simply
because there were fewer of them.290 Less easy to explain, though, is why, when 7.8 million or
about 50% of World War II veterans took advantage of training and educational benefits, only
2.4 million or about 42% of Korean War veterans did.291 In the 1950s, reporters and others
posited a number of reasonable explanations for this apparent failure of Korean War veterans to
use the educational benefits granted them. Howard Rusk suggested that these younger veterans
of Korea did not receive the same type of indoctrination in their rights and benefits upon
separation from the military that the older and perhaps more worldly World War II veterans got
and thus did not even know about the various programs funded by the government.292 This
makes some degree of sense as the law did in fact prohibit the V.A. from approaching veterans to
“inform them of their personal status in the veterans’ benefit program,” limiting officials to
responding only to individuals who sought them out first.293 Private groups, like Veterans
Benefit Inc. of Memphis, Tennessee, formed to help veterans learn about and apply for benefits,
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but undoubtedly many Korean War veterans never knew about any of the entitlements bestowed
on them by Congress.294 Also, as Benjamin Fine pointed out, a number of Korean War veterans
did not need Korean G.I. Bill-funded training. The post-Korea economic climate, while slowed
some by the war, still had enough health to make it relatively “easy for the veterans to get jobs.”
Furthermore, about a million veterans of the Korean War had served in World War II, enabling
them to use the first G.I. Bill, and thousands of others had taken deferments and completed their
educations before entering the military.295
The stipulations of the Korean G.I. Bill also made educational and training benefits less
attractive to veterans than if Congress had tailored this piece of legislation to more closely
resemble the original G.I. Bill. In trying to curb corruption and waste, Congress inadvertently
made it more difficult for Korean veterans to opt for government subsidized G.I. schooling.
While paying veterans directly had seemed the perfect remedy for bloated tuition bills, since
schools would have to compete for the dollars of frugal G.I.s, stipends seldom kept pace with
inflation. Writing his parents in 1952, one Marine bemoaned the fact that while he had 36
months of college coming to him, the $110 dollars a month allotted by the government fell far
short of his current $450 a month salary.296 Female veterans had greater reason to complain.
Male veterans automatically received extra monthly pay for their wives and children, but female
veterans, even those with dependent spouses, did not qualify under the law for any addition to
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their allowances.297 Facing budget crunches, Korean veterans regularly petitioned lawmakers for
more money, charging that rising school fees and increased costs of living made it impossible to
live on G.I. allowances. By and large such pleas fell on deaf ears, putting degrees and
certificates out of reach for some financially strapped veterans.298
Additionally, Congress’s attempt to exclude fly-by-night operations by limiting G.I.s to
institutions with student bodies composed of no more than 85% G.I. Bill students hampered their
enrollment. With so many men and women taking advantage of the two G.I. Bills and so few
other students willing or able to pay their own tuition and expenses, many colleges as well as
other types of schools had great difficulty maintaining the mandated ratio of 15% tuition-paying
students. This had devastating consequences. Like other institutions, a popular tailoring school
in Jacksonville, Florida had no choice but to relegate many Korean War G.I. applicants to a
waiting list which in some instances moved their entrance date beyond the termination of their
eligibility for benefits. Thus blocked from pursuing their chosen fields of training, Korean
veterans could do little else but decide upon another course of study, using up their one-time
change of objective, or write their congressmen and senators that, “I answered the call of my
Country to protect it and all of its civilians and I do not feel that it is fair and right for me to be
denied the privilege of better preparing myself to be a more useful citizen because of the fact that
a sufficient number of the citizens I fought to protect do not care to go to school.”299 In
297
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particular, African American veterans suffered under this Korean G.I. Bill restriction.
Effectively barred from enrolling in many “white” schools and subjected to discriminatory quota
systems, black veterans often had to try to gain entrance into black colleges or trade schools and
programs. But, even more than Americans in general, the black non-veteran population could
not afford to pay their own fees and many segregated institutions could not attract enough
tuition-paying students to make their programs viable options for those wishing to use the
Korean G.I. Bill, making it even more difficult for black G.I.s to find eligible institutions to
attend.300 This, coupled with the fact that many employers excluded African Americans from
on-the-job training programs, made it extremely challenging for black veterans to use their
benefits whether living in the South or elsewhere.301
Time limitations attached to the Korean G.I. Bill’s educational benefits also prevented
some veterans from using them. Viewing Public Law 550 as a measure to help veterans readjust
economically and educationally to regular life after leaving military service and not wishing to
create a permanent class of privileged citizens, Congress mandated that veterans initiate their
courses of training by August 20, 1954 or within two years of their release from the military not
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to exceed the Korean War service period by more than seven years.302 Most of those who
mustered out after their wartime tours of duty had no trouble meeting these deadlines, but men
and women who remained on active duty sometimes did. Barred from using the G.I. Bill while
still in service, time ran out before they could enter school. Any significant break in service
started the clock ticking. Reenlisting in the Army in February 1955 after less than ninety days of
freedom, Donald Dippe had both his application for G.I. Bill educational benefits and his appeal
rejected by the Veterans’ Administration which calculated his time of eligibility from his first
discharge. Frustrated, he reflected, “I did not realize when I reenlisted … that at that moment I
had thrown away a College Education.”303 And, once commenced, schooling could not be
stopped for longer than twelve months without a veteran risking the loss of his or her
entitlement. When the outbreak of the Vietnam War necessitated the recall of men to active
duty, Congress had to pass legislation to prevent those who had not yet begun their studies under
the G.I. Bill and those who had started but would now be interrupted from losing their
benefits.304 Enacting a G.I. Bill for peacetime veterans might have solved some of these
bureaucratic nightmares and put an end to some of the injustices caused by time limits, but most
Americans, including officials at the V.A., opposed such measures in principle and proved not
yet inclined to pay for the provision of “education and training benefits to peacetime veterans
who had not been disabled as the result of their service.”305
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Other problems with Public Law 550 probably deterred some men and women from
taking advantage of their benefits, but Korean veterans, especially those who had served in the
Far East, had reasons all their own for not using the G.I. Bill. Heroics had played out on the
battlegrounds of Korea and in the hospital wards of Japan, but back home Americans did not
seem to think of that when they thought about the war at all. Instead, magazine and newspaper
articles drew attention to the “brainwashing” of POWs that allegedly occurred or to the fact that
this conflict had not been won in the same way as World War II. To be sure, the government had
handed out medals, about 50,000 of them, but not always to those who deserved them and not to
POWs injured in captivity or in the action that lead to their being taken captive.306 And, what did
it mean that some of the relatives of posthumous Medal of Honor recipients refused to accept
those tokens of the nation’s esteem?307 Maybe Chesty Puller, a Marine Corps hero himself, had
it right when he declared, “Stalemate, hell! We lost the first war in our history, and it’s time
someone told the American people the truth about it. The Reds whipped the devil out of us, pure
and simple.”308 In light of public attitudes and feeling that perhaps they had not quite finished
the job entrusted to them overseas, more than a few Korean War veterans hardly thought
themselves worthy of the kinds of benefits used so readily and nonchalantly by the veterans of
World War II. Like Verlin Rogers, they decided not to apply for G.I. Bill programs because
“others deserved the money and help more than I did.”309 Also, born into that generation of kids
306
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raised during the Great Depression and the Second World War and reared to take responsibility
and to earn respect by displaying independence, Korean veterans frequently persisted in trying to
carve their own paths through life without any assistance, especially from the government. As
Everett McFarland, who refused to use the G.I. Bill, later noted, “This cost me in terms of money
but I was beholden to no one.”310
In the end, enough Korean War veterans availed themselves of educational benefits under
the Korean G.I. Bill that the federal government spent nearly $4.6 billion on their schooling and
training alone.311 In general, this investment paid off handsomely for both veterans and the
United States. Like their World War II counterparts, Korean War veterans proved to be good
students.312 At first stigmatized as a “silent generation” one without spirit or interests, Korean
veterans displayed concentration, resiliency, and determination in their studies and careers.313
This was especially true of female veterans who, in spite of often beginning their training later
than men, used a greater percentage of their entitlements than male veterans.314 And, unlike
World War II G.I.s, of whom only 25% of G.I. Bill participants worked toward college degrees,
more than half of Korean War veterans who used government allowances attended universities
and colleges and many shifted into higher paying occupations.315 Of Korean veterans who later
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went on to use V.A. educational assistance, only 24.9% had attended college before separating
from the military. After using the G.I. Bill, that rate increased to 57.4% and the percent of
veterans possessing the equivalent of a college degree jumped from 8% to nearly 37%.316 It can
be no wonder that Korean veterans credit their G.I. Bill with “providing me with opportunities
that would not have been available” and moving them from modest backgrounds into professions
like law and teaching and up into the middle class.317 But, in getting an education or by
participating in job training, Korean veterans also gave back to their country by providing it with
a new generation of doctors, engineers, scientists, businessmen, and teachers and by raising the
national educational level.318 Also, armed with more complete educations and employed in
higher paying fields, many Korean veterans paid back in taxes the entire cost of their G. I. Bill
benefits within about 15 years of re-entering the work force.319
In addition to the Korean G. I. Bill, the federal government offered a smorgasbord of
entitlements to worthy candidates.320 Disabled veterans had the opportunity to select from a
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number of programs and benefits to “restore every disabled veteran to a useful place in our
economy and society,” including medical and dental care, vocational rehabilitation, insurance,
pensions or other monetary compensation, automobiles, housing for paraplegics, and loan
guarantees.321 Soldiers who had served on the front lines in Korea could apply for special
combat pay through their local Veterans Administration.322 POWs could file claims for about
$2.50 a day for every day they were held as a POW, $1 for each day that they received food or
care below the standard outlined by the Geneva Convention and $1.50 for each day held in
inhumane conditions.323 Wounded veterans could hope for disability ratings resulting in
compensation and pensions.324 Legislators, veterans’ organizations, and individuals proposed
other measures as well, such as a minimum compensation rating of 30% for ex-prisoners of war,
paid transportation for POWs to motels in Florida which offered them free vacations, and
II, benefits grew exponentially helping to create a backlash against benefits for Korean War veterans. For greater
detail, see Levitan and Cleary, Old Wars Remain Unfinished.
321
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service-connection for cancer or psychosis developing within two years of service.325 Some of
these ideas failed to bear fruit, but a fair number of returnees tried, with varying degrees of
success, to take advantage of the V.A. and government offerings which did become available.326
By June 30, 1972, the government had paid Korean War veterans and their dependents over $5
billion in compensation, $740 million in pensions, $6 million for automobiles and special
devices, and $14 million for homes for paraplegics. Adding in loan guarantees, burial
allowances, various educational and training programs, health care, and administrative costs, the
government’s expenditure on veterans of the Korean War added up to nearly $17 billion.327
However, competing with World War II veterans for public sympathy and the
government purse and returning to a social climate tainted by Cold War fears and the feeling that
the war in Korea had ended in a draw, Korean War veterans did not always get what they were
entitled to when they came home. Four months after filing a claim for his combat pay, Alfred
Mishos wrote Senator Robert Taft in frustration, “I served 9 months with a front line unit…I
have not received one dime or an explanation why. I have a beautiful set of rotten teeth which
the Army could have taken care of but were more interested in sending me to Korea.”328 Plagued
with a variety of problems caused by the war, Arthur Smith got notice that the government did
325
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not consider his ruined teeth or frostbitten feet a disability and he got nothing.329 In 1995 Gilbert
Towner finally got a rating of 60% disability from a doctor for his frostbitten hands and feet only
to have the V. A. counter with a rating of 10%.330 The V. A. recognized another veteran’s
bleeding ulcers as service-connected right after the war, but he still had to fight for several years
after becoming unable to work before the government would give him a pension.331 It took
Fernando Gandara fifty years to get a 40% disability rating for his damaged ears.332 Perhaps
POWs fared the worst. The Army held hearings to determine whether or not POWs had
collaborated and, without producing any tangible proof of guilt, the V. A. proceeded to deny
some men benefits and the $2.50 per day compensation.333 Joseph Hammond, a Bronze Star
recipient rated at 40% disability for gunshot wounds, had his claim for $2507 turned down by a
V. A. commission on the basis of vague accusations and then had his appeal dismissed because
the examiners stalled until the deadline passed. When Hammond asked to see the evidence
against him, the chair said it was “classified.”334 Only much later would the stigma of Korean
War POWs be removed and V. A. services be offered through an outreach program.335 Anyway,
when men who had been wounded or held captive in Korea finally received their checks,
pensions, or government-funded schooling, they often found that these scarcely compensated for
what they had been through.
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Regardless of whether or not veterans qualified for any special compensation or took
advantage of the educational opportunities guaranteed by Public Law 550, they usually did not
come out of Korea or out of the military empty-handed. In addition to any back pay accrued and
not yet paid, veterans out-processing also got mustering-out pay. Under Title V of the Veterans’
Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, the Korean G.I. Bill, service members who served 60 or
more days outside the continental U. S. got $300, $100 at discharge and $100 a month for two
months thereafter. Those who served less than 60 days got a onetime payment of $100.336
Returning from the war zone, John Hatcher boasted that he had $1200 in his bank account and,
with a year of back pay accumulated while he was in Korea and a reenlistment bonus in hand,
Anthony DeAngelis had “more than I ever had in my whole life!”337 Plenty of places existed for
veterans to spend any newfound wealth. Some, like Richard Chappell, traveled around taking
vacations and seeing America, the country for which they had endured so many hardships
overseas.338 Others used the money to buy new cars or television sets, get married, or have a
good time. Veterans also took the opportunity to invest these funds to better their future
finances. They purchased homes with G. I. loans, bought into businesses, and converted their
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$10,000 military insurance policies, taking over the premiums and guaranteeing themselves
future dividends.339
The men and women who served in the Far East during the Korean War marched to their
duty stations with the imprint of World War II’s tickertape parades and national unity embedded
in their memories. But, instead of returning to the grateful nation they remembered, veterans of
Korea came home to a civilian society marked by indifference to the war, racism, and sexism.
Turning to the government for which they had offered up a year or more of their lives, veterans
found not only insensitivity to their physical and psychological suffering, but also a reluctance
on the part of lawmakers to compensate and reward them for their services in the same way that
men and women of the Second World War had been. In response, some Korean War veterans
“quietly resumed their civilian lives … and set out to forget Korea,” determining that “if we
thought that we would receive any lasting public reward for our service, we were mistaken.”340
But, a great many others determined to make the most of their lackluster benefits and, like
Robert Chappel and Elmer Payne, could claim years later that “today I’m reaping the benefits
from it [military service] and I’m glad I did it” and “I actually benefited from military service
which opened the door to a very rewarding career and pleasant retirement.”341
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CHAPTER 7: MORE THAN EVER A VETERAN: SERVICEMEN AND
WOMEN OF THE KOREAN WAR
“South Korea has prospered like a weed. If we had been allowed to finish the job maybe North Korea would
be an ally and free instead of an opponent and not free.”—Everett J. McFarland, veteran.1
“I don’t think I thought it [the Korean War] worthwhile in 1953—but I do now!”—John “Jack” Orth,
veteran.”2
“Today … I don’t have mixed emotions. It [the war] was a waste of beautiful young lives. Who ordered this
ridiculous poke at the enemy? Was it a politician sitting on his fat duff in Washington? War is senseless.
There has to be a better way of settling differences.”—William Montgomery, veteran.3
“Even though war is a horrible thing, I learned many things during my stay in Korea, and I also grew as a
person.”—Aubrey Loving, veteran.4
“Those who have devoted service to this country will never be forgotten. Their sacrifice will live on forever in
the hearts of all who cherish freedom.”—Angelo Biviano, veteran.5

As men and women straggled back to the States from the Far East during and after the
Korean War, a few Americans and groups did seek to honor them and memorialize their
sacrifices. Citizens of Springfield, Massachusetts, for instance, built “the only known Korean
Memorial for the Korean Veterans,” completing it by May 1955.6 Similarly, the United Nations
dedicated a plaque to the Korean War dead at its headquarters on June 21, 1956.7 And, on
November 11, 1954, Armistice Day officially became Veterans Day in the United States, in part
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to recognize these new veterans.8 But, with public support for such efforts as tepid in the 1950s
as attitudes toward the war had been, early attempts to construct lasting monuments in
remembrance of either the Korean War or veterans of that conflict often failed. As with the
American Battle Monuments Commission’s proposal to build a memorial in South Korea,
neither enough interest nor money could be generated to sustain projects.9 Tired of arguing that
America “hadn’t ‘lost’ in Korea” and quieted by the country’s apathy, many Korean War
veterans made their “earliest contribution to our generation of silence leading to our forgotten
war” by trying to put the war behind them and forget that they were veterans at all.10 All the
same, Korean War service shaped the lives of the men and women who completed tours of duty
in theater, and, later, sometimes years or decades later, members of the “silent generation” found
their voice as American war veterans.
Looking back now after nearly a lifetime, most veterans of the Korean War see
connections between their days in service and the way their lives unfolded after the conflict.
Injured physically or mentally, some recognize that they have yet to recover from wounds “so
deep that they scarred my very soul.”11 Others continue to wrestle with the unpleasant lessons
they learned in the war, such as that “children and innocent people suffer.”12 A few note that
service adversely affected their careers. “The guy who stayed home and went to college got the
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better job. I operated a machine. He was probably up in the office.”13 Most, however,
acknowledge that they “learned many things during my stay in Korea, and … also grew as a
person” and that they “learned a lot about myself” and “can give part of the credit for my good
fortune to the Corps. My experience as a Marine was a very positive thing. As an enlisted man I
learned self-discipline.”14 Like Edgar Miller, who bought and ran a business and became mayor
of a small town, veterans credit both the military and their wartime experiences with instilling
the skills and character traits in them that enabled their success in the civilian world after
mustering out.15
Indeed, financially, Korean War veterans do seem to have profited from or at least not
been impeded by their military service. In general, veterans of modern wars, including World
War II, “suffer an earnings penalty in the civilian economy.”16 Removed from the regular work
force for years, out of the loop for promotions and job-related training, and perhaps hindered by
physical or emotional impairments caused by the war, veterans have a difficult time catching up
to their non-veteran peers in terms of salary and occupational status.17 For veterans of wars other
than Korea it took as many as ten years for the disparity in earnings to even out if it ever did.18
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But, maybe because they reentered a comparatively stable economy or because they were
younger than veterans of some wars when they returned, Korean War veterans tended to fare
somewhat better than both the veterans of other wars and their non-military contemporaries.19
By 1979, studies indicated Korean War veterans, rather than making less than men or women
who had not entered the Armed Forces, had considerably more income, some 17% more. In fact,
in that same year Korean War veterans had the highest median income of all groups of wartime
veterans as well as the highest rate of home ownership.20 More likely than veterans of World
War II, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf War to have earned a college degree, Korean War
veterans in the work force managed to get the “highest rate of return for years of education.”21
White veterans of the Korean War, especially those with less than a high school diploma,
proved adept at converting military experience into civilian earnings, but minority veterans
showed themselves even more able to make their service pay off.22 Whether because a record of
military service encouraged employers to hire them, because veterans’ readjustment programs
helped neutralize discrimination and other barriers to employment, or because service gave them

race, and marital status were taken into account, they actually made far less than their contemporaries. Some
scholars estimate that on average Vietnam veterans earn(ed) 19% less than non-veterans. See Saul Schwartz, “The
Relative Earnings of Vietnam and Korean-Era Veterans,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 39:4 (July 1986),
564 and Stephen L. Mangum and David E. Ball, “The Transferability of Military-Provided Occupational Training in
the Post-Draft Era,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 42:2 (January 1989), 234.
19
Advantages over other veterans remain obvious even after sorting through various demographic characteristics.
Melanie Martindale and Dudley L. Poston, Jr., “Variations in Veteran/Nonveteran Earnings Patterns Among World
War II, Korea, and Vietnam War Cohorts,” Armed Forces and Society 5:2 (February 1979), 229.
20
“National Survey of Veterans, 1979,” “Final Report,” 11 and 68, NA, RG 015, Box 1. 88.8% of those who served
in Korea only had bought or built a home to live in compared to 87.3% of World War II veterans and 66.5% of
Vietnam War veterans. 90.9% of those who served in both Korea and Vietnam and 95% of those who served in
World War II, Korea, and Vietnam had purchased or built homes.
21
Schwartz, “The Relative Earnings of Vietnam and Korean-Era Veterans,” 569 and Valentine M. Villa, Nancy D.
Harada, Donna Washington, and JoAnn Damron-Rodriguez, “ Health and Functioning Among Four War Eras of
U.S. Veterans: Examining the Impact of War Cohort Membership, Socioeconomic Status, Mental Health, and
Disease Prevalence,” Military Medicine 167 (September 2002), 785.
22
Mangum and Ball, “The Transferability of Military-Provided Occupational Training in the Post-Draft Era,” 234
and Martindale and Poston, “Variations in Veteran/Nonveteran Earnings Patterns Among World War II, Korea, and
Vietnam War Cohorts,” 238.

348

more confidence and higher expectations, African American and Hispanic veterans of Korea far
surpassed their non-veteran counterparts economically. For at least a decade after joining the
work force, non-white Korean veterans pulled in 10% more income than their civilian equals.23
True also for minority veterans of other wars, one thing that distinguished Korean War black
veterans was their greater resiliency to unemployment. In 1979, when more than 10% of black
World War II veterans were out of work, the rate of unemployment among black Korean War
veterans remained about half that.24 In addition, some Mexican veterans received more than
increased income as a result of their service. Responding in part to the 1952 deportation of
Alberto Gonzales, a 21 year old Mexican Purple Heart recipient wounded in Korea after crossing
the border and enlisting in the U.S. Army, congressmen pushed to allow all Mexicans “who bore
arms for this country to apply for United States citizenship and to remain here until they got it.”25
While remunerated in some ways for participating in the Korean War, most veterans
struggled after separation with the feeling that Americans had forgotten not just their personal
sacrifices and the very memory of those who lost their lives on the Korean Peninsula but the
conflict itself. In the 1950s and 1960s, World War II veterans dominated Memorial Day and
Veterans Day events and parades as well as most veterans’ organizations. By the 1970s,
veterans of the Vietnam War began demanding their share of public attention. Where, in
between World War II, the “Good War,” with its victorious veterans and Vietnam, the “Bad
23
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War,” with its vocal veterans did Korea, the “forgotten war,” with its silent veterans belong?
Slowly, especially after the dedication of the Vietnam Memorial in Washington, D.C. in
November 1982, Korean War veterans, who had not yet been honored with a national memorial,
began to reflect upon their own war and wonder, “We did what our country called us to do. Is it
too much to ask that we be recognized for what we did?”26
After many years of silence about their wartime experiences, Korean War veterans found
their identity as veterans rekindled.27 Many for the first time began joining existing veterans’
organizations like the VFW and the American Legion or pledged membership in newer groups
like the Chosin Few (formed in 1983 for veterans of the action at Chosin Reservoir in the winter
of 1950), the Korean War Veterans Association (incorporated in 1985), and Korean War
Veterans International (formed in 1986). Attending meetings and reunions, they met up with old
buddies and made new friends “among men who could understand what it means to have been in
combat.”28 Here, Korean War veterans finally found some of the understanding and camaraderie
that had characterized the post-Korea lives of men and women who stayed in the military after
the war and which had been missing from their own. They felt that “I fit right in and I like
that.”29 Although separated from each other for many years and only seeing each other
occasionally, “when we reunited it was as if time had stood still. The unspoken words, emotion,
and common destiny are perhaps the glue that hold our sprinkled … parts together for ever
after.”30
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Reconnecting with other veterans had a healing effect on those who served in Korea, but
it also provided the impetus for them to push for more outward recognition of their needs and
rights as veterans and of the “forgotten” war they had fought so long ago.31 As one veteran
noted, “after 40 years of being quiet, we’re ready to rattle our sabers.”32 By the late 1970s, and
especially after the construction and unveiling of the Vietnam War Memorial, veterans of Korea
began to lobby for a national memorial of their own.33 Eli Belil, deputy mayor of Marlboro,
New Jersey, took it upon himself to correspond with various government agencies, the American
Battle Monuments Commission, and veterans’ organizations to draw attention to the fact that
Korean War veterans had nothing to show for their duty to country except “a few fading pictures
amongst themselves and scars that neither time nor the Government’s apathy will heal.”34 In
1985, just three years after the dedication of the Vietnam War Memorial, forty veterans followed
Balil’s lead, forming the Korean War Veterans Association to, among other things, “establish
war and other memorials commemorative of any person or persons who served in the Korean
War.”35 Largely in response to the push by Korean War veterans and the KWVA, Congress in
October 1986 authorized the erection of a Korean War memorial, but only allocated $1 million to
the project, making veterans responsible for raising the other $5 million on their own.36 On June
14, 1992, Korean War veterans finally broke ground on the Korean War Memorial in
31
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Washington, D.C. and on July 27, 1995 President William Jefferson Clinton and Kim Dae-jung
dedicated the completed memorial.37 Forty-two years after their war in Korea ended with an
armistice, veterans of the Korean War won “one of the biggest battles we had to fight,” getting
their memorial, a tangible reminder of the country’s gratitude.38
In addition to struggling for a national memorial, some Korean War veterans in the last
three decades fought for other things related to their veteran status. In the 1990s, black veterans
launched a campaign to force historians and the military to reevaluate the official record and
produce an unbiased account of African American troops in Korea. Though they failed to halt
the 1996 publication of William T. Bowers’ Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry
Regiment in Korea, and though later works reaffirmed that all-black units performed poorly,
these veterans did manage to force the reexamination of the facts which resulted in blame for
poor performance shifting to the Jim Crow Army and away from individual soldiers.39 Other
veterans strove and continue to strive for rights to government-funded medical care. In 2002,
Korean War veterans sued the government for the free lifetime medical benefits promised them
by recruiters fifty years ago and in 2005 some joined in a lawsuit over cuts in medical benefits.40
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Perhaps most successfully, the survivors of the action at Chosin Reservoir in the winter
of 1950 worked toward V.A. recognition of their frostbite-related maladies as service-connected.
After the several hundred men gathered for the first meeting of the Chosin Few in 1985
discovered they all suffered from diseases and conditions related to the frigid weather they
endured in North Korea, they began to mobilize. Marine Gunnery Sergeant Ernie Pappenheimer,
who lost his toes and part of a foot to the cold, began researching frostbite complications. Along
with Dr. Stanley Wolf, also a veteran of the early months of the Korean War, Pappenheimer
formed the Cold Injury Committee of the Chosin Few. In addition to informing both veterans
and doctors “about the latent effects of frostbite and cold injury,” this group “sent delegations to
Washington, lobbying” for government recognition and medical assistance.41 Eventually
persistence paid off and the Department of Veterans Affairs agreed to “broadly recognize the
long-term effects of frostbite as service-related injuries.”42 In 1997, veterans of the Korean War
began getting compensation for their cold injuries and in 2004 the Senate put forth a bill to
require the V.A. to “carry out a program of outreach to veterans of World War II and the Korean
Conflict on the nature and availability of benefits.”43 In the first year alone, as many as 4000
Korean War veterans benefited from these changes in the V.A. stance on frostbite.44 It did,
however, take V.A. doctors a little while to catch up to V.A. rulings and develop sensitivity to
the needs of these older veterans. Visiting V.A. doctors for the first time with regard to the later
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effects of frostbite, Korean War veterans noticed that “When they view frostbite patients they
ask ‘Why didn’t you put on more clothes.’”45
As Korean War veterans began to lay claim to veteran rights, the American public
responded with increased attention.46 On July 27, 1988, church bells across America rang out at
10:00 a.m. to mark the 35th anniversary of the armistice.47 In 2000, Bruce Salisbury, an Aztec,
New Mexico resident, suggested putting one Purple Heart for every American who died in
combat in Korea along designated highways, saying, “It would be hard to ignore or overlook
Purple Hearts stretching for 37 miles along a highway.”48 New York held a “belated official
homecoming” complete with a parade from Broadway to Battery Park for Korean veterans in
June 1991.49 As evidenced by the onlooker who asked if the festivities celebrated Desert Storm,
to which one veteran replied “Do me a favor, walk the other way. We’ve waited 40 years.
Desert Storm can wait a couple of months,” not everyone knew exactly what the parade marked,
but still 250,000 people showed up.50 Denied the “Republic of Korea War Service Medal” in the
1950s because of rules forbidding American military personnel from wearing medals issued by
foreign governments, Korean veterans got another chance to apply for one in the 1990s.51 From
the late 1980s to the present time, numerous communities designed and constructed state and
45
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local Korean War memorials or added Korea to existing war monuments.52 In Minnesota, one
woman, “Billboard Sally,” lived in a tent on the edge of a billboard 25 feet off the ground to
raise money for the state Korean War memorial.53 Korean War veterans, no longer silent or
forgotten, not infrequently took charge of these efforts to memorialize them. When Camden
County, New Jersey officials planned to build their Korean War memorial on a traffic island on
the highway, veterans successfully pressured them into changing the location.54
Reestablishing their identity as veterans, many of those who served in Korea during the
war decided to return once more to the “Land of the Morning Calm.” Remembering the bulletriddled buildings, the hungry peasants “in a land ravaged by war,” and the shelters made of
“corrugated tin, cardboard, and anything else that could be used,” veterans could scarcely
imagine that the Korea before them had once been the site of their war.55 They marveled at the
“hillsides covered with trees … [and that] Seoul was a huge modern city … with numerous
skyscrapers, including the tallest building in the Orient … rebuilt … by men and women whose
grandparents knew only oxen and the rice paddy.”56 Of course, not everything had changed.
With North Korean troops still patrolling the 38th Parallel, searchlights illuminated the DMZ and
soldiers continued to stand guard along the border between North and South Korea. As one
veteran says, “It was eerie to stand in a concrete-lined South Korean observation post located on
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the same spot where I had dug a foxhole.”57 For some, the trip reawakened old sadness and they
“felt like a burn victim whose raw nerve ends are suddenly exposed to air.”58 But, after all,
though they visited Korea, “it was not my Korea.”59 The war zone had metamorphosed into a
land of happy, industrious people who “appreciate what we did and the sacrifices those men
made.”60
Nearly sixty years after the war that turned them into veterans, and in light of South
Korea’s progress and the greater willingness of Americans to recognize the sacrifices of those
who served in the Far East in early the 1950s, what do Korean War veterans now think of the
Korean War? Unsurprisingly, most “look back and think we did a good thing.”61 From their
perspective, not only did the United States help “the Korean people gain something,” but soldiers
in Korea “accomplished what the troops in Viet Nam were denied: We drove the enemy back
across the border and denied them the victory they so desperately sought.”62 Some veterans wish
that “the Korean War had slammed the door harder on communism, for we had to sail the same
ideological boat in the Vietnam War just a few years later, and the Cold War did not end for a
decade and a half,” but they still acknowledge, “Had we not taken a stand on the Korean
Peninsula when we did the Cold War would not be past history.”63 They also challenge
Americans “who regard the defense of South Korea as worthless … [to] imagine what a unified
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Korea today under a communist dictatorship would be like.”64 Arned Hinshaw goes one step
further, positing that by draining Red China of resources the Korean War possibly saved
Formosa from Chinese aggression.65 In the final analysis, most veterans of Korea agree with
Jack Orth, “I don’t think I thought it worthwhile in 1953—but I do now!”66 And, they “look
back with pride in our work and what we did,” believing “If I had to do it all over again, I would
do it.”67
For a few veterans, however, bitterness still lingers over America’s involvement in “a
stagnant war that was not meant to be won.”68 They remain angry about the “waste of beautiful
young lives” and want to know, “Who ordered this ridiculous poke at the enemy? Was it a
politician sitting on his fat duff in Washington?”69 Some argue that “The Korean War was a
mistake as a limited war. The Korean War should have been fought all out” or lament, “If we
had been allowed to finish the job maybe North Korea would be an ally and free instead of an
opponent and not free.”70 Like Burdette Thomsen they believe the United States “should have
finished the job … When you play the game you play to win” or like Walter Klein they contend,
“We could have done it in a good old American style and finish[ed] that thing off for a long, long
time with the Chinese never again saying ‘Paper Tiger’ to the Americans.”71 Because of their
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experiences or because they blame the Vietnam War on failures in Korea, some of these veterans
have decided “Korea, like most wars, settled nothing. There were few gains and many, many
losses” or even that “war is futile. No one ever wins except perhaps for the politicians and the
people who manufacture combat equipment.”72 James Campbell, who at the time thought the
war a worthy cause, now keeps a bumper sticker on his car, “Veterans for Peace.”73
Nearly 2 million servicemen and women returned home alive from the Korean War in the
1950s after paying a hefty price for the defense of South Korea. Like veterans of the American
Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, the
Vietnam War, Desert Storm, the war in Afghanistan, and the Iraq War, Korean War veterans lost
their innocence along with fallen comrades, felt connections to the home front loosen or
sometimes snap, and suffered physical and psychological wounds on the battleground.
Reentering society, they fared sometimes worse and sometimes better than those who marched
back from other wars. But, Korean War veterans hold a unique place in the pantheon of
American war veterans. Reared during the Great Depression and World War II to place country
above self, the men and women of Korea unhesitatingly “did what was my duty, my obligation”
when Uncle Sam asked.74 They served in the shadow of the glorified soldiers of World War II,
receiving little recognition for their own sacrifices and accomplishments. When it became clear
that the country preferred to forget not only the Korean War but those who fought it, Korean War
72
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veterans carried their burden of war quietly, almost imperceptibly. But, requesting V.A.
headstones at a rate only slightly lower than World War II veterans and accounting for 18% of
all internments in national cemeteries, it seems clear that Korean War veterans remember their
war and in the twilight of their lives choose to define themselves by it.75
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